COPIES

OF

ORIGINAL LETTERS

FROM THE

FRENCH ARMY

IN

EGYPT.

France Army
K

PART THE THIRD,

CONSISTING OF THOSE

LETTERS TO THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT, INTERCEPTED BY THE BRITISH FLEET IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

WHICH HAVE BEEN

PUBLISHED HERE BY AUTHORITY.

WITH AN

ENGLISH TRANSLATION.

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IN

EGYPT.

The Grenville Library

INTRODUCTION.

THE Letters and Dispatches, of which the following are copies, have been recently intercepted, on their paſſage from Egypt to France, by the British Squadron in the Mediterranean: and have since been printed here by the authority of Government.

They are re-printed in their present shape, by the editors of two former collections on the same subject, for the more general information of the Public.

These letters, and indeed the whole of those from among which they are selected, are addressed, either to the late French Government, or to different individuals composing It: and are evidently the first that have been sent from the remnant of the French Army in Egypt, since the desertion of General BONAPARTE.

Among them is a copy of the Instructions which BONAPARTE addressed to KLEBER, at his departure. It was inclosed in KLEBER'S official dispatch to the Directory. Undoubtedly KLEBER knew his chief too well, to expect that he would tell his own story with fidelity at Paris.

THERE ARE NO PRIVATE LETTERS.* The state in which the Army is described to be, will, perhaps, sufficiently account for this circumstance. It was not so, while they had yet hope.

Never did the Public in this Country, never, perhaps, did the World, receive information more interesting and important than is communicated in these papers. Never was there a moment, in the affairs of this Country, or of the World, at which such information could have been received so opportunely.

* By this is meant, no letters from individuals in the army to private persons in France. The letter of General DUGUA to the Director BARRAS is, technically speaking, a *private* letter; as it is not written by Dugua, nor addressed to Barras, in an official capacity; but it is written wholly upon public subjects to a public man; and is indeed one of the most important documents of the whole collection.

The lesson, which is to be derived from these papers, affords a full confirmation of the observations which were offered to the Public, in former periods of the Egyptian Expedition; though accompanied in many respects with different sensations.

The Army of Egypt, in the outset of its enterprize, or in the full course of its sanguinary and impious career;—the Army of Egypt, while it was yet flushed with recent carnage, and intoxicated with the hopes of continued success;—the army of Egypt, while its collective character and conduct were identified with the character and conduct of its commander;—while confident in *his* fortunes, and fierce in *his* name; while party to *his* cruelties, *his* blasphemies, and *his* frauds;—it was surely impossible to look at the Army of Egypt, in these situations, without abhorrence; or to speak of it in any other language than that of indignation.

The publication of the former collections of letters from Egypt was, therefore, naturally and justly calculated to hold up to general detestation the whole scope and aim, the whole principle and conduct, of the Egyptian Expedition. *

* If ever these sentiments and this language admitted of variation—it was only when abhorrence was mingled with

Every observation that was added to those publications was directed, justly and necessarily directed, to awaken and keep alive the attention of the World, to the gradual but certain progress of that devoted Army from infamy to ruin;—to their progress from the triumphant anticipation of the miseries which they were so gayly preparing for others,—to the full consummation of them upon their own heads;—their progress from the hour in which they deluged the streets of Alexandria with the blood of its unresisting inhabitants, in order to "strike terror" * into their opponents,—to that in which they should be rotting under its walls, an example to "strike terror" into those who justify and applaud them;—from the moment when they were shouting in the train of BONAPARTE, as the leader who was to conduct them to riches, to power, and to fame;—to that, when gazing after his departing sail, from

ridicule, and the tone of indignation softened into contempt, at the contemplation of those unwilling martyrs to a curiosity not their own,—the unhappy but unregretted *Savans*. It was indeed a relief to turn for a moment from the disgusting repetition of crimes and barbarities, which disgraced the military character of the Expedition, to the boasts or wailings of kidnapped philosophy, and the rants and blunders of vagabond *virtù*.

* Intercepted Correspondence, part I. page 132.

the shore on which he had left them to perish, they should pursue him with execrations as a fugitive and a traitor. *

If such was the course of contemplation, to which public attention was excited, perhaps it may now appear, that public attention was not excited in vain: and those who, at the time, were moſt loud in blaming the rashness or exaggeration of these predictions, must now be struck and confounded by the fullness and accuracy of their accomplishment.

With those, who at the time believed the prophecy, and did not disguise that they wished it to be fulfilled; with those (in other words) whose feelings were warm, and whose wishes were confident for the interests of their own Country, of her most valuable dependencies, and of her Allies, this result must produce very different sensations: yet not even in their minds those of unmixed triumph and exultation. No:—With the circumstances of the Army itself, the sentiments which It excited are in some degree changed.

Proud and powerful, with BONAPARTE at its head, and advancing, under his guidance, to the perpetration of the most atrocious crimes, the

* Intercepted Correspondence, part I. Introduction, p. xviii.

Army has hitherto been necessarily involved with its Commander in one common sentiment of aversion and horror. Hitherto it has been impossible to discriminate between those who planned, and those who executed, the bloody work of desolation. Together, they constituted one great engine for the ravage and destruction of an unoffending Country:—together, they formed one great object for the fear and the hatred of mankind.

But the hour of discrimination is now come. The object of our contemplation now divides itself, into the Guilt which has fled from punishment, and the Misery which it has basely left behind to expiate its enormities.

The Army of Egypt, deserted by its Commander, resolves itself into a multitude of betrayed and devoted outcasts:—in the contemplation and commiseration of whose individual sufferings, our remembrance of the crimes of which they have been the instruments, is lost in our indignation at the treachery of which they are the victims.

It is not, therefore, for the purpose of triumphing over fallen wickedness;—it is not for the purpose of pointing out the weighty and dreadful retribution, under which the perpetrators of such unheard-of injustice and cruelty are now

suffering calamities, proportioned to those which they inflicted—(though that triumph were natural and justifiable;—though the lesson resulting from that retribution be aweful and salutary): but it is to objects of more immediate concern, and more practical utility, that the attention of the Public is now called.

The purpose and the effect of this Publication is to paint, from facts which cannot be controverted,—from confessions of his own, which cannot be mistaken or disguised,—the personal character of a Man; with whose personal conduct (by a singular dispensation of Providence) is for a time involved the destiny, not as heretofore of an Army, but, of a great and powerful Nation: to whose personal dispositions,—but for the wisdom, the firmness, and the magnanimity of the Government of this Country,—might, at the present moment, have been subjected the destiny of England; and therewith that of Europe, and of the World.

Let Englishmen here learn *from himself* what reliance is to be placed on his engagements: and let them then recollect that THIS IS THE MAN, who has recently required of *their* SOVEREIGN to trust implicitly to *his* individual sincerity, and to repose unlimited confidence in his individual professions!—Let them here look for the traces

of his justice, his lenity and forbearance, in the grounds of his claims upon Egypt, and in his treatment of its inhabitants: and then let them recollect that THIS IS THE MAN, who claims credit to himself, and to himself almost exclusively, for his rigid observance of the rights of nations, and for his regard for the "happiness of families!" *—Let them here read the avowal of his Egyptian Councillors, that it is the settled maxim of his political school, that "*negotiations* "*should be opened with England*, PURELY TO "GAIN TIME; *and concessions made*, WITH A "VIEW OF RESUMING THEM AT THE FIRST "FAVOURABLE OPPORTUNITY:" †—and then let them recollect that, on the issue of *such* a negotiation, THIS MAN would fain have persuaded them to commit the interests and honour of their Country!

Fortunately, the Government of this Country has been actuated by wiser and firmer councils: and the spirit and good sense of a brave and generous People will not disavow them. They have wisely refused to pledge all their hopes of lasting and honourable Peace, upon the *sincerity* of One, whose course has been *fraud*,—

* See Bonaparte's Letter to the King.

† See Poussielgue's Letter in the following Collection, No. XIII.

upon the *humanity* of One, whose business has been *blood*,—upon the *steadiness* and *consistency* of One, whose element is *revolution*;—they have not hastily consented to hazard so sacred a trust upon such insufficient and uninviting security;—they have not thought it reasonable, in a matter of such fearful moment, to believe at once *against* all past example, and to presume at once *against* all probable inference; but have at least determined to wait until that example and that inference shall be contradicted by "EXPERIENCE and THE EVIDENCE OF "FACTS."*

Those, indeed, who raise at all times and under all circumstances, a senseless and indiscriminate clamour for peace,—not because they love peace, but because they delight in clamour,—are not to be silenced by the demonstration, that treaty at this moment must have been insecure. Those, who, if they wish for Peace, wish for it, not because it would bring with it the honourable and certain termination of their Country's struggles for security and independence;—but because it would afford rest and breathing-time

* See His Majesty's Declaration in answer to Bonaparte's letter.

to the principles of the French Revolution, exhausted (as some may think) in their means of present mischief; who trust that an interval of repose would give to those principles the freshness and vigour, which they have now lost; and, by procuring oblivion of their past enormities, would enable them to renew their operations, and to re-assemble their afflicted and scattered partizans;—no wonder, if persons of this persuasion should resent the just exposure of that Man's principles and conduct,—with whose fortune the fate of the Revolution is associated, and in whose person its power is enthroned.

They believe that Peace made, at this moment, with BONAPARTE, would tend to confirm and consolidate his yet unsettled authority; in that view he proposed Peace. They know that he has pledged himself to the Nation, over whom he has usurped dominion, to procure Peace for them without delay; in the hope of persuading them,—perhaps having in vain presumption persuaded himself,—that his ascendant was as uncontroulable, and his genius as imposing, throughout Europe, as he has found it for a time in Egypt, and (since he fled from Egypt) in France.—

They know that a refusal to treat, at his first bidding, will of itself have taught France to appreciate more justly the estimation in which his character is held. They know that this refusal will be justified, in the eyes of France itself, by such irrefragable proofs, as these papers contain, of the habitual insincerity of his professions, of his selfish and unprincipled ambition:—and they tremble for the shock which such a conviction may give, not only to all reliance on his consideration abroad, but to all respect for his authority at home.—

No wonder, therefore, that an outcry should be raised, by those who have worshipped the Revolution, in all its successive stages, and who now worship BONAPARTE, as the Representative of the Revolution, against the detection and disgrace, which they understand to be impending over him. No wonder, that they should resort to every argument, even to arguments the most inconsistent with each other, to create a prejudice against the publication of these Letters, or to discredit their authenticity.

They began with the latter of these attempts; but they presently felt that it was hopeless. The Letters speak too plainly for themselves: even if all doubts upon this subject had not been

removed by their publication, in the first instance, by the authority of Government.

Next, however, nothing daunted by its direct contradiction with their original supposition, they resort to the argument, that, *if genuine, they ought not to have been published.**

* It is not at all wonderful, that Gentlemen of a Jacobin way of thinking should have such an unconquerable aversion to the publication of INTERCEPTED LETTERS. They must yet remember, with horror, the confusion which was occasioned by the publication of MR. STONE's Letter to DR. PRIESTLEY, ("patriot, and saint, and sage") which was intercepted by one of our Cruizers, in a vessel bound from France to America, and which developed, *(as the friends of both Parties may recollect)* some of the most *confidential* principles of that branch of the new school, so happily established in this Country. But even this act of unparallelled "*breach of confidence*" is little, to what they must be prepared to expect by and by. They will hear, with dismay, that at SERINGAPATAM, taken by storm, the Palace of Tippoo Sultaun was inhumanly violated, its most private recesses fraudulently explored, and his most intimate and confidential drawers and pigeon-holes disingenuously ransacked; and that the whole of the Secret Papers, found there and intended for his own most private and particular eye, containing his CORRESPONDENCE with FRANCE, and with the societies of Frenchmen, established on the true Jacobin model, in India, and his PLANS and ENGAGEMENTS for the SUBVERSION OF THE BRITISH POWER in that Quarter of the World, is intended for immediate publication: an instance of perfidy and "*breach of confidence*" that throws the present quite into the shade.

The publication of them, say these clear-headed reasoners, is "*a breach of confidence.*"—The idea is logically conceived; and the words are fancifully chosen.—"*Confidence*" then, it seems, implies not something entrusted by a friend, but something wrested from an Enemy: it relates, not to what has been communicated, voluntarily, under the express or implied promise of secrecy; but to what has been rightfully seized, by open force, in spite of resistance from the apprehension of disclosure.

Or perhaps in some chapter of those new Ethicks, which prescribe the duties that the rest of mankind owe to FRANCE, it may be laid down as a principle, that the interception of the correspondence of an enemy, *(when that enemy happens to be* FRANCE),—instead of giving to the interceptors the right and advantage of using the information which they thus obtain, ought to excite in their minds the tenderest feelings of sympathy, and to impose on them the most delicate duties of friendship!

These doctrines the jurisprudents of Jacobinism may discuss and settle at their leisure.

In the mean time, perhaps, they may be forced to acknowledge that it is, after all, France her-

self who will derive the chief benefit from this publication.

If to the people of England it be indeed of no small importance to be informed of the real nature and extent of the machinations of their enemies; to see laid open before them the dangers which they have escaped, and the deceptions against which they have been guarded: Is it not of still greater moment to the people of France, that they should know the extent of the delusion which has been practised upon *them*, and the true character of the man by whom they have been so deceived? Have not the people of France a still deeper interest in the disclosure of the true state of that favourite Army; which they are even now taught to believe in so prosperous a condition, as to want no comfort of life, but an *Opera*,* and to need no re-inforcement, but of *Prostitutes*? †

* See Bonaparte's Letter in the following Collection, p. 14.

† One of the first acts of BONAPARTE's provisional administration (as related in the Paris Papers) was a *hot press* at the *Palais Royal*, for a number of ladies of this description. Three hundred hands (able or ordinary) were thus procured; and put up, as was then understood, to be dispatched by the first convoy to Egypt. This account of their destination has indeed since been contradicted in some of the French Papers, but whether by those in the confidence of ABBE SYEYES, is still matter of mystery.

When, from the perusal of these letters, the people of that country shall be enabled to judge what has really been the fate, and what are now the hopes of so many thousands of their countrymen; and to compare with what they now learn, the representations with which they have hitherto been amused; it may perhaps occur to them to ask whether the hands from which they have received so faithful an account of their Army, be those into which they can most safely entrust the administration of their Empire.

When they see with what unfeigned reluctance the General tears himself from his faithful and affectionate followers; how considerately he spares them the pain of exchanging adieus; with how much caution and foresight he calculates the probable scale and progress of destruction to those whom he *quits with so much regret*, and "*in the midst of whom he still remains in heart and spirit*," (though forced for certain reasons to be corporeally absent *for a moment*;" *) how tenderly he recommends the negotiation for their safety to be *begun* without loss of time, so soon as "*fifteen hundred shall have*† *died* fairly *by the plague*, ("*over*

* See Bonaparte's Address to his Soldiers, p. 5.

† See Bonaparte's Letter, p. 19.

and above," says this sturdy arithmetician, "*those who perish daily in the field:*")—seeing this, they may perhaps pause to consider, whether he who shews such anxious care for those whom he acknowledges as "*his children,*"* is likely to extend the same paternal solicitude towards those whom he claims for his subjects.

The people of France will not fail to recollect, that the Expedition to Egypt was exclusively the project of BONAPARTE.†

They may, perhaps, therefore reasonably infer from his conduct with regard to that Expedition, what is to be expected from his attachment to the Revolution, many parts of which are also peculiarly his own.

Of the Expedition he has assumed to himself all the merit of the plan, and monopolized all the glory of its execution; so far as the Plan

* See Bonaparte's Letter, p. 27.

† So *Reubell*, so *Lepaux*, so the indubitable *Talleyrand*, has assured them:—*Reubell*, in his defence before the Council of Antients; *Lepaux*, in a book published at the same time; and *Talleyrand*, in the vindication of himself, which appeared in the French Papers. They all *concur* in attributing the Project of the Expedition to Bonaparte. On either of these testimonies, singly, it might perhaps not be fair to fasten such a charge upon him: but, if it be false, fortunately for his character, he has *Talleyrand* at hand, and can presently force him to retract it.

has been successful; so far as the execution has been splendid: and in pursuit of these praises to himself, he has led his Army into unprofitable dangers, and finally left them to a ruin, which he has refused to share. Of the Revolution, he helped to establish with his * cannon that form, which he has now overturned with his bayonets. And when the time of trial to this new fabric shall arrive;—it may strike the people of France, perhaps, that he who abandoned an Expedition of his own planning, as soon as its Catastrophe appeared unavoidable; might again give the last blow to a Constitution of his own erecting, whenever he should see reason to apprehend

* On the 13th Vendemiaire (Oct. 1795), at the period of the last revolution but *two*,—no: but *three*: when Bonaparte, under the direction of Barras, commanded the artillery at Paris, and mowed down whole groupes of the people of the Sections. Bonaparte is said to have been the only military man who could be found to undertake this work of slaughter. It was the origin of his promotion; the first foundation of his greatness. Undoubtedly the recollection of it must render him dear to the People of Paris. The friends and relatives of those who fell in the massacre of that day, must feel their remembrance of those victims, pleasingly excited, as often as they are called upon to troop after the heels of the First Consul to the *Opera*, or the *Institute*;—and to admire, in a morning, his blue coat, and white pantaloons; and, in the evening, the white coat, with the blue ones: Magnificence cheaply purchased by the blood of "*mon bon peuple de Paris.*"

that he might otherwise be crushed himself in its fall.

They may recollect, perhaps, that the followers of BONAPARTE have not as yet been admitted, in the crisis of danger and distress, into a fair participation of his boasted *fortune*; and that the great effort of his prudence, and the best resource of his genius, has hitherto consisted in *facrificing* THEM, to *extricate* HIMSELF.

And when, at length, these things shall force themselves, as they must, upon the observation of those who are now awed by his power, or dazzled by his name; and when they see that these things are known and felt throughout Europe: may they not think it matter of serious doubt, whether that name and that power be indeed (as they have been taught to believe), destined to consolidate the fortunes of France;—to heal the wounds, and calm the agitations, of her long series of Revolutions; to efface the memory of her multiplied crimes and sufferings; to re-establish her station among the Nations of the Earth; and to restore to her, once again, tranquillity at home, and peace abroad?

May they not reasonably doubt whether the qualities of BONAPARTE, such as they are here recorded, and the Government of which *they* constitute the sole recommendation and security, are fitted to so high and arduous a duty?

And *then*,—ye implicit and unwearied admirers of every possible French constitution,—say, does this last work of "*human wisdom and integrity*" promise to be immortal?

What think you, ye Jacobins of Europe, will not your Idol totter on his throne?

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COPIES

OF

ORIGINAL LETTERS,

&c. &c.

PART III.

No. I.

LIBERTE'. EGALITE'.

Au Quartier Général du Caire, le 18 *Vendémiaire, an* 8 *de la République Française.*

KLEBER, *Général en Chef, au* DIRECTOIRE EXE'CUTIF.

LE Citoyen Barras, m'étant particulièrement connu par ſa loyauté, par ſon dévouement au Gouvernement, par ſon amour pour la République, et pour la vérité, j'ai cru, Citoyens Directeurs, ne pouvoir faire un

meilleur choix que celui de ſa perſonne, pour vous porter mes premières dépêches non chiffrées. Il a ordre de les jeter à la mer, en cas qu'il fût preſſé par les ennemis, et il connait aſſez leur contenu pour vous en faire un rapport verbal, s'il étoit néceſſaire. Je vous prie de lui accorder la même confiance que l'intégrité de ſa conduite dans ce pays-ci m'a inſpirée.

Salut et reſpect,

(Signé) KLEBER.

TRANSLATION.

LIBERTY. EQUALITY.

Head Quarters, Cairo, October 9, 1799.

KLEBER, *Commander in Chief, to the* EXECUTIVE DIRECTORY.

THE Citizen Barras* being particularly known to me by his fidelity, his extreme attachment to the Government, his love for the Republic, and for truth;

* Couſin to the ci-devant Director of that name.

I thought, Citizens Directors, that I could not fix on a more proper perſon to ſend home with my firſt diſpatches to you, out of cipher. I have ordered him to throw them overboard †, in the event of his being cloſely purſued by the enemy; and he is ſufficiently acquainted with their contents to be able to give you a verbal account of them, if it ſhould be neceſſary. I entreat you to place the ſame confidence in him which I have been induced to do, from obſerving the uprightneſs of his conduct ſince he has been in this country.

Health and reſpect.

(Signed) KLEBER.

† This was done, but ſome of the El Vincejo's men inſtantly jumped into the boat, and ſaved them.

No. II.

Au Quartier Général d'Alexandrie, le 5 Fructidor, an 7.

BONAPARTE, *Général en Chef, à l'*ARME'E.

LES nouvelles d'Europe m'ont décidé à partir pour France. Je laiſſe le commandement de l'armée au Général Kléber. L'armée aura bientôt de mes nouvelles; je ne puis en dire davantage. Il me coûte de quitter les ſoldats auxquels je ſuis le plus attaché, mais ce ne ſera que momentanément; et le Général que je leur laiſſe a la confiance du Gouvernement et la mienne.

(Signé) BONAPARTE.

Par ordre du Général en Chef, et Général de Diviſion, Chef de l'Etat Major Général,

(Signé) ALEX. BERTHIER.

Pour copie conforme,
(Signé) SONNET,
l'Adjudant Général.

Pour copie,
(Signé) LE ROY.

TRANSLATION.

Head Quarters, Alexandria,
Auguſt 23, 1799.

BONAPARTE, *Commander in Chief, to the* ARMY.

IN conſequence of the news from Europe, I have determined to return immediately to France. I leave the command of the army to General Kleber: they ſhall hear from me ſpeedily: this is all I can ſay to them at preſent. It grieves me to the heart to part from the brave men to whom I am ſo tenderly attached; but it will be only for an inſtant; and the General I leave at their head is in full poſſeſſion of the confidence of the Government and of mine.

(Signed) BONAPARTE.

By order of the Commander in Chief, and of the General of Diviſion, Chief of the Staff,

(Signed) ALEX. BERTHIER.

A true copy,

(Signed) SONNET,
Adjutant General.

A true copy,
(Signed) LE ROY.

Note.

This addreſs to the army was not delivered by Bonaparte. It was encloſed in the letter to Kleber, to be read to them *after he was gone!*

No. III.

Alexandrie, le 5 Fructidor, an 7.

Le Général en Chef BONAPARTE, *au Général de Diviſion* KLEBER.

Vous trouverez ci-joint, Citoyen Général, un ordre pour prendre le commandement en chef de l'armée. La crainte que la flotte Angloiſe reparaiſſe d'un moment à l'autre, me fait précipiter mon voyage de deux ou trois jours.

Je mène avec moi les Généraux Berthier, Lannes, Murat, Andréoſſi, et Marmont, les Citoyens Monge et Bertholet.

Vous trouverez ci-joint les papiers Anglais, et de Francfort juſqu'au 10 Juin. Vous y verrez que nous avons perdu l'Italie, que Mantoue, Turin et Tortonne ſont bloqués. J'ai lieu d'eſpérer que la première de ces places tiendra juſqu'à la fin de Novem-

bre : j'ai l'eſpérance, ſi la fortune me ſourit, d'arriver en Europe avant le commencement d'Octobre.

Vous trouverez, ci-joint, un chiffre pour correſpondre avec le Gouvernement, et un autre chiffre pour correſpondre avec moi.

Je vous prie de faire partir dans le courant d'Octobre, Gimot, ainſi que les effets que j'ai laiſſés au Caire, et mes domeſtiques. Cependant, je ne trouverai pas mauvais que vous engagiez à votre ſervice ceux qui vous conviendraient.

L'intention du Gouvernement eſt que le Général Deſaix parte pour l'Europe dans le courant de Novembre, à moins d'événement majeur.

La Commiſſion des Arts paſſera en France par un parlementaire que vous demanderez à cet effet, conformément au cartel d'échange, dans le courant de Novembre, immédiatement après qu'ils auront achevé leur miſſion. Ils ſont dans ce moment-ci occupés à ce qui leur reſte à faire, à viſiter la Haute Egypte. Cependant ceux que vous jugeriez pouvoir vous être utiles, vous *les mettrez en réquiſition ſans difficulté.*

L'Effendi fait priſonnier à Aboukir eſt parti pour ſe rendre à Damiette. Je vous ai écrit de l'envoyer en Chypre. Il eſt porteur pour le Grand Vizir de la lettre dont vous trouverez ci-joint la copie.

L'arrivée de notre eſcadre de Breſt à Toulon, et de l'eſcadre Eſpagnole à Carthagène, ne laiſſe aucune eſpèce de doute ſur la poſſibilité de faire paſſer en Egypte les fuſils, les ſabres, piſtolets, fers coulés, dont vous avez beſoin, et dont j'ai l'état le plus exact, avec une quantité de recrues ſuffiſantes pour réparer les pertes des deux campagnes. Le Gouvernement vous fera alors connaître lui-même ſes intentions: comme homme public et comme particulier, je prendrai des meſures pour vous faire avoir fréquemment des nouvelles.

Si par des événemens incalculables, toutes les tentatives étoient infructueuſes, et, qu'au mois de Mai, vous n'ayez reçu aucun ſecours ni nouvelles de France, et ſi cette année, malgré toutes les précautions, la peſte étoit en Egypte, et vous tuait plus de 1500 ſoldats, perte conſidérable, puiſqu'elle ſerait en ſus de celle que les événemens de la guerre vous occaſionneraient journellement, je penſe que, dans ce cas, vous ne devez pas vous hazarder à ſoutenir la campagne prochaine, et que vous êtes autoriſé à conclure la paix avec la Porte Ottomane, quand même l'évacuation de l'Egypte devrait être la condition principale. Il faudroit ſimplement éloigner l'exécution de cette condition, ſi cela étoit poſſible, juſqu'à la paix générale.

Vous ſavez apprécier auſſi bien que perſonne, Citoyen Général, combien la poſſeſſion de l'Egypte eſt importante à la France. Cet empire Turc,

menacé de ruine de tous côtés, s'écroule aujourd'hui, et l'évacuation de l'Egypte par la France serait un malheur d'autant plus grand, que nous verrions de nos jours cette belle province passer en d'autres mains Européennes.

Les nouvelles des succès ou des revers qu'aurait la République en Europe, doivent aussi entrer puissamment dans vos calculs.

Si la Porte répondait aux ouvertures de paix que je lui ai faites, avant que vous n'eussiez reçu de mes nouvelles de France, vous devez déclarer que vous avez tous les pouvoirs que j'avois ; entamez la négociation, *persistez toujours dans l'assertion que j'ai avancée*, QUE L'INTENTION DE LA FRANCE N'A JAMAIS ETE D'ENLEVER L'EGYPTE A LA PORTE. Demandez que la Porte sorte de la Coalition, et nous accorde le commerce de la Mer Noire, qu'elle mette en liberté les Français prisonniers, et enfin six mois de suspension d'hostilités ; afin que, pendant ce tems là, l'échange des ratifications puisse avoir lieu.

Supposant que les circonstances soient telles que vous croyiez devoir conclure le traité avec la Porte, vous ferez sentir que vous ne pouvez pas le mettre en exécution, qu'il ne soit ratifié, et selon l'usage de toutes les nations, l'intervalle entre la signature d'un traité et la ratification, doit toujours être une suspension d'hostilités.

Vous connaissez, Citoyen Général, quelle est ma

manière de voir ſur la politique intérieure de l'Égypte. Quelque choſe que vous faſſiez, les Chrétiens ſeront toujours nos amis. Il faut les empêcher d'être trop inſolents, afin que les Turcs n'ayent pas pour nous le même fanatiſme que contre les Chrétiens, ce qui nous les rendrait irréconciliables. Il faut endormir le fanatiſme en attendant qu'on puiſſe le déraciner. En captivant l'opinion des Grands Cheicks du Caire on a l'opinion de toute l'Egypte, et de tous les chefs que ce peuple peut avoir, il n'y en a aucuns moins dangereux pour nous, que les Cheicks, qui ſont peureux, ne ſavent pas ſe battre, et qui, *comme tous les prêtres*, inſpirent le fanatiſme ſans être fanatiques.

Quant aux fortifications, Alexandrie et El Arifch, voilà les deux clefs de l'Egypte. J'avois le projet de faire établir cet hivet des redoutes de Palmier, deux depuis Sallich à Caſſies, deux de Caſſies à El Arifch; une de ces dernières ſe ſeroit trouvée à l'endroit où le Général Menou a trouvé de l'eau potable.

Le Général de Brigade Sanſon, Commandant de Génie, le Général de Brigade Sougis, Commandant l'Artillerie de l'armée, vous mettront au fait, chacun en ce qui regarde ſon arme.

Le Citoyen Pouſſielgue a été excluſivement chargé des Finances. Je l'ai reconnu travailleur et homme de mérite. Il commence à avoir quelques renſeignemens ſur le cahos de l'adminiſtration de ce pais-ci.

J'avois le projet, ſi aucun événement ne ſurvenait, de tâcher cet hiver d'établir un nouveau ſyſtème d'impoſitions, ce qui aurait permis de ſe paſſer à peu près des Cophtes. Cependant, avant de l'entreprendre, je vous conſeille d'y réfléchir long tems. Il vaut mieux entreprendre cette opération un peu tard, qu'un peu trop tôt.

Des vaiſſeaux de guerre Français paroîtront indubitablement cet hiver à Alexandrie, ou à Brulos, ou à Damiette. Faites conſtruire une batterie et une tour à Brulos. *Tachez de réunir cinq à ſix cent Mamelouks, que lorſque les vaiſſeaux Français ſeraient arrivés, vous feriez arrêter dans un jour au Caire, et dans les autres provinces, et embarquer pour la France. Au défaut de Mamelouks, des ôtages d'Arabes, des Cheicks et* **** *qui par une raiſon quelconque* ſe trouveraient arrêtés, pourraient y ſuppléer. Les individus, arrivés en France, y ſeraient retenus un ou deux ans, verraient la grandeur de la nation, prendroient une idée de nos mœurs et de notre langue, et, de retour en Egypte, nous fourniroient autant de partiſans.

J'avois demandé déjà pluſieurs fois une troupe de comédiens. Je prendrai un ſoin particulier de vous en envoyer. Cet article eſt très-important pour l'armée, et pour commencer à changer les mœurs du pais.

La place importante que vous allez occuper en chef,

* Illegible in the original.

va vous mettre à même de déployer les talens que la nature vous a donnés. L'intérêt de ce qui se passe ici, est vif, et les résultats en seront immenses sur le commerce et la civilisation. Ce sera l'époque d'où dateront de grandes révolutions.

Accoutumé à voir la récompense des peines et des travaux de la vie dans l'opinion de la postérité, j'abandonne l'Egypte avec le plus grand regret. L'intérêt de la patrie, sa gloire, l'obéissance, les événemens extraordinaires qui viennent de s'y passer, me décident seuls à passer au milieu des escadres ennemies, pour me rendre en Europe. Je serai, d'esprit et de cœur, avec vous. Vos succès me seront aussi chers que ceux où je me trouverais moi-même, et je regarderai comme mal employés tous les jours de ma vie, où je ne ferai pas quelque chose pour l'armée dont je vous laisse le commandement, et pour consolider le magnifique établissement dont les fondemens viennent d'être jettés.

L'armée que je vous confie est toute composée de mes enfans. J'ai eu, dans tous les tems, même au milieu de leurs plus grandes peines, des marques de leur attachement. Entretenez-la dans ces sentimens. Vous le devez à l'estime et à l'amitié toute particulière que j'ai pour vous, et l'attachement vrai que je leur porte.

(Signé) BONAPARTE.

Pour copie conforme à l'original,

KLEBER.

TRANSLATION.

Alexandria, August 22d, 1799.

BONAPARTE, *Commander in Chief, to General* KLEBER.

ANNEXED to this, Citizen General, you will find an order for you to take the command of the army. My conſtant apprehenſions leſt the Engliſh fleet ſhould again appear on the coaſt, compel me to haſten my voyage by two or three days.

I take with me Generals Berthier, Lannes, Murat, Andreoſſi, and Marmont; Citizen Monge, and Citizen Bertholet.

Encloſed you will find the Engliſh and Francfort papers* up to the 10th of June. You will ſee by them,

* It would ſeem from this (and indeed the whole tenour of this correſpondence proves it) that the Directory gave themſelves as little trouble about Bonaparte, as if he had not obliged them by ſacrificing his gallant army to their common views. But for theſe papers (which were moſt probably given to him by ſome unſuſpecting Britiſh tar, who had better have kept them himſelf),

that we have loſt Italy! that Mantua, Turin, and Tortona, are in a ſtate of blockade. I have ſome grounds to flatter myſelf that the firſt of theſe places will hold out to the end of November *; and I truſt, if fortune

he would have been ignorant of what was doing in Europe. He refers Kleber to no information from the Directory; HE MENTIONS NO ORDERS FOR HIS RECALL—which would have been a ſufficient plea, and which he would not have failed to urge, if he had received any—but bottoms the whole, upon the accidental acquiſition of a few newſpapers! Even in his farewell addreſs to the army, he gives no other reaſon for his return, but the *news*; though ſuch a circumſtance muſt have been to them a moſt cruel inſult; as their preſence in Europe muſt have been full as neceſſary as his own.

* Bonaparte may be pardoned for this conjecture, formed from an eſtimate of the time which it took him to reduce it, in his boaſted campaigns. Mantua was inveſted by him for the firſt time on the 4th of June 1796; it did not ſurrender till the 2d of February in the following year, a ſpace of eight months; nor then to the fire of the beſiegers, but to that with which no courage, nor obſtinacy, can contend—an abſolute want of food! Compare this with the recovery of the ſame town, in the preſent campaign. It fell, with a garriſon of thirteen thouſand men, after a cloſe and vigorous ſiege of only eleven days! Indeed, if the Auſtro-Ruſſian campaign in Italy be compared with thoſe of Bonaparte, the latter dwindle into inſignificance. With an immenſe army, powerfully reinforced by the diſcontented and vicious of all nations, whom he attached to his ſtandard by the lure of novelty and indiſcriminate plunder, Bonaparte over-ran Italy in two years: let it be remembered, however, that all its fortreſſes (with the exception of Mantua) were puſillanimouſly or inſidiouſly delivered to him, before he had even captured the paltry town of Ceva, the firſt garriſon in Piedmont; while

ſmiles upon me, to be in Europe before the beginning of October.

You will alſo find encloſed, a cipher for your correſpondence with the Government; and another, for your communications with me.

I entreat you to diſpatch Gimot ſome time in the month of October *, together with the baggage which I have left at Cairo, and my domeſtics. I ſhould, however, have no particular objection to your taking as many of them as may ſuit you, into your own ſervice.

It is the preſent intention of Government, that General Deſaix † ſhould ſet out for Europe in November

the Auſtro-Ruſſians have reconquered the ſame country in the ſhort ſpace of nine months, with the addition of Alexandria, Tortona, &c. and the almoſt impregnable fortreſſes of Coni and Turin; the laſt of which had been treacherouſly ſeized by the execrable Joubert.

This, though pretty generally known, is mentioned here, for the excluſive benefit of Bonaparte's Jacobin admirers; who, reduced to deſpiſe, with the reſt of the world, his legiſlative talents, pretend to found his claims to empire on his *rapid* and *unrivalled* victories!

* The General had forgotten that he promiſed the ſoldiers (whom he took leave of with ſuch heart-felt regret) that he would return to them forthwith *(momentanément)*.

† This is the perſon who, according to the joint reports of

next, unleſs ſomething of conſequence ſhould ariſe here to detain him.

The COMMISSION OF THE ARTS ſhall return to France on board a flag of truce, which you will demand for this purpoſe, conformably to the late cartel, ſome time in the month of November, immediately after they have completed the object of their miſſion. They are at preſent engaged in putting a finiſhing hand to it, by an examination of Upper Egypt. Nevertheleſs, if you think that any of them will be of ſervice to you, you may put them *in requiſition* without ſcruple* !!!

Bonaparte and himſelf, has annihilated Mourad Bey, and his handful of Mameloucs, ſeveral times over. It will be ſeen preſently, however, that they are ſtill alive and merry; preparing to do as much for him in their turn. Deſaix was looked upon in France as one of the beſt officers in the ſervice.

* Would not one imagine this humane *ſavant-driver* was talking of camels or buffaloes, inſtead of the men whoſe immortal labours in Egypt were to aſtoniſh the world, and illuſtrate France with a full diſplay of the recondite lore of Hermes Triſmegiſtus? *Put them in requiſition without ſcruple!* Unfortunate beings! this is the very thing that he had before done to them in France!

This paragraph is highly worthy of the ſerious conſideration of the Jacobins: ſince of all the brilliant qualities of Bonaparte, none (with the exception of his humanity) has been ſo long and ſo loudly dwelt upon by them, as his ſingular love of learning, and learned men!

The Effendi who was made priſoner at Aboukir, is ſet out for Damietta. I have already written to you to ſend him to Cyprus: he takes with him a letter for the Grand Vizier, of which I encloſe you a copy †.

The arrival of the Breſt fleet at Toulon, and of the Cadiz fleet at Carthagena, leaves no kind of doubt of the poſſibility of tranſmitting to Egypt the muſkets, ſabres, piſtols, balls, &c. of which you ſtand in need, and of which I am provided with a very exact enumeration; together with a ſufficient number of recruits to ſupply the loſſes of our two campaigns. Government itſelf, I preſume, will, by that conveyance, acquaint you with its intentions: as for myſelf, both in my public and my private capacity, I promiſe to take every meaſure for enabling you to hear frequently from France ‡.

If, by a ſeries of the moſt extraordinary events, none of theſe attempts ſhould ſucceed, and you ſhould neither receive reinforcements, nor intelligence from France

† See No. XIV.

‡ After noticing the various wants of the French army, the reader may be curious to know what Bonaparte has done in either of his *capacities* to relieve them. It may be told in three words. He has raked the kennels of Paris for a number of proſtitutes more peſtilential than the plague, to ſend them; and he has *put in requiſition* a few miſerable companies of ſtrolling players, who may probably arrive time enough to ſee the curtain drop for ever on the tragi-comedy of his expedition.

by May next; and if this year, in ſpite of all your precautions, the plague ſhould break out in Egypt and carry off more than fifteen hundred of the troops §—a conſiderable loſs in addition to that which the events of the war will daily occaſion—I think that you ought not then to venture upon another campaign, and that you are ſufficiently juſtified in concluding a peace with the Ottoman Porte; even though the evacuation of Egypt ſhould be the leading article. It will merely be neceſſary for you to poſtpone the execution of it (if ſuch a thing be poſſible) till the period of a general peace.

No one, Citizen General, has better means of judging of the importance of Egypt to France, than yourſelf. The Turkiſh empire, menaced with ruin on every ſide, is crumbling to pieces at this moment; and the evacuation of Egypt on our part, would be ſo much the more unfortunate, as we ſhould be ſure to ſee, ere long, this fine province fall into the hands of ſome other European powers.

The intelligence of the good or ill fortune which may attend the Republic in Europe, will, of courſe,

§ The cool calculation of 1500 men, which this "hope and conſolation" of the rancorous "ſchool of humanity" thinks a reaſonable quantity to die of the plague, is chiefly noticed here, as furniſhing a tolerable criterion for eſtimating the numbers that fell in the former ſeaſon. As an uſeleſs ſacrifice of ſo many hundred human beings, it is ſcarce worth mention in the hiſtory of a man, who has ſpilled more blood wantonly than any commander of ancient or modern times.

have its due influence in determining your future meaſures.

If the Porte ſhould reply to the overtures I have made for peace, before my letters from France can reach you, it will be, in that caſe, neceſſary for you to declare, that you have all the powers with which I was entruſted. Enter then upon the negotiation; *adhere ſtrenuouſly and conſtantly to the aſſertion which I have advanced, that France never had the leaſt idea* OF TAKING EGYPT FROM THE GRAND SEIGNIOR!!! Require the Ottoman Porte to ſeparate itſelf from the Coalition, to grant us the free commerce of the Black Sea, to ſet at liberty all the French in confinement, and laſtly, to agree to a ſuſpenſion of hoſtilities for ſix months, that there may be a ſufficient time for the mutual exchange of ratifications.

Suppoſing, however, that you ſhould find yourſelf in ſuch circumſtances as you conceive make it neceſſary to *conclude* the treaty with the Porte; you muſt then make that power underſtand that you cannot execute your part of it, before it be ratified (at home); and that, according to the uſual practice of all nations, the interval between the ſigning and ratifying of a treaty, is always conſidered as a ſuſpenſion of hoſtilities.

You are acquainted, Citizen General, with my way of thinking reſpecting the interior policy of Egypt. Act in whatever manner you pleaſe, the Chriſtians will

ſtill be our friends; it will be neceſſary, however, to prevent them from growing too inſolent, leſt the Turks ſhould conceive the ſame fanatic prejudice againſt us as againſt them, which would deſtroy every poſſibility of a reconciliation: this fanaticiſm muſt at all events be laid aſleep, until we have an opportunity of extirpating it entirely *. By gaining the good opinion of the powerful Cheiks at Cairo, we ſhall ſecure that of all Egypt; and of all the chiefs which its inhabitants may rally under, there are none leſs to be apprehended by us than the Cheiks, who are all timorous, unacquainted with arms, and, like all other prieſts, know how to inſpire the people with fanaticiſm, without being fanatic themſelves †.

* Our General "has a meaning, and, no doubt,
"You all have ſenſe enough to find it out;"
though, it muſt be confeſſed, it is not very obvious. The truth ſeems to be, that, with an abundant degree of cunning (and this, and a fierce and ſavage courage, will, upon examination, be found to make up the whole of his character), he has bewildered himſelf in the variety of his objects. The Chriſtians, by whom probably Bonaparte means the Copts, are to be trampled upon to gratify the Turks, whoſe fanaticiſm is to be indulged, that it may be the more eaſily deſtroyed ſome time hence by the French, who are at preſent treating for the entire evacuation of the country! Such are the contradictory reveries with which Bonaparte labours to confound Kleber, and to conceal his own want of rational and enlarged ideas on a ſubject ſo infinitely intereſting and important.

† Bonaparte's ignorance is inconceivable. He has been amuſing himſelf for fifteen months with hunting out and deſtroying

With reſpect to the fortifications, I conſider Alexandria and El Ariſch as the two keys of Egypt. I had once an idea of forming, during the approaching winter, ſeveral redoubts of palm-tree*; two from Sallich to Caſtles, two from Caſtles to El Ariſch: of theſe laſt, one was to be placed on the ſpot where General Menou diſcovered a ſpring of tolerable water.

Arabs, Turks, and Copts; and yet he ſeems to know as little of their diſtinct polity as if he had never left home. Who ever heard before of Cheik prieſts? A Cheik is an Arabian chief, neither timorous nor unacquainted with arms, as he has frequently found to his coſt. It is not improbable but that Bonaparte means by his Cheiks the Coptic clergy! Mean what he will, however, the ſneer at prieſts comes with an admirable grace from one who has juſt paid them ſuch extraordinary compliments in his proclamation to the royaliſts of La Vendée. An Atheiſt at Paris, a Catholic at Rome, a Muſſulman at Grand Cairo, and a hypocrite every where, it is to be hoped his inſidious language will be treated as it deſerves; and that what is here ſaid of prieſts will be duly weighed by as many of thoſe brave and faithful people as have at ſome unſuſpicious moment been gratified by an encomium on their church, as deceitful, they will now ſee, as it was impious.

It is pleaſant to reflect, that the communication with the Vendéans, &c. is now ſo eaſy and ſo frequent, that this publication will probably reach them before it is heard of at Paris.

* This was an *idea* truly worthy of Bonaparte. To deſtroy the palm-trees would as effectually depopulate many parts of Egypt, as if he had turned the courſe of the Nile; thouſands of the natives who inhabit the borders of the deſerts have no other ſubſiſtence but dates for a great part of the year. But what is this to Bonaparte? To deſtroy and to reign are all he aſks; it matters not over what or whom.

Brigadier-general Sanſon, commander of the corps of engineers, and Brigadier-general Sougis, commander of the artillery, will furniſh you with the neceſſary details of their reſpective departments.

Citizen Pouſſielgue has had the ſole management of the finances; I have found him extremely active, and in every reſpect a perſon of merit; he begins to have ſome inſight into the chaos of the adminiſtration of this country. It was my intention, if nothing occurred to prevent me, to attempt this winter a *new* ſyſtem of taxation, which would, by degrees, relieve us from our preſent dependance on the Copts: before you undertake it, however, I adviſe you to make it the ſubject of long and deliberate meditation; it is ſafer to begin an operation of this nature a little too late, than a little too ſoon.

Our ſhips of war will certainly make their appearance this winter, either at Alexandria, Brulos, or Damietta. You muſt have a battery and a ſignal-tower at Brulos. Endeavour to get together five or ſix hundred Mameloucs, in ſuch a manner that, when the French fleet arrives, you may be able to lay your hands upon them at the ſame inſtant of time, either at Cairo or in the other provinces, and ſend them off immediately for France*. If you cannot procure Mameloucs,

* It is impoſſible to conceive a ſcheme of blacker or more diabolical perfidy than Bonaparte here plans for Kleber,

ſuch Arab hoſtages, Cheiks el Beled as may then be in cuſtody, no matter on what account, will anſwer the end as well. Theſe people, landed in France, and detained there for a year or two, will contemplate the grandeur of the nation; they will acquire, in ſome degree, our manners and our language, and when they return to Egypt, will prove to us ſo many partiſans.

Five or ſix hundred innocent people, living without ſuſpicion or fear under the protection of the French, are to be torn from their country, their families, and friends, and hurried off to France under a pretence equally abſurd and iniquitous.

Fortunately, Bonaparte left a man behind him but little inclined to be the agent of his villany. How muſt this gallant and diſcerning ſoldier have felt the inſult here offered him? How muſt he have ſmiled with contempt at this mixture of idiotiſm and frenzy? this order for him to exaſperate the country by an act of wanton barbarity, at the time he was inſtructed to treat about leaving it in peace! Bonaparte allows that thoſe Mamelouc miſſionaries could not finiſh their Pariſian education in leſs than a year or two, and yet he has juſt before granted a delay of only ſix months to conclude the agreement which is to ſhut the French out of Egypt for ever.

With reſpect to the Arab hoſtages, Cheiks, or any thing elſe inſtead of Mameloucs; if ſuch a motley crew were not deſigned to gratify his own vanity, they could only ſerve to remind the Pariſians of the ever-memorable proceſſion of the "Orator of the human race," Anacharſis Clootz. At any rate, the idea of bringing about a great change in the country by their means, is completely ridiculous, and truly worthy of the man who conceived it.

I have already repeatedly written for a company of comedians; I will take particular care that they ſhall be ſent *. This appears to me an article of the utmoſt conſequence, not only for the army, but for the purpoſe of effecting ſomething like a change in the moral habits of the country.

The important ſituation of Commander in Chief, which is now devolved upon you, will afford you ample opportunities of diſplaying thoſe talents with which nature has endowed you. The intereſt taken in every thing which paſſes here, is active and lively; and the conſequences reſulting from it will be immenſe, whether conſidered with reſpect to commerce or to civilization. This is aſſuredly the epoch from whence revolutions of the moſt extraordinary nature will take their date.

Accuſtomed to look for the recompence of the toils and difficulties of life in the opinion of poſterity, I abandon Egypt with the deepeſt regret *! The honour

* This is the only one of all his numerous promiſes that Bonaparte has condeſcended to recollect. He thought of it, we ſee, in Egypt; and, not to diſparage his talents for invention, might be indebted for the idea to Voltaire, who adviſed us (not ſeriouſly, it muſt be confeſſed) to ſend a few opera-dancers to St. Vincent's, to ſoften and ſubdue the Caraibs.

* What have we here? A mortified Carthuſian? Meek and lowly ſervant of an unambitious republic, he makes no boaſtful claims to the admiration of the preſent age; he fights battles, he overturns ſtates, he wades through human blood, from the

and interests of my country, duty*, and the extraordinary events which have recently taken place there; these, and these alone, have determined me to hazard a paſſage to Europe, through the midſt of the enemy's ſquadrons. In heart and in ſpirit I ſhall ſtill be in the midſt of you! Your victories will be as dear to me as any in which I may be perſonally engaged; and I ſhall look upon that day of my life as ill employed, in which I ſhall not do ſomething for the army of which I leave you the command; and for the conſolidation of the magnificent eſtabliſhment, the foundation of which is ſo recently laid.

The army I entruſt to your care, is entirely compoſed of MY OWN CHILDREN. I have never ceaſed,

ſhores of Genoa to the Adriatic; he flies from one ravaged quarter of the globe to lay waſte another, without motive or end; —and he tells all this in a jargon that Captain Bobadil would have bluſhed at. What then? His toil, like virtue, is its own reward, and he aſpires only to the grateful notice of poſterity! All this is as perfectly true, as that he abandoned Egypt *with regret*, or that Kleber believed him when he ſaid ſo.

* *Obéiſſance* in the original. This is the only word which he ventures to hazard reſpecting a call to return, and this is weak and inſignificant. If he had been *ordered* to France, the ſimple truth would have been ſoon told; but it is evident he was not, he had other reaſons for his flight: the meaſure of his cruelties in Egypt was now full, and vengeance was approaching with haſty ſtrides. The attempt to blind Kleber by an ambiguous word, was as vain as it was fooliſh; that general ſaw his motive, and has recorded it.

even in the midſt of their moſt trying difficulties and dangers, to receive proofs of their attachment*; endeavour to preſerve them ſtill in thoſe ſentiments for me. This is due to the particular eſteem and friendſhip I entertain for you, and to the unfeigned affection I feel for them!

(Signed) BONAPARTE.

A true Copy,

KLEBER.

* Of what materials muſt this man's heart be made? Even Satan is repreſented by Milton as burſting into *ſuch tears as angels ſhed*, at the recollection of what he had brought on his followers, yet—*faithful how they ſtood*. But Bonaparte ſeems abſolutely incapable of any impreſſions of pity or remorſe; he is an anomalous being, ſuch as neither hiſtory nor fiction has yet dared to exhibit.

No. IV.

LIBERTÉ. ÉGALITÉ.

REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE.

Au Quartier Général du Caire, le 26 Vendémiaire, an 8 de la République Française.

KLEBER, *Général en Chef*, *au* DIRECTOIRE EXÉCUTIF.

LE Général en Chef Bonaparte eſt parti pour France le 6 Fructidor, au matin, ſans en avoir prévenu perſonne. Il m'avoit donné rendezvous à Roſette le 7. Je n'y ai trouvé que ſes dépêches. Dans l'incertitude ſi le Général a eu le bonheur de paſſer, je crois devoir vous envoyer copie, et de la lettre par laquelle il me donne le commandement de l'armée, et de celle qu'il adreſſa au Grand Viſir à Conſtantinople, quoiqu'il ſût parfaitement que ce Pacha étoit déjà arrivé à Damas.

Mon premier ſoin a été de prendre une connoiſſance exacte de la ſituation actuelle de l'armée.

Vous ſavez, Citoyens Directeurs, et vous êtes à même de vous faire repréſenter l'état de ſa force, lors de ſon arrivée en Egypte. Elle eſt réduite de moitié; et nous occupons tous les points capitaux du triangle des Cataractes à El Arich, d'El Arich à Alexandrie, et d'Alexandrie aux Cataractes. Cependant, il ne s'agit plus aujourd'hui comme autrefois de lutter contre quelques hordes de Mamelukes découragés; mais de combattre et de réſiſter aux efforts réunis de trois grandes puiſſances: la Porte, les Anglois, et les Ruſſes.

Le denûment d'armes, de poudre de guerre, de fer coulé, et de plomb, préſente un tableau tout auſſi alarmant que la grande et ſubite diminution d'hommes dont je viens de parler. Les eſſais de fonderie faits n'ont point réuſſi; la manufacture de poudre établie à Ilhoda n'a pas encore donné, et ne donnera probablement pas le réſultat qu'on ſe flattoit d'en obtenir: enfin la réparation des armes à feu eſt lente; et il faudroit pour activer tous ces établiſſemens, des moyens et des fonds que nous n'avons pas.

Les troupes ſont nues; et cette abſence de vêtement eſt d'autant plus fâcheuſe, qu'il eſt reconnu que dans ce pays elle eſt une des cauſes les plus actives des diſſenteries et des opthalmies qui ſont les maladies conſtamment régnantes; la première ſurtout a agi cette année puiſſamment ſur des corps affoiblis et épuiſés par les fatigues. Les officiers de ſanté remarquent, et le rapportent conſtamment, que quoique

No. IV.

LIBERTÉ. ÉGALITÉ.

REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE.

Au Quartier Général du Caire, le 16 Vendémiaire, an 8 de la République Française.

KLEBER, *Général en Chef*, au DIRECTOIRE EXECUTIF.

LE Général en Chef Bonaparte eſt parti pour France le 6 Fructidor, au matin, ſans en avoir prévenu perſonne. Il m'avoit donné rendezvous à Roſette le 7. Je n'y ai trouvé que ſes dépêches. Dans l'incertitude ſi le Général a eu le bonheur de paſſer, je crois devoir vous envoyer copie, et de la lettre par laquelle il me donne le commandement de l'armée, et de celle qu'il adreſſa au Grand Viſir à Conſtantinople, quoiqu'il ſût parfaitement que ce Pacha étoit déjà arrivé à Damas.

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l'armée ſoit ſi conſidérablement diminuée, il y a cette année un nombre beaucoup plus grand de malades, qu'il n'y en avoit l'année dernière à la même époque.

Le Général Bonaparte avant ſon départ, avoit, à la vérité, donné des ordres pour habiller l'armée en drap, mais pour cet objet, comme pour beaucoup d'autres, il s'en eſt tenu là; et la pénurie des finances qui eſt un nouvel obſtacle à combattre, l'eût mis dans la néceſſité, ſans doute, d'ajourner l'exécution de cet utile projet.

Il faut en parler, de cette pénurie.

Le Général Bonaparte a épuiſé les reſſources extraordinaires dans les premières mois de notre arrivée: il a levé alors autant de contributions de guerre que le pays pouvoit en ſupporter. Revenir aujourd'hui à ces moyens, alors que nous ſommes au dehors entourés d'ennemis, ſeroit préparer un ſoulevement à la première occaſion favorable.

Et cependant Bonaparte, à ſon départ, n'a pas laiſſé un ſol en caiſſe, ni aucun autre objet équivalent. Il a laiſſé au contraire un arriéré de près de dix millions; c'eſt plus que le revenu d'une année dans la circonſtance. La ſolde arriérée pour toute l'armée ſe monte ſeule à quatre millions.

L'inondation actuelle rend impoſſible le recouvrement de ce qui reſte dû ſur l'année qui vient d'ex-

pirer, et qui ſuffiroit à peine pour la dépenſe d'un mois. Ce ne ſera donc qu'au mois de Frimaire qu'on pourra en recommencer la perception ; et alors, il n'en faut pas douter, on ne pourra pas s'y livrer, parcequ'il faudra combattre. Enfin, le Nil étant cette année très-mauvais, pluſieurs provinces, faute d'inondation, offriront des non-valeurs auxquelles on ne pourra ſe diſpenſer d'avoir égard.

Tout ce que j'avance ici, Citoyens Directeurs, je puis le prouver, et par des procés verbaux, et par des états certifiés des differentes ſervices.

Quoique l'Egypte ſoit tranquille en apparence, elle n'eſt rien moins que ſoumiſe. Le peuple eſt inquiet et ne voit en nous, quelque choſe que l'on puiſſe faire, que des ennemis de ſa propriété ; ſon cœur eſt ſans ceſſe ouvert à l'eſpoir d'un changement favorable.

Les Mamelukes ſont diſperſés, mais ils ne ſont pas détruits. Mourad-Bey eſt toujours dans la Haute Egypte avec aſſez de monde, pour occuper ſans ceſſe une partie conſidérable de nos forces. Si on l'abandonnoit un moment, ſa troupe ſe groſſiroit bien vite, et il viendroit nous inquiéter juſque dans cette capitale ; qui, malgré la plus grande ſurveillance, n'a ceſſé juſqu'à ce jour de lui procurer des ſecours en argent et en armes.

Ibrahim-Bey eſt à Gaza, avec environ deux mille

Mamelukes; et je ſuis informé que trente mille hommes de l'armée du Grand Viſir et de Dgezzar Pacha y ſont déjà arrivées. Le Grand Viſir eſt parti de Damas il y a environ vingt jours. Il eſt actuellement campé auprès d'Acre. Enfin les Anglais ſont maîtres de la Mer Rouge.

Telle eſt, Citoyens Directeurs, la ſituation dans laquelle le Général Bonaparte m'a laiſſé l'enorme fardeau du commandement de l'armée d'Orient. *Il voyoit la criſe fatale s'approcher*; vos ordres ne lui ont pas permis de la ſurmonter; que cette criſe exiſte ſes lettres, ſes inſtructions, ſa negociation entamée, en ſont foi; elle eſt de notoriété publique, et nos ennemis ſemblent auſſi peu l'ignorer que les Français qui ſe trouvent en Egypte.

"Si cette année," me dit le Général Bonaparte, "malgré toutes nos précautions, la peſte eſt en Egypte, et vous tuoit plus de quinze cent ſoldats, &c. je penſe que dans ce cas vous ne devez point hazarder à ſoutenir la campagne prochaine, et que vous êtes autoriſé à conclure la paix avec la Porte Ottomanne, quand même l'evacuation de l'Egypte devroit être la condition principale, &c."

Je vous fais remarquer ce paſſage, Citoyens Directeurs, parcequ'il eſt caractériſtique, ſous plus d'un rapport, mais qu'il indique ſurtout la ſituation réelle dans laquelle je me trouve. Que peuvent être quinze cent hommes de plus ou de moins dans l'immenſité

de terrein que j'ai à défendre et auſſi journellement à combattre.

Le Général dit ailleurs : " Alexandrie et El Arich, voilà les deux clefs de l'Egypte." El Arich eſt un méchant fort à quatre journées dans le Déſert. La grande difficulté de l'approviſionner ne permet pas d'y jetter une garniſon de plus de deux cent cinquante hommes. Six cent Mamelukes et Arabes pourront, quand ils le voudront, intercepter ſa communication avec Catieh, et comme, lors du départ de Bonaparte, cette garniſon n'avoit pas pour quinze jours de vivres en avance, il ne faudroit pas plus de tems pour l'obliger à ſe rendre ſans coup férir. Les Arabes ſeuls étoient dans le cas de faire des convois ſoutenus dans les brûlants déſerts : mais, d'un côté, *ils ont été tant de fois trompés*, que loin de nous offrir leurs ſervices, ils s'eloignent et ſe cachent ; d'un autre côté, l'arrivée du Grand Viſir, qui inflamme leur fanatiſme et leur prodigue des dons, contribue tout autant à nous en faire abandonner *.

Alexandrie n'eſt point une place, c'eſt une vaſte camp retranché ; il étoit à la vérité aſſez bien defendu par une nombreuſe artillerie de ſiége, mais depuis que nous l'avons perdue cette artillerie *dans la déſaſtreuſe campagne de Syrie*, depuis que le Général Bonaparte a retiré toutes les pièces de marine pour armer au com-

* Il y a deux chemins pour arriver de la Syrie en Egypte qui n'oblige nullement à paſſer par El Arich, et ſur leſquels on trouve de l'eau, d'un d'eux vient d'être reconnu.

plet les deux frégattes avec leſquelles il eſt parti, ce camp ne peut plus offrir qu'une foible réſiſtance.

Le Général Bonaparte enfin s'etoit fait illuſion ſur l'effet que devoit produire le ſuccès qu'il a obtenu au poſte d'Aboukir. Il a en effet détruit la preſque totalité des neuf mille Turcs qui avoient débarqué. Mais, qu'eſt-ce qu'une perte pareille pour une grande nation, à laquelle on a ravi la plus belle portion de ſon empire, et à qui la religion, l'honneur, et l'intérêt, préſcrivent également de ſe venger et de réconquérir ce qu'on avoit pu lui enlever; auſſi cette victoire n'a-t-elle pas rétardé un inſtant ni le préparatifs ni la marche du Grand Viſir.

Dans cet état de choſes, que puis-je et que dois-je faire? Je penſe, Citoyens Directeurs, que c'eſt de continuer les négociations entamées par Bonaparte: quand elles ne donneroient d'autre réſultat que celui de gagner du tems, j'aurois déjà lieu d'en être ſatisfait. Vous trouverez ci-joint la lettre que j'écris en conſéquence au Grand Viſir; en lui envoyant duplicate de celle de Bonaparte.

Si ce miniſtre répond à ces avances, je lui propoſerai la reſtitution de l'Egypte aux conditions ſuivantes.

Le Grand Seigneur y établiroit un Pacha comme par le paſſé.

On lui abandonneroit le Miri que la Porte a toujours perçu de droit et jamais de fait.

Le commerce seroit ouvert réciproquement entre l'Egypte et la Syrie.

Les François demeureroient dans le pays, occuperoient les places et les forts, et percevroient tous les autres droits avec ceux des douanes, jusqu'à ce que le Gouvernement François eût conclu la paix avec l'Angleterre.

Si ces conditions préliminaires et sommaires étoient acceptés, je croirois avoir fait pour la patrie, plus qu'en obtenant la plus éclatante victoire. Mais je doute que l'on veuille prêter l'oreille à ces propositions; si l'orgueil des Turcs ne s'y oppose point, j'aurais à combattre l'influence de l'or des Anglois. Dans tous les cas, je me guiderai d'après les circonstances.

Je connois toute l'importance de la possession de l'Egypte. Je disois en Europe qu'elle étoit pour la France le point d'appui par lequel elle pourroit remuer le système du commerce des quatre parties du monde; mais pour cela il faut un puissant lévier; ce lévier, c'est la marine; *la nôtre a existé:* depuis lors, tout a changé, et la paix avec la Porte peut seule, ce me semble, nous offrir une voie honorable pour nous tirer d'une entreprise qui ne peut plus atteindre l'objet qu'on avoit pu s'en proposer.

Je n'entrerai point, Citoyens Directeurs, dans les détails de toutes les combinaiſons diplomatiques, que la ſituation actuelle de l'Europe peut offrir : ils ne ſont point de mon reſſort. Dans la détreſſe où je me trouve, et trop éloigné du centre des événemens, je ne puis guère m'occuper que du ſalut et de l'honneur de l'armée que je commande :—heureux ſi dans mes ſollicitudes, je réuſſis à remplir vos vœux. Plus rapproché de vous, je mettrois toute ma gloire à vous obéir.

Je joins ici, Citoyens Directeurs, un état exact de ce qui nous manque en matériel pour l'artillerie, et un tableau ſommaire de la dette contractée et laiſſée par le Général Bonaparte.

Salut et reſpect.

(Signé) KLEBER.

P. S. Au moment, Citoyens Directeurs, où je vous expédie cette lettre, quatorze ou quinze voiles Turques ſont mouillées devant Damiette, attendant la flotte du Capitaine Pacha mouillée à Gaffa et portant, dit-on, quinze à vingt mille hommes de débarquement. Quinze mille hommes ſont toujours réunis à Gaza, et le Grand Viſir s'achemine de Damas. Il nous a renvoyé ces jours derniers un ſoldat de la vingt-cinquieme demi-brigade fait priſonnier du côté d'El Arich. Après lui avoir fait voir tout le camp, il

lui a intimé de dire à ſes compagnons ce qu'il avoit vu, et à leur Général de trembler. Ceci paroît annoncer ou la confiance que le Grand Viſir met dans ſes forces, ou un déſir de rapprochement. Quant à moi, il me ſéroit de toute impoſſibilité de réunir plus de cinq mille hommes en état d'entrer en campagne;—nonobſtant ce, je tenterai la fortune, ſi je ne puis parvenir à gagner du tems par des negociations. Dgezzar a retiré ſes troupes de Gaza, et les a fait revenir à Acre.

KLEBER.

TRANSLATION.

LIBERTY. EQUALITY.

FRENCH REPUBLIC.

Head Quarters, Cairo, October 7th, 1799.

KLEBER*, *Commander in Chief, to the* DIRECTORY.

THE Commander in Chief, Bonaparte, quitted this country for France on the morning of the 23d ult. without ſaying a word of his intention to any perſon

* This is the firſt letter that has yet appeared from Kleber, and it is ſuch as might have been expected from one of his diſtinguiſhed reputation. It is ſenſible, and manly; forming a complete contraſt in every reſpect to the letter of Bonaparte, of which it is a ſhrewd and impartial critique.

To point out the ſuperior penetration and good ſenſe of Kleber, would be ſuperfluous; but it may not be ſo to compare his manner of proceeding with Bonaparte's treatment of Brueys. That unfortunate man, after being reluctantly detained on the coaſt of Egypt by Bonaparte's expreſs and reiterated orders, was no ſooner dead, than Bonaparte publiſhed, in the face of all Europe, that he had fallen a victim to his own obſtinacy, and contempt of authority!—though the remonſtrances of Brueys, and Bonaparte's

whatever. He had appointed me to meet him at Roſetta on the ſubſequent day! (the 24th.) I found nothing there but his diſpatches. Unable to divine whether the General has had the good fortune to reach Toulon, I think it incumbent on me to ſend you a copy of the letter by which he transferred to me the command of the army, as alſo of another which he had addreſſed to the Grand Vizier *at Conſtantinople*, although he knew perfectly well, that this officer was already arrived at Damaſcus *.

My firſt cares have been directed to obtain an accurate knowledge of the preſent condition of the army.

You know, Citizen Directors, and you have it in your power to procure the requiſite ſtatements; you know, I ſay, the actual ſtrength of the army at its ar-

rejection of them, both exiſted, to convict him of ſo baſe, cowardly, and malicious a calumny. While Kleber, with the calm dignity of a ſoldier, and a man of honour, indulging in no random ſpeculations, patiently reviews the General's ſtatement, which he tranſmits to the Directory, with his own remarks, always intelligent and convincing;—that they may be enabled to judge of the facts on which they are founded, and the opinions from which they are drawn.

* It is not eaſy to account for this vagary of Bonaparte's: the moſt natural way of obtaining his purpoſe, would certainly have been to look for the Vizier where he was ſure to be found. Kleber apparently feels ſome reſentment at this trifling with the miſeries of the army, by a feeble attempt at procraſtination.

rival in Egypt: it is reduced a full half!—and we occupy all the capital points of the great triangle, from the Cataracts to El Ariſch, from El Ariſch to Alexandria, and from Alexandria again to the Cataracts; meanwhile it is no longer a queſtion, as it once was, of contending with a few hordes of diſpirited Mameloucs; but of reſiſting and combating the united efforts of three great powers, the Porte, England, and Ruſſia.

The abſolute want of arms, of gunpowder, of cannon and muſket-balls, preſents a picture no leſs alarming than the prodigious and rapid diminution of our numbers. Our attempts to eſtabliſh a foundry have failed of ſucceſs; and the manufactory of powder, which we ſet on foot at Ilhoda, has not hitherto kept pace in any degree with our expectations; in all probability it never will. Add to this, that the repairing of our ſmall arms proceeds but ſlowly; and that, to give the neceſſary activity to theſe various undertakings, money and means, of which we have neither, are abſolutely indiſpenſable.

THE TROOPS ARE NAKED—and this privation of clothing is the more calamitous, as it is perfectly aſcertained in this country, to be one of the moſt active cauſes of the dyſenteries and ophthalmies which conſtantly prevail here. The firſt, in particular, has operated with an alarming effect this ſeaſon, on bodies already weakened and exhauſted by fatigue. The members of the Board of Health remark (and never fail to mention it in their reports), that although the army is

ſo much diminiſhed, the number on the ſick liſt is conſiderably larger this year, than at the ſame period of the laſt.

General Bonaparte, previous to his departure, had, it is true, given orders for new clothing the army: but for this, as well as for a great many other projects, he contented himſelf *with the mere orders**:—the poverty of the finances (which is a new obſtacle to be combated) reduced him, doubtleſs, to the neceſſity of adjourning the execution of this uſeful deſign.

* Kleber has fallen into a ſlight miſtake here. Bonaparte did not abſolutely content himſelf with ordering the clothing—no, he went farther—he ſet the Savans of the Egyptian Inſtitute upon conſulting what *coloured* cloth was beſt adapted to the climate: and theſe venerable ſages, after diſcuſſing at great length the merits of ſeveral, of which there was not an ell in the country, ultimately fixed upon a *gris-de-lin*, of which there was ſtill leſs! Nor did the General ſtop even here: he aſſerted in his diſpatches that many thouſand ells of this cloth (ſo judiciouſly choſen) had been delivered to the army! The readers of the Jacobin newſpapers here cannot yet have forgotten their generous triumph at this incontrovertible proof of the improving condition of "the Army of the Eaſt!"

The concluſion of this paragraph is an evident ſarcaſm. Kleber knew that Bonaparte was as well acquainted with the ſtate of the finances before theſe orders as after them. He knew too, what all the world beſides knows, that they were only given to procure a momentary popularity, and carry on that ſyſtem of fraud and hypocriſy with which he began, and with which he will moſt aſſuredly end.

Now I have mentioned the finances, I feel it my duty to ſay ſomewhat more on the ſubject.

General Bonaparte exhauſted the extraordinary reſources within a few months after our arrival! He levied at that time as extenſive a military contribution as the country could poſſibly ſupport! To have recourſe a ſecond time to this expedient, now that we are ſurrounded with enemies from without, would only pave the way for an inſurrection the firſt favourable moment.

Notwithſtanding all this, Bonaparte, at quitting us, did not leave behind him a SINGLE SOUS in the military cheſt, nor any thing capable of being turned into money! He left, on the contrary, a debt of near ten millions, more than a whole year's income in the preſent ſtate of things: the pay of the army alone is in arrear full four millions.

The preſent ſtate of the inundation makes it impoſſible to recover the deficiencies of the year juſt expired, and which, if it were not ſo, would ſcarce anſwer the expenſes of a month: we cannot, therefore, enter again on the collection of the taxes till the end of November; and even then it is clear to me, that we ſhall not be in a condition to attend ſufficiently to it, becauſe we ſhall have our hands full of fighting. In a word, the Nile being very low this year, many provinces,

deprived of the inundation, will claim the cuſtomary exemptions, to which we cannot, in common juſtice, object.

Every ſyllable, Citizen Directors, which I here advance, I can authenticate either by verbal proceſſes, or by eſtimates of the different ſervices regularly ſigned.

Although Egypt is to all appearance tranquil, it is nothing leſs than in a ſtate of ſubmiſſion; the people are reſtleſs and uneaſy, and in ſpite of all we can do to the contrary, perſiſt in looking upon us as the enemies of their property: their hearts are inceſſantly open to the hopes of a favourable change.

The Mameloucs are diſperſed, but not deſtroyed. Mourad Bey is ſtill in Upper Egypt with a body of men ſufficiently numerous to find conſtant employment for a conſiderable part of our forces. If we ſhould quit him for an inſtant, his little army would increaſe with inconceivable rapidity, and he would deſcend the Nile and haraſs us at the gates of this capital, where, in ſpite of the moſt vigilant attention, they have conſtantly found means, to this very hour, to procure him ſupplies of arms and money.

Ibrahim Bey is at Gaza with about two thouſand Mameloucs; and I am informed that thirty thouſand

men, part of the army of the Grand Vizier and Dgezzar Paſha, are alſo arrived at the ſame place. The Grand Vizier left Damaſcus about three weeks ago; he is at preſent encamped near Acre: finally, the Engliſh are maſters of the Red Sea.

Such, Citizen Directors, is the ſituation in which General Bonaparte has left me to ſuſtain the enormous burden of commanding the army of the East! HE SAW THE FATAL CRISIS APPROACHING*: your orders have not permitted him to ſurmount it. That ſuch a criſis exiſts, his letters, his inſtructions, his negotiation lately ſet on foot, all contribute to evince; it is of public notoriety, and our enemies appear to me no leſs perfectly informed of it than ourſelves.

"If this year," ſays General Bonaparte, "in ſpite of all my precautions, the plague ſhould break out in Egypt, and carry off more than fifteen hundred men, &c. I then think that you ought not to venture

* Here is the key to Bonaparte's flight. With reſpect to the *orders* Kleber mentions, he muſt either ſpeak ironically, or, which is more probable, mean to convey an idea that the inſinuation couched under the word *obéiſſance* in Bonaparte's letter, was falſe, and juſtified by no authority from home; he puts Bonaparte and the Directory at iſſue upon the point; and as it muſt be manifeſt who is really culpable, it is, perhaps, fortunate for the former that his preſent uſurpation ſets him above the immediate dread of the guillotine, for an act of equal treachery and diſobedience.

upon another campaign, and that you are ſufficiently juſtified in concluding a peace with the Ottoman Porte, even though the evacuation of Egypt ſhould be the leading article, &c."

I have pointed out this paſſage to you, Citizen Directors, becauſe it is characteriſtic in more than one point of view*; and, above all, becauſe it clearly ſhows you the real ſituation in which I am placed. Of what conſequence are fifteen hundred men, more or leſs, in the immenſe ſpace of country which I have to defend, and againſt an eternal repetition of attacks?

The General further ſays, "Alexandria and El Ariſch are the two keys of Egypt†." El Ariſch is

* The general opinion of the good ſenſe and humanity of Kleber would be ill juſtified, if he had omitted to ſet a mark of reprobation upon the paſſage he has quoted; it is, indeed, characteriſtic of Bonaparte! It is marked with his uſual contempt of human ſufferings, with his laviſh expenditure of blood, and with his wanton ſacrifice of his followers to projects at once uſeleſs and unattainable!

It is permitted to hope, however, that the more ſerious views of Kleber will induce him to cloſe the diſaſtrous ſcene, though *a few leſs than fifteen hundred men* ſhould be the victims of the next peſtilence.

† The ſtatement which follows of the real ſtrength and importance of El Ariſch, and which differs ſo materially from

a paltry fort, four days journey in the Deſert; the prodigious difficulty of victualling it, will not allow of its being garriſoned by more than two hundred and fifty men. Six hundred Mameloucs and Arabs might, whenever they pleaſed, cut off all communication with Catiez; and as, when Bonaparte left us, this garriſon had but a fortnight's proviſion in advance; juſt that ſpace of time, and no more, would be ſufficient to compel it to capitulate without firing a ſhot! The Arabs alone were capable of furniſhing regular convoys of proviſions through theſe burning deſerts: but they have been ſo often over-reached and defrauded, that, far from offering us their ſervices, they now keep aloof and conceal themſelves; beſides, the arrival of the Grand Vizier, who inflames their fanaticiſm and overwhelms them with preſents, will equally tend to incline them to deſert us*.

that of Bonaparte's, is corroborated by a general officer in a letter which will be found (No. XIII.).

There is no doubt of its accuracy, and it bears hard either on the veracity or the military ſkill of Bonaparte. The latter (of the former there are no doubts) has long been ſomewhat problematical; and the attentive readers of this correſpondence will probably be inclined to think not much more highly of it than Kleber appears to do, or the very judicious officer, to whoſe ſtrictures we allude.

* There are two roads from Syria to Egypt; ſo that it is by no means neceſſary to paſs by El Ariſch. Both theſe roads furniſh water; one of them has juſt been diſcovered.—*Note of Kleber.*

Alexandria is by no means a fortreſs; it is a large intrenched camp. It was, indeed, tolerably well defended by a numerous heavy artillery; but ſince we loſt it in the diſaſtrous invaſion of Syria, and ſince General Bonaparte has taken all the cannon belonging to the ſhipping, to complete the equipment of the two frigates with which he ſailed for France, this camp can make, in fact, but a feeble reſiſtance *.

General Bonaparte deceived himſelf with regard to the conſequences which he expected from his victory at Aboukir. He cut to pieces †, it is true, near nine

* This circumſtance is not leſs characteriſtic than the one ſo properly pointed out by Kleber a few pages above: to provide for his own perſonal ſafety at the expenſe of that of the whole "Army of the Eaſt," is only a part of that narrow and ſelfiſh ſyſtem on which he has always acted. But does any thing in it reliſh of the great general? Or can his moſt enthuſiaſtic admirers ſee any thing that did ſo in his unfurniſhing the only defenſible place in his poſſeſſion (of the importance of which he takes care to remind Kleber), for the ſake of a wild and deſultory expedition, he knew not where, at the hazard of leaving it an eaſy prey to the firſt enemy that might be apprized of its unprotected condition?

It is ſcarcely poſſible, on reading theſe and ſimilar paſſages, not to call to mind the ſenſible exclamation of Lacuée; "Oh! how many falſe reputations were acquired in Italy! and how many pedeſtals will now reſt without ſtatues!" *Intercepted Correſpondence, Part II. p.* 133.

† *Détruit.* This does not mean abſolutely cut to pieces, but deſtroyed as a body; and indeed it appears from Bonaparte's

thouſand Turks who had landed there: but what is ſuch a loſs as this to a great nation, from whom we have violently torn the faireſt portion of its empire, and whom religion, honour, and intereſt, equally ſtimulate to avenge its injuries, and to re-conquer what it has been thus deprived of? As a proof of what I ſay, this victory has not retarded for a ſingle inſtant, either the preparations or the march of the Grand Vizier.

In this ſtate of things, what can, and what ought I to do? I think, Citizen Directors, that I ſhould continue the negotiations entered upon by Bonaparte; though the reſult ſhould be merely the gaining a little time, I ſhould even then have ſufficient reaſon to be ſatisfied with it. I have encloſed you the letter * which,

diſpatches to the Directory, that more than two thouſand of thoſe who had diſembarked were priſoners. From this General's well-known talents for exaggeration, a reaſonable hope might be entertained that when he ſtated the loſs of the Turks at eighteen thouſand men, he had merely put down a cipher too many; this hope is now done away by the unſuſpected evidence of Kleber, which unfortunately reduces Bonaparte's number only one half. The reſt of Kleber's information is of the moſt important and conſolatory nature. The army of which Bonaparte and Berthier repreſent the whole to have been deſtroyed, was merely a detachment, it appears, from a much greater force; which, without any ſenſible diminution of its numbers or reſolution, was ſtill hovering near the place of action, and alarming the French for the ſafety of Brulos and Damietta!

* See No. XVI.

in conſequence of this determination, I wrote to the Grand Vizier; ſending him, at the ſame time, a duplicate of that from Bonaparte*.

If this miniſter meets my advances, I ſhall propoſe to him the reſtitution of Egypt on the following conditions†:

"The Grand Signor ſhall appoint a Paſha, as before."

"The Beys ſhall give up to him the Miri, which the Porte has had always *de jure*, and never *de facto*."

"Commerce ſhall be reciprocally open between Egypt and Syria."

* See No. XIV.

† Of theſe conditions, the firſt is unneceſſary, the ſecond impracticable, the third nugatory, and the fourth inadmiſſible. It is evident, however, that Kleber expected nothing from them; they are merely projected in obedience to the commands of Bonaparte, to whom this excellent officer pays the ſame deference as if he were ſtill at the head of the army. Indeed the whole of his conduct, as it appears in this well-written letter, is admirable in the higheſt degree; he feels that he is betrayed, yet not a murmur eſcapes him on his own account; and though he holds it a part of his duty to expoſe the weakneſs of which Bonaparte either was, or affected to be ignorant, he determines to hazard more, perhaps, than his own better judgment approved, to carry his inſtructions into execution with the ſmalleſt deviation poſſible.

"The French ſhall continue in the country, occupy the ſtrong holds and the forts, and collect all the duties and cuſtoms, till the French government ſhall have made peace with England."

If theſe ſummary preliminaries are accepted, I ſhall think I have rendered my country a greater ſervice than if I had obtained the moſt brilliant victory. But I fear they will not be attended to: if the haughtineſs of the Turks oppoſes no obſtacle, I ſhall ſtill have to combat the influence of Engliſh gold. Happen what may, I will endeavour to direct myſelf by circumſtances.

I know all the importance of the poſſeſſion of Egypt. I uſed to ſay in Europe, that this country was for France the point of fixture, by means of which ſhe might move at will the commercial ſyſtem of every quarter of the globe; but to do this effectually, a powerful lever is required, and that lever is a navy. OURS HAS EXISTED! Since that period, every thing has changed; and peace with the Porte is, in my opinion, the only expedient that holds out to us a method of fairly getting rid of an enterpriſe no longer capable of attaining the object for which it was undertaken.

I ſhall not enter, Citizen Directors, into the details of all the diplomatic combinations which the preſent ſtate of Europe might furniſh: this is not my province. In the forlorn ſituation in which I ſtand, and ſo far removed from the centre of action, I can ſcarce give a

thought to any thing but the ſafety and honour of the army which I command: happy if, in the midſt of my diſtreſſes, I ſhould have the good fortune to meet your wiſhes; at a leſs diſtance from you I ſhould place all my glory in obedience.

I have annexed to this an exact eſtimate of the more material articles of which we ſtand in need for the ſervice of the artillery *; and alſo a ſummary recapitulation of the debt contracted and left unpaid by General Bonaparte †.

Health and reſpect.

KLEBER.

P. S. At this inſtant, Citizen Directors, juſt as I am making up my diſpatches, I learn that fourteen or fifteen Turkiſh veſſels are at anchor before Damietta, where they are waiting for the fleet of the Captain Paſha, now at Joppa, and having on board, as I am told, from fifteen to twenty thouſand land forces; beſides theſe, there are ſtill fifteen thouſand men at Gaza, and the Grand Vizier is marching from Damaſcus. A few days ſince, he ſent us back a ſoldier of the 25th demi-brigade, who had been made priſoner

* See No. VI.

† See No. VII.

in the neighbourhood of El Ariſch; after having ſhowed him all his camp, he deſired him to acquaint his comrades with what he had ſeen, and to tell their commander to tremble. This ſeems to announce either the confidence which the Grand Vizier has in his forces, or a wiſh to enter upon an accommodation. With reſpect to myſelf, it will be *abſolutely impoſſible* for me to get together more than five thouſand men capable of taking the field againſt him: notwithſtanding this, I will try my fortune, if I do not ſucceed in gaining time by my negotiations. Dgezzar has withdrawn his forces from Gaza, and marched them back to Acre.

No. V.

Au Quartier Général du Caire, le 14 Fructidor, an 7.

**KLEBER, *Général en Chef, à l'*ARMÉE.

Soldats!

DES motifs impérieux ont déterminé le Général en Chef Bonaparte à passer en France.

Les dangers que présente une navigation entreprise dans une saison peu-favorable sur une mer étroite et couverte d'ennemis, n'ont pu l'arrêter: il s'agissoit de votre bien être.

Soldats; un puissant secours va vous arriver, ou bien une paix glorieuse; une paix digne de vous et de vos travaux va vous ramener dans votre patrie.

En recevant le fardeau dont Bonaparte étoit chargé, j'en ai senti l'importance, et tout ce qu'il avoit de pénible; mais appreciant d'un autre côté votre valeur, tant de fois couronnée par les plus brillants succès; appréciant votre constante patience à braver tous les maux, à supporter toutes les privations; appréciant, enfin, tout ce qu'avec de tels soldats l'on peut faire ou

entreprendre, je n'ai plus consulté que l'avantage d'être à votre tête, que l'honneur de vous commander, et mes forces se sont accrues.

Soldats ; n'en doutez pas ; vos pressants besoins seront sans cesse l'objet de ma plus vive sollicitude.

(Signé) KLEBER.

Par ordre du Général in Chef, Le Général de Division, Chef de l'Etat Major Général,

(Signé) DAMAS.

Pour copie conforme,

(Signé) DUMAS,
l'Adjudant Général.

Pour copie,
LE ROY.

TRANSLATION.

Head Quarters, Cairo, Auguſt 31, 1799.

KLEBER, *Commander in Chief, to the* ARMY.

Soldiers!

MOTIVES of the moſt imperious nature have determined the Commander in Chief, Bonaparte, to return to France.

The dangers incident to a voyage undertaken in no very favourable part of the year *, on a narrow ſea, covered with the enemies' fleets, were too feeble to arreſt him. Your happineſs was at ſtake!

Soldiers! a powerful reinforcement, or a glorious peace, is at hand: a peace worthy of you and of your achievements, is on the point of reſtoring you to your country.

* The 22d of Auguſt may ſeem to thoſe unacquainted with the Mediterranean, no very unfavourable ſeaſon for putting to ſea; but the north-weſt winds, which almoſt conſtantly prevail there about this period, make the voyage to France extremely tedious, and fully juſtify Kleber's obſervation. For the reſt, this ADDRESS, delivered while that General was yet ſmarting from the recent perfidy of Bonaparte, may be recommended to the reader as a model of generoſity, manlineſs, and true military honour.

In taking upon myſelf the charge with which Bonaparte was intruſted, I was neither unaware of its importance, nor of the toil and danger attending it; but on the other hand, when I conſidered your gallantry, ſo often crowned with the moſt brilliant ſucceſs; your unwearied patience in braving every calamity, and ſupporting every privation; when I conſidered, in ſhort, all that might be done or attempted with ſuch ſoldiers, I loſt ſight of every thing but the advantage of being at your head, and the honour of commanding you; and I felt myſelf inſpired with new vigour.

Soldiers! rely upon what I ſay; your urgent wants ſhall be the never-ceaſing object of my moſt earneſt ſolicitude.

(Signed) KLEBER.

By order of the Commander in Chief, the General of Diviſion, and Chief of the Staff,

(Signed) DAMAS.

A true copy.

(Signed) DUMAS,
Adjutant General.

A true copy.

LE ROY.

No. VI.

Armée d'Orient. *République Française.*

APPERÇU *des Sommes dûes au 6 Fructidor, an 7, Epoque à laquelle le Général* KLEBER *a pris le Commandement de l'Armée.*

Desfignation des Services.	Sommes dues.
SOLDE de l'armée, -	4,015,000 0 0
Pour l'extraordinaire, -	576,000 0 0
Difference de ſolde de la loi du 2 Thermidor, an 2, à celle du 23 Floréal, an 5, dûe à une partie de l'armée, - -	802,332 6 2
Artillerie, - -	91,214 0 0
Génie, - -	
Par approximation, marine, militaire et marchande, -	3,962,124 0 6
Subſiſtances militaires,	1,198,973 10 0
Habillement, -	144,381 10 10
Hôpitaux militaires, -	311,277 15 4
Tranſports militaires, -	177,098 4 0
Poſtes militaires, -	5,432 12 2
Au Chef de l'attellier des ſelles,	12,601 0 0

Au Chef de l'attellier des bottes,	6,000	0	0
Aux Fourniſſeurs de Suez,	7,014	6	0
A differens particuliers, François, Turcs, et Grecs, qui ont fait les fournitures, ſoit à Alexandrie ou autres places,	41,980	7	0
Au Citoyen Roſetty pour fournitures faites à l'armée lors de ſon paſſage à Rhamanie,	3,222	12	8
Total général,	£.11,315,252	10	2

OBSERVATIONS.

La dépenſe excéde la recette de 11,315,252 : 10 : 2 depuis votre départ de France; la dette ne peut donc qu'augmenter. En arrivant en Egypte il a été frappé de réquiſitions dans toutes les places, pour ſubvenir aux beſoins de l'armée en ſubſiſtances. Cet objet n'a pas été payé.

Il a été levé des contributions extraordinaires ſur les marchands, negociants, &c.

L'on s'eſt emparé en arrivant des biens des Mamelloucks, de leurs effets; leurs femmes ont payé une impoſition extraordinaire.

Le revenu de l'an 7 a été plus conſidérable que ne ſera celui de l'an 8. L'innondation a été mauvaiſe cette année, et beaucoup de villages n'ont pas eu d'eau.

L'on n'a pas compris dans la dette ce qui eſt dû aux provinces, pour les objets fournis en nature pour le paſſage des troupes.

Il ſera facile de voir par ces obſervations, qu'auſſi longtemps que l'armée en Egypte ſera active, que le commerce avec l'extérieur n'aura pas repris, l'on ne pourra jamais parvenir d'établir la recette égale à la dépenſe : les finances ne pourront donc être dans un état ſatisfaiſant avant la paix.

Certifié conforme par moi, Commiſſaire Ordonnateur en Chef de l'Armée aux états particuliers qui m'ont été remis.

Au Caire le 16 Vendemiaire, an 8 de la République Françaiſe.

Vu le Général en Chef,

(Signé) KLEBER,

TRANSLATION.

Army of the East. *French Republic.*

ESTIMATE *of the different Sums due on the 23d of Auguſt 1799, the Period at which* GENERAL KLEBER *took upon himſelf the Command of the Army.*

	Sums due.		
PAY of the army - -	4,015,000	0	0
Extraordinaries - -	576,000	0	0
Difference of pay, between the law of the 2d Thermidor, in the year 2, and that of the 23d Floreal, in the year 5, due to part of the army - -	802,332	6	2
Artillery - -	91,214	0	0
Engineers - -			
Marine, military, and merchant ſervice, by a rough calculation	3,962,124	0	6
Military ſubſiſtence - -	1,198,973	10	0
Clothing - - -	144,381	10	10
Military hoſpitals - -	311,277	15	4
Military convoys - -	177,098	4	0
Military poſts - -	5,432	12	2
To the Inſpector of the ſaddle manufactory - -	12,601	0	9

To the Inſpector of the boot manufactory - -	6,000	0	0
To the Commiſſaries at Suez -	7,014	6	0
To certain French, Turks, and Greeks, who have furniſhed proviſions at Alexandria, and elſewhere - - -	41,980	7	0
To Citizen Roſetty for proviſions for the army, when on its march to Rhamanie -	3,222	12	8
Total	11,315,252	10	2

OBSERVATIONS.

Since the army quitted France, the expenditure has exceeded the receipts by 11,315,252 livres, 10 ſous, 2 deniers—this debt, then, muſt inevitably continue increaſing. At our firſt arrival here, requiſitions were made in all the towns for the immediate ſubſiſtence of the troops. Theſe have never been paid for.

Extraordinary contributions were levied upon the merchants, tradeſmen, &c.

The effects of the Mamelouks were alſo ſeized on our arrival: their wives have been made to pay an extraordinary impoſition.

The receipts of the laſt year were greater than thoſe

of the preſent can poſſibly be. The inundation has failed, and many villages have been deprived of water.

The debt above ſtated, does not include what is due to the provinces for the ſupplies in kind, with which the troops were furniſhed during their march.

It is evident from theſe obſervations, that, as long as the army of Egypt is engaged in hoſtilities, there can be no foreign trade; nor can the receipts be poſſibly made to anſwer the expenſes. It is peace alone which can place the receipts on a ſatisfactory footing.

Certified by me,

E. POUSSIELGUE, Commiſſary-general, &c.

to be conformable to the reſpective liſts delivered to me at Cairo, Oct. 7, 1799.

Examined by the Commander in Chief,

(Signed) KLEBER.

No. VII.

Etat des principaux Objets relatifs à l'Artillerie manquants à l'Armément des Places, à l'Armée active, et à l'Equipage de Siége.

ARTILLERIE.

ARMÉE D'ORIENT.

Nature des Objets.	Manquant à l'armément			
	Des places.	De l'armée active et à ses établissemens.	A l'équipage de siége.	Total.
Bouches à feu — Cannons de touts calibres	197	45	14	309
Bouches à feu — Mortiers et pierriers de différens calibres	22	—	6	
Bouches à feu — Obusiers de différens calibres	16	5	4	
Affûts de rechange de toutes espèces	184	38	25	187
Boulets de différens calibres	150,000	36,000	14,000	200,000
Bombes et obus de touts calibres	10,800	1,800	4,200	16,800
Balles de fer battu pour mitrailles	1,696,000	840,000	70,000	2,606,000
Grenades de remparts et à mains	10,000	—	—	10,000
Plombs en saumons	300,000*lb.*	400,000*lb.*	—	700,000*lb.*
Poudre de guerre	600,000*lb.*	400,000*lb.*	150,000*lb.*	1,150,000*lb.*

Nature des Objets.			Manquant à l'armément			
			Des places.	De l'armée active et à ses établissemens.	A l'équipage de siége.	Total.
Pierres à feu			400,000	600,000	—	1,000,000
Armes portatives	Fusils avec bayonnettes, baguettes, &c.		10,000	10,000	—	20,000
	Carabines		—	2,000	—	2,000
	Pistolets de calibre		—	4,000	—	4,000
	Bayonnettes de rechange		—	10,000	—	10,000
	Platines, idem		—	5,000	—	5,000
	Pieces de rechange de toutes espèces		—	40,000	—	40,000
	Sabres	à la houssarde	—	1,200	—	1,200
		de cavalerie	—	1,200	—	1,200
		d'infanterie	—	6,000	—	6,000
		d'artillerie	—	1,000	—	1,000
Outils	à Pionniers	Pilles — Quarrées	2,000	700	500	3,200
		Pilles — Rondes	3,000	2,000	1,500	6,500
		Pics — Hoyaux	3,000	2,000	1,500	6,500
		Pics — à Roe	500	400	300	1,200
	Tranchants	Haches	800	400	600	1,800
		Serpes	1,600	800	1,200	3,600
	d'Ouvriers en fer et en bois de toutes espèces		2,317	1,171	1,146	4,634*qrs.*
Fers de différens échantillons (quintaux)			400*qrs.*	300*qrs.*	100*qrs.*	800*qrs.*

Aciers (quintaux)	80	60	20	160
Charbon de terre (quintaux)	1,200qrs.	900qrs.	300qrs.	2,400qrs.
Forges de campagnes	—	10	—	10
Feuilles de fer blanc	96,000	48,000	6,000	150,000
Tôle (feuilles)	600	600	—	1,200
Cuivre laminé (quintaux)	100qrs.	150qrs.	—	250qrs.
Bois (solives de différens échantillons)	3,000	1,500	1,500	6,000
Bois de fusils	5,000	5,000	—	10,000
Etoffes pour sachets (aunes, &c.)	10,000	25,000	—	35,000
Papiers pour gargousses et cartouches (rames, &c.)	680	300	80	1,060
Sacs à terre	200,000	50,000	50,000	300,000
Mêches (livres)	100,000	25,000	25,000	150,000
Cordages et menus cordages (quintaux)	60qrs.	20qrs.	20qrs.	100qrs.
Poix noire, blanche, résine, goudron, soufre, cire et suiffe (livres de)	12,000	—	6,000	18,000
Utensiles d'artifices de toutes espèces	500	300	200	1,000

(Signé) KLEBER,
Le Général en Chef.

ORIGINAL LETTERS.

Il n'y a dans les places que la moitié des bouches à feu néceſſaires à leur armément et la plûpart ſont hors de ſervice; les meilleurs ſont à la marine, qui les redemande.

Le charbon de bois eſt épuiſé; il n'y a aucun moyen d'en faire.

Ce tableau au moins eſt appuyé d'un mémoire qu'on a cru inutile d'envoyer.

(Signé) KLEBER.

Au Caire, le 9 Vendémiaire, an 7.

(Signé) Le Général d'Artillerie,
FOUGER.

*** As the real importance of this paper can only be duly appreciated by military men, who will undoubtedly underſtand it better in the original than in any tranſlation that can be offered by ſuch as are but imperfectly acquainted with the terms of the ſcience; it is given to them as it came from the hands of Kleber.

No. VIII.

BUREAU DES PORTS.

Alexandrie, le 10 Vendémiaire, an 8.

L'ORDONNATEUR *de la Marine, en Egypte, au Miniſtre de la Marine et des Coloniet.*

Citoyen Miniſtre,

JE déſire ardemment que l'arrivée des quatre bâtimens aux ordres du Contr'-amiral Ganteaume, vous ait mis à même de reçevoir le peu de mots, qu'il m'ait été poſſible de leur remettre, par duplicata, le 5 Fructidor dernier, époque de leur départ.

Voici à tout événement la liſte de ces bâtimens.

Bâtimens.		Artillerie.		Commandans.
		Batterie.	Gaillards.	
Le Muiron	Frégates Vénitiennes cloüées et chevillées en fer, doublées en cuivre, la première le 3 Brumaire, la ſeconde le 25 du dit; an 7 - -	28 de 18	12 de 6	Ganteaume, Contr'-amiral. Delarue, Capitaine de frégate.
Le Carrère -		28 de 12	10 de 5½	Dumanoir le Pelley, Chef de Diviſion.
L'Indépendant	Aviſo - - -	4 de 6		Gaſtaud, E. N.
La Révanche	Idem - -	4 de 3		Picard, E. E.

C'eſt à bord de la frégate le Muiron, que s'eſt embarqué le Général Bonaparte. Les proclamations, dont j'annexe ici les copies, ont fait connoître à l'armée ſon départ, et ſon remplacement par le Général Kleber.

J'aurois voulu joindre ici une liſte exacte des paſſagers embarqués à bord de ces quatre bâtimens; mais le ſecret du départ a empêché de les porter ſur le rôle du bureau des armémens, et c'eſt en vain que je me ſuis adreſſé à l'état major-général actuel. Voici la ſeule liſte que le Chef du Bureau des Armémens ait pu me procurer, et une liſte préſumée.

Le Général Bonaparte, le Contr'-amiral Ganteaume vous auront mieux inſtruit que je ne pourrois le faire de notre ſituation intérieure. Je me contente de vous hazarder des ſommaires particuliers au port d'Alexandrie.

Privés à peu près de toute correſpondance depuis notre arrivée en Egypte, nous avons des preuves évidentes de l'activité que mettent les ennemis à intercepter les communications. Il conviendroit, je penſe, de profiter d'un bâtiment de choix pour faire paſſer un chiffre qui mît à même de vous rendre des comptes détaillés.

Depuis le départ du Général Bonaparte, les vigies d'Alexandrie n'ont ſignalé que trois bâtimens éloignés,

et un bateau ſoupçonné porteur de paquets: il auroit pu être intercepté, ſi nous avions eu ici quelques bâtimens légers, doublés en cuivre. Il n'eſt pas de mon reſſort de vous parler des forces militaires maritimes; ſeul moyen de conſolider les ſuccès de l'armée de terre; mais je dois avoir l'honneur de vous obſerver que, dans les moments où il n'y a pas de blocus, des bâtimens de 12 à 16 canons, doublés en cuivre, pourroient exécuter des expéditions très-utiles à cette colonie.

Voici copie d'un rapport du Général en Chef au Directoire. On parle confuſément d'un raſſemblement en Syrie de troupes aux ordres directs du Grand Viſir, compoſées, 1, de celles qu'il a amenées; 2. de celles de Djezzar Pacha d'Acre; 3. enfin, de ce qui reſte de Mamelouks à Ibrahim Bey, ancien Cheick-el-Belled.

Quelle que ſoit, Citoyen Miniſtre, l'iſſue des opérations militaires, il me paroît de la dernière urgence que le Directoire Exécutif nomme un commiſſaire, qui, muni d'inſtructions, ait l'autorité convenable pour ſuppléer à l'ancienne inſpection de l'ambaſſadeur près la Porte Ottomane, et aviſe aux moyens, ſoit de diminuer les plaies du commerce du Levant, ſoit de le faire renaître à la paix; l'induſtrie, et la ſubſiſtance des départemens meridionaux commandent cette meſure. Ces utiles fonctions, Citoyen Miniſtre, ont beſoin d'être confiées à quelque ancien adminiſtrateur

des colonies, habitué à réparer les maux que cauſent inévitablement au commerce maritime, les invaſions militaires et leurs ſuites. Il ſera on ne peut plus eſſentiel de tracer avec rigueur la démarcation des pouvoirs. L'ardeur guerrière connoît peu le ſyſtême des contrepoids: elle ſacrifie tout aux beſoins du moment; elle s'empare et des officiers ſupérieurs et des officiers ſubalternes. Ils oublient combien le reſpect des lois, et l'amour de l'ordre aſſurent les réſultats; ils ſervent leur ambition particulière, et occaſionnent, ſans le vouloir, des déſordres irréparables. J'ai vu un officier, eſtimable d'ailleurs, vouloir commander la rade, les armes, et les travaux. Survenoit-il un Contr'-amiral, les pouvoirs s'entre-choquoient, les déſordres ſe multiplioient; l'intérêt particulier étoit le ſeul qui, ſuivant avec conſtance ſes vues, profitoit de la multiplicité * * * * * * *.

* * * des claſſes dans la Méditerrannée, le rétabliſſement du commerce dans cette mer, exigent les meſures les plus promptes, les plus vigoureuſes, et les plus ſages.

Salut et reſpect.

(Signé) LE ROY.

P. S. Depuis ma lettre écrite, j'ai demandé quelques renſeignemens à un Capitaine de navire qui a fréquenté les échelles; je les avois vainement demandés au commerce.

Les marchandiſes Françaiſes ſe débitoient en Egypte par échange contre les marchandiſes du païs, qui ſe compoſoient de ſes productions, de celles de Yemen, et de celles de l'intérieur de l'Afrique.

Les Beys demandoient aux négocians ce dont ils avoient beſoin, mais à crédit: ils payoient lorſque bon leur ſembloit; de ſorte qu'il reſte dans toutes les places de commerce de l'Egypte, des dettes conſidérables; les unes provenant d'échanges qui n'ont pas été acquittés, les autres de dettes antérieures.

Dans la ſituation actuelle, il paroît de la prudence et de la juſtice, de charger un agent du Gouvernement de ſe faire préſenter les livres de crédit des diverſes maiſons Françaiſes, pour connoître ce qui eſt dû au commerce entier; puis mettre à même le Gouvernement de prendre les meſures jugées néceſſaires.

A l'egard des autres échelles du Levant, la paix ſeule pourra faciliter au commerce les moyens de répéter ce qui lui eſt dû. L'objet du Gouvernement doit être de lui préparer les moyens de protection néceſſaires pour appuyer ſes réclamations.

L. R.

No. 1.

État des Passagers sur les Bâtimens ci-après, partis le 6 Fructidor, an 7.

SAVOIR :

Frégate le Carrère.

LEON Le Vavasseur, Directeur d'Artillerie; François Joseph Allemand, Capitaine de Frégate.

Frégate le Muiron.

Joseph Marie Nouveau, maître calfat entretenu, provenant du vaisseau L'Orient, ayant été employé depuis à Alexandrie.

Alexandrie le 23 Fructidor, l'an 7 de la République.

(Signé) GIRAUD,
Sous-Commissaire de Marine.

Pour copie,
LE ROY.

No. 2.

Liſte des Paſſagers préſumé embarqués ſur les Bâtiments de la République aux Ordres du Contr'-Amiral Ganteaume.

SAVOIR :

Bonaparte, Général en Chef.
Duroc, } Aides de Camp.
La Valette, }
Beauharnois, }
Merlin, }
Fauvelet Bourſienne, Secrétaire.
Berthier, Général de Diviſion.
L'Huilier, Aide de Camp.
Andréoſſy, Général de Brigade.
Lannes, Général de Brigade.
Murat, Général de Brigade.
Marmont, Général de Brigade.
Monteſney; Aide de Camp.
Beiſſieres, Chef de Brigade des Guides.
Monge, Membre de l'Inſtitut National.
Bertholet, idem.
Denon, Membre de l'Inſtitut d'Egypte.
Perceval, idem.

L. R.

TRANSLATION.

MARINE OFFICE.

Alexandria, October 1, 1799.

LE ROY, *Commiſſary of the Marine in Egypt, to the Miniſter of Marine and of the Colonies.*

Citizen Miniſter,

I MOST anxiouſly wiſh that the ſafe arrival of the four veſſels under the command of Rear-admiral Ganteaume may have put you in poſſeſſion of the ſhort letter which I had juſt time to diſpatch; duplicates of which were put on board them on the 22d of Auguſt, the day of their departure.

At all events, however, I ſend you a liſt of the names, &c. of thoſe veſſels:

Le Muiron, of 28 guns, 18-pounders on the main-deck. Ganteaume, Rear-admiral; De la Rue, Captain.

Le Carrère, of 28 guns, 12-pounders. Dumanoir le Pelley, General of Diviſion.

(Both theſe frigates are Venetian built; bolted with iron, and coppered here; the firſt on the 24th

of October, and the ſecond the 15th of November laſt.)

L'Independant, Advice-boat, 4 ſix-pounders. Gaſtaud, Enſign.

La Révanche, Advice-boat, 4 three-pounders. Picard, Enſign.

General Bonaparte took his paſſage on board Le Muiron. The Proclamations, which I encloſe, firſt announced to the army his departure, and the appointment of General Kleber in his ſtead.

I ſhould have been happy to ſend you a correct liſt of the paſſengers on board theſe four veſſels; but the ſecrecy of their departure prevented the names from being entered on the regiſters of the proper office; and I have aſked in vain for information from the officers of the preſent ſtaff. You will find at the concluſion of my letter the only liſt which the firſt clerk of the Navy Office was able to procure me; and another made up on conjecture.

General Bonaparte and Rear-admiral Ganteaume will have given you better information than I can pretend to do on our internal ſituation. I ſhall merely confine myſelf to hazarding a few brief obſervations on the port of Alexandria.

Deprived of nearly all correſpondence with France

ſince our arrival in this country, we have the moſt undoubted proofs of the ſucceſsful activity of the enemy in intercepting our communications. It ſtrikes me therefore, that it would be exceedingly proper to diſpatch, by a ſwift-ſailing veſſel, a cipher that would at once enable me to ſend you more detailed accounts.

From the time that General Bonaparte left us, the men on the look-out have diſcovered but three ſhips in the offing; and a boat which was ſuſpected to have diſpatches on board. We might eaſily have taken it, had we been provided with a few light, copper-bottomed veſſels. It certainly does not fall within my department to ſay any thing reſpecting the naval forces, the ſole means of giving effect to the ſucceſſes of the land army; but I muſt, notwithſtanding, do myſelf the honour to hint to you, that during thoſe periods when the blockade is accidentally raiſed, a few corvettes, carrying from 12 to 16 guns, and coppered, might be ſucceſsfully employed on expeditions of the utmoſt utility to the colony.

Here is the copy of a report made to the Directory by the Commander in Chief: "We have a confuſed account of an army collecting in Syria, under the immediate command of the Grand Viſier, compoſed, firſt, of the troops which followed him from Conſtantinople; ſecondly, of thoſe of Djezzar, Paſhaw of Acre, and, thirdly, of the remainder of the Mame-

loucs, under Ibrahim, ancient Cheick-el-beled, or chief of the Beys."

Whatever, Citizen Miniſter, may be the iſſue of our military operations, I cannot but think it of the utmoſt moment that the Executive Directory ſhould appoint a commiſſary, with the requiſite powers, to ſupply the void of the inſpection, formerly confided to the ambaſſador at the Ottoman Porte. They ſhould alſo conſult on the means, either of diminiſhing the loſſes of the Levant trade; or rather of reproducing and invigorating it, at the period of peace: the employment and the ſubſiſtence of the ſouthern provinces imperiouſly call for ſomething of this kind.

Theſe uſeful functions, Citizen Miniſter, ſhould be confided in ſome former manager of theſe eſtabliſhments; one habituated to repair the evils which a war of invaſion, and its attendant conſequences, inevitably bring on foreign trade. It will be alſo eſſentially neceſſary to define with rigorous exactneſs the limits of authority in each department. Military ardour enters little into the ſyſtem of a counterpoiſing power: it ſacrifices every thing to the calls of the moment; it lays its hands on the civil officers of every deſcription. Soldiers forget what influence a reſpect for the laws and a love of order has on the event of things: they liſten only to an intereſted ambition, and occaſion, without intending it, diſorders of the moſt irreparable kind. I have ſeen myſelf, an officer, in other reſpects

a valuable character, insist upon commanding the harbour, the troops, and the workmen! Did a Rear-admiral chance to drop in; their authorities instantly clashed: confusion succeeded to confusion; and private interest, which alone pursues its object with steadiness, took advantage of these multiplied pretensions * *

[Here is an omission in the original.]

* * * * * * * * * of the different orders in the Mediterranean, and the re-establishment of trade in that sea, call for the most prompt, decisive, and judicious measures.

Health and respect.

(Signed) LE ROY.

P. S. Since my letter was finished, I have had an opportunity of procuring some information from the captain of a ship, who has frequented the ports of the Levant. The merchants have constantly rejected my application.

Our merchandise was usually exchanged in Egypt for the merchandise of the country, which consisted of the productions of Yemen, and those of the interior of Africa.

The Beys took from the traders the articles of which they stood in need; but always on credit. They paid for them at their leisure; so that there are considerable debts still out-standing in most of the commercial

towns of the country; ſome ariſing from exchanges which have not been completed, and others from former demands.

In the preſent ſituation of things, it would ſeem to be no leſs an act of prudence than of juſtice to empower an agent of Government to lay before them the account-books of the different houſes in advance, that an eſtimate may be formed of what is due to the whole body, and proper meaſures taken to recover it.

With reſpect to the other ports of the Levant, nothing but peace can enable the merchants to get in what is due to them. The object of Government ſhould be to furniſh them with the degree of protection neceſſary to ſupport and enforce their claims.

LE R.

ENCLOSURES.

No. 1.

List of Passengers on board the under-mentioned Vessels, which sailed August the 23d, 1799.

On board Le Carrère.

Léon Le Vavasseur, Director of the Artillery; Francis Joseph Allemand, Captain of the frigate.

On board Le Muiron.

Joseph Marie Nouveau, Master-caulker, from the *L'Orient*, and since employed at Alexandria.

Alexandria, September 9, 1799.

(Signed) GIRAUD,
Under-Commissary of Marine.

A true copy,
LE ROY.

No. 2.

Conjectural Liſt of Paſſengers on board the Ships of the Republic, under the Command of Rear-admiral Ganteaume.

Viz.

Bonaparte, Commander in Chief.

Duroc,
La Vallette,
Beauharnois,
Merlin,
} Aid de Camps.

Fauvelet Bourſienne, Secretary.

Berthier, General of Diviſion.

L'Huilier, Aid de Camp.

Andréoſſi,
Lannes,
Murat,
Marmont,
} Generals of Brigade.

Monteſney, Aid de Camp.

Beiſſieres, Chief of Brigade of Guides.

Monge,
Bertholet,
} Members of the National Inſtitute.

Denon,
Perceval,
} Members of the Egyptian Inſtitute.

L. R.

No. IX.

LIBERTE'. EGALITE'

Au Kaire, le 19 Vendémiaire, an 8 de la République Françaiſe.

E. POUSSIELGUE, *Contrôleur des Dépenſes de l'Armée, Adminiſtrateur-général des Finances de l'Egypte, aux Commiſſaires de la Tréſorerie Nationale.*

Citoyens Commiſſaires,

JE n'aurai de compte à vous rendre que quand je ſerai de retour en France, ou quand la liberté et la ſûreté des communications ſeront rétablies. Ce compte ſera court: il ſe trouvera plus détaillé dans le compte de vôtre Payeur-général.

Je me borne à vous aſſurer qu'on ne peût mettre plus d'ordre dans la comptabilité; plus d'intégrité et d'exactitude dans les payemens; et plus d'obſervations des regles preſcrites par les loix et par vos inſtructions, que ne l'a fait votre Payeur-général.

Malgré la plus ſévère économie, l'armée eſt extrêmement arriérée : il eſt dû plus de 10 millions ; et nos reſſources diminuant chaque jour, cet arriéré s'accroîtra. Il vous ſera préſenté ſucceſſivement des lettres de change qu'il a fallu donner à toutes les parties prenants à qui on ne pouvoit donner du numéraire. Je vous prie, Citoyens Commiſſaires, d'y faire honneur pour conſerver à l'armée ce ſeul crédit qui lui reſte, autant que pour être juſtes envers des hommes qui font ici le ſacrifice de leur ſanté, et qui ſupportent toutes les eſpèces de privations imaginables.

Salut et reſpect.

POUSSIELGUE.

TRANSLATION.

LIBERTY. EQUALITY.

FRENCH REPUBLIC.

Cairo, October 10, 1799.

E. POUSSIELGUE, *Comptroller of the Expenſes of the Army, and Adminiſtrator-general of the Finances of Egypt, to the Commiſſioners of the National Treaſury.*

Citizen Commiſſioners,

I SHALL have no account to lay before you till my return to France, or till the freedom and ſafety of our communications ſhall be re-eſtabliſhed. The preſent account will be conciſe: it will be found more detailed in that of your Paymaſter-general.

I confine myſelf to aſſuring you, that it is not poſſible to exhibit better order in this department, more integrity and accuracy in the payments, or ſtricter obſervance of the rules preſcribed by the laws, than your Paymaſter-general has already ſhown.

In ſpite of the moſt ſevere economy, the army is extremely in arrear: it already amounts to more than ten millions; and, as our reſources are daily diminiſhing, this arrear muſt neceſſarily increaſe. You will be ſucceſſively preſented with the drafts which we have been obliged to give to different people whom we could by no means pay in ſpecie; I entreat you earneſtly to honour them duly, as well for preſerving to the army the only means of obtaining credit that are left, as for doing juſtice to a ſet of men *, who are here ſacrificing their health, and ſupporting every kind of privation imaginable.

Health and reſpect.

POUSSIELGUE.

* Pouſſielgue alludes to thoſe ſpeculators, brokers, &c. who always attend the plundering expeditions of the French, and of whom ſo ſtriking a deſcription is given by Deſcorches. *See the Second Part of the Intercepted Correſpondence*, p. 184.

No. X.

LIBERTE'. EGALITE'.

Au Caire, le 24 Vendémiaire, an 8 de la République Françaiſe.

E. POUSSIELGUE, *Contrôleur des Dépenſes de l'Armée, et Adminſtrateur-général des Finances de l'Egypte, au Citoyen* MERLIN, *Membre du Directoire Exécutif.*

Citoyen Directeur,

DEPUIS que j'ai remis au Citoyen Barras, la premiere dépêche que j'ai eu l'honneur de vous adreſſer, les conferences particulieres et qui ont eu lieu avec l'Effendi revenu de Damas, ont laiſſé entretenir, nonobſtant la lettre du Grand Viſir, des voyes d'accomodement qui peuvent devenir extrêmement importantes pour la République Françaiſe; mais elles dependent uniquement de la part que les Anglais voudront y prendre.

Le Général Kleber met ſous les yeux du Directoire les notes qui contiennent l'analiſe de la conference. Il m'eſt bien démontré que le Grand Viſir ſeroit diſpoſé à faire tout ce que nous deſirerions, s'il ne craignoit,

qu'à la première apparence de ſon intelligence avec nous, la Ruſſie n'attaquât à l'improviſte, l'Empire Ottoman, qui n'eſt pas en état de ſe defendre ; mais ſi la Porte étoit aſſurée d'une alliance puiſſante, qui ſoutiendroit bientôt ſes foibles efforts, et finiroit par la rendre victorieuſe, elle ne balanceroit pas à prendre ſon parti, et cependant les diſpoſitions ſont toujours ſubordonnées à ce que les Anglais ſoyent d'accord avec lui, et avec nous.

Or, comme la République Françaiſe ne peut rien craindre des Anglais, qui ne ſoit fort au deſſous de ce que l'établiſſement des Ruſſes dans la Méditerranée lui feroit perdre : qu'il n'y a pas à eſpérer que pendant la guerre actuelle, on puiſſe obtenir aucune reſtitution de la part des Anglais, autrement que par un prompt traité qui leur preſenteroit d'autres avantages, et qu'en ſuppoſant même qu'ils ne conſentiſſent à aucune reſtitution, il n'y auroit aucun intérêt préſent à continuer la guerre, et *aucun inconvenient à ajourner nos reclamations à des tems plus heureux.* Le Directoire Exécutif, s'il goutoit le plan reſultant des notes que lui envoye le Général Kleber, pourroit applanir toutes les difficultés, et, d'un ſeul coup, par ſon alliance avec les Anglais et la Porte, délivrer la République Françaiſe de ces deux puiſſans ennemis, et de tous les autres, dont ils entraineroient neceſſairement la chûte.

Dans tous les cas, il eſt néceſſaire d'entamer vivement des négociations avec les Anglais, et avec la Porte, quand

ce ne ſeroit que pour gagner du temps, et donner de l'ombrage à la Ruſſie, et la porter à déclarer la guerre au Grand Seigneur, comme elle paroit en attendre impatiemment l'occaſion.

Salut et reſpect.

POUSSIELGUE.

TRANSLATION.

LIBERTY. EQUALITY.

E. POUSSIELGUE *, *Comptroller of the Expenſes of the Army, and Adminiſtrator-general of the Finances of Egypt, to Citizen* MERLIN, *Member of the Executive Directory.*

Citizen Director,

SINCE the delivery to Citizen Barras of the firſt diſpatch which I had the honour to addreſs to you,

* The name of Pouſſielgue is familiar to the readers of the Intercepted Correſpondence. They have ſeen and admired his accurate deſcription of the victory of Aboukir: he

the particular conferences which have taken place with the Effendi, who is returned from Damaſcus, have afforded us, notwithſtanding the letter of the Grand Vizier, ſome glimpſes of a plan of accommodating matters, which may, in its conſequences, become extremely important for the Republic; its final ſucceſs, however, *depends entirely* on the part which the Engliſh may think proper to take in it.

General Kleber is now engaged in arranging for the Directory the notes which contain the ſubſtance of the conference. To me it is evident that the Grand Vizier would be diſpoſed to do every thing we could wiſh; if he were not afraid that the inſtant his communications with us were diſcovered, Ruſſia would ſuddenly fall upon the Ottoman Empire, which is at this time in no ſtate of defence. But, if the Porte were ſure of a powerful alliance, which would ſupport her feeble efforts at the outſet, and finally render her victorious, ſhe would not heſitate an inſtant in forming her reſolution. After all, theſe mea-

appears here in a new light; and though his views for this country cannot be conſidered as evincing much knowledge of our character or connexions, yet his obſervations, as far as they reſpect France, muſt be allowed to be judicious. It would be ſuperfluous to dwell on the importance of this letter, or to call the reader's attention to the hopeleſs ſituation of the French affairs in the Mediterranean. The deſultory whining of Le Roy ſhowed that their commerce was annihilated there; the ſtrong and concluſive repreſentations of Pouſſielgue prove that their military influence will not long ſurvive it.

ſures, as I have already ſaid, cannot be put in execution unleſs the Engliſh become a party in them, and unite with the Porte and with us.

Now as the French Republic has nothing to apprehend from the Engliſh, which is not trifling when compared with the loſſes ſhe muſt inevitably ſuſtain from the eſtabliſhment of the Ruſſians in the Mediterranean; as there is not a chance of recovering from the Engliſh any part of what they have taken from us during the preſent war, but by an immediate treaty, which ſhould hold out to them equivalent advantages elſewhere; and, on the ſuppoſition that they would agree to no reſtitution, there would be no preſent purpoſe anſwered by continuing the war, *and no inconvenience ſuſtained by adjourning our claims* (reclamations) *to a happier period*; the Executive Directory, if it ſhould reliſh the plan reſulting from the notes which General Kleber is preparing to ſend home, may eaſily remove every difficulty; and by an alliance with England and the Porte, deliver, at one ſtroke, the French Republic from theſe two powerful enemies, and from all the others, whoſe fall their defection from the alliance would neceſſarily enſure.

At all events, IT IS INDISPENSABLE TO OPEN NEGOTIATIONS IN THE MOST EARNEST MANNER WITH THE ENGLISH AND THE PORTE; EVEN IF NO OTHER ADVANTAGE SHOULD RESULT FROM THEM THAN

GAINING TIME, AND GIVING OFFENCE TO RUSSIA; such offence as should induce her to declare war against the Grand Seignior, to an opportunity of doing which she seems to look forward with impatience.

Health and respect.

POUSSIELGUE.

No. XI.

LIBERTE'. EGALITE'.

Au Quartier Général du Caire, le 20 Vendémiaire, an 8 de la République Françaiſe, une et indiviſible.

DAMAS, *Général de Diviſion, Chef de l'Etat Major, Général de l'Armée, au* MINISTRE DE LA GUERRE.

J'AI l'honneur de vous adreſſer, Citoyen Miniſtre, la Proclamation du Général Bonaparte à l'armée en la quittant, et celle du Général Kleber en en prenant le commandement en chef :

Les ordres du jour, et les 4 numéros du Courier d'Egypte qui ont paru depuis cette derniere époque :

L'état des officiers généraux, et états majors, et ſupérieurs des corps qui ſont morts à l'armée juſqu'à ce jour :

L'état des promotions que le Général en Chef Kleber a cru indiſpenſable de faire pour le bien du ſervice ;

vous en ſentirez vous-même la néceſſité, en comparant ces deux derniers.

Je vous prie, Citoyen Miniſtre, de demander au Directoire Exécutif la confirmation de ces grades, et de m'en faire paſſer les nominations définitives.

Je ne puis encore vous envoyer, l'état détaillé de la ſituation générale de l'armée, parce qu'en prenant les fonctions de Chef d'Etat Major, Général, je n'ai pas trouvé les états particuliers néceſſaires pour le former. J'eſpére vous les faire parvenir par le premier courier.

Il ne m'a pas encore été poſſible de réunir ceux de tous les corps de l'armée diſſéminés ſur une auſſi grande étendue de terrein que celle que nous avons à défendre; et dont la plupart ſont, en outre, ſans ceſſe occupés à pourſuivre les Arabes, ou à combattre les Beys errans avec leurs partis, qui ſe groſſiſſent auſſitôt qu'on leur donne un moment de relâche.

Vous pouvez juger de l'affoibliſſement de l'armée par ſa réduction conſidérable depuis un an.

Son effectif au 1 Vendémiaire, an 7, étoit de plus de 33,000 hommes: il eſt, en ce moment au deſſous de 22,000, dont il faut déduire deux mille malades ou bleſſés hors d'état de faire aucun ſervice; et 4000 environ hors d'état d'entrer en campagne, qui ne ſont point propres à un ſervice actif, et dont partie ou

bleſſés, ou attaqués de maux d'yeux préfèrent reſter dans les dépôts plutôt que de s'expoſer à gagner les maladies épidémiques auxquelles les hôpitaux ſont ſujets dans ce pays.

Il réſulte de ce tableau comparatif que depuis un an l'état de l'effectif eſt réduit d'un tiers, et celui des préſens ſous les armes diminué de moitié.

Les ſeize mille hommes (environ) de toutes armes qui compoſent l'armée active, ſont répandus ſur une ſurface de terrein compriſe dans un triangle, dont la baſe, depuis le Maraboud juſqu'à El Arich, a deux cent lieues à peu près ; de même que ſes côtés dont l'un depuis El Arich s'éleve juſqu'au delà des premieres Cataractes (qui peuvent être conſidérées comme ſon ſommet) et l'autre depuis les Cataractes juſqu'au Maraboud.

L'expérience prouve en ce moment, Citoyen Miniſtre, que lorſque les garniſons indiſpenſables pour la ſureté des places et des provinces ſont diſtraites du nombre d'hommes en état d'entrer en campagne, il eſt impoſſible d'en réunir ſept mille ſur un ſeul point pour s'oppoſer aux efforts des ennemis, qui nous menacent d'invaſion de tous côtés.

Je préſume que le Général en Chef, en écrivant au Directoire Exécutif, lui donne des renſeignemens plus circonſtanciés ſur la ſituation de l'armée et de toute la colonie.

Salut et reſpect.

DAMAS.

TRANSLATION.

LIBERTY. EQUALITY.

ARMY OF THE EAST.

Head Quarters, Cairo,
October 11, 1799.

DAMAS *, *General of Division, Chief of the Staff, General of the Army, to the* MINISTER OF WAR.

I HAVE the honour of transmitting you, Citizen Minister, the Proclamation of General Bonaparte to the army on taking leave of it; and that of General Kleber on taking upon him the Command in Chief:

Also the orders of the day, and the four numbers of the *Courier d'Egypte*, which have appeared since that period:

* Damas has already appeared in the First Part of the Intercepted Correspondence. See his letter (p. 76), and what is there said of him. Though there seem to be a great degree intimacy between him and Kleber, yet he probably owes his advancement to the head of the Staff no less to his own merit than to the kindness of the Commander in Chief. He is, indeed, a very excellent officer.

The liſt of the general, ſtaff, and commiſſioned officers of the different corps, who have died, up to this day;

The liſt of the promotions which Kleber, the Commander in Chief, has judged it indiſpenſable to make for the good of the ſervice. You will feel yourſelf the neceſſity of it in comparing thoſe two liſts*.

I entreat you, Citizen Miniſter, to requeſt the Executive Directory to confirm theſe promotions, and to tranſmit me the definitive nominations.

I cannot ſend you a detailed eſtimate of the general ſituation of the army at preſent; becauſe, when I took upon me the function of Chief of the Staff, I was not able to find the particular eſtimates from which it muſt neceſſarily be formed. I hope to be enabled to tranſmit it by the firſt courier.

It is alſo out of my power, at this moment, to collect thoſe of the various corps of the army, ſcattered as they are over ſo prodigious an extent of country as that which we have to defend; and of whom the greater number are, beſides, inceſſantly occupied in purſuing the Arabs, or in combatting the wandering Beys and their partiſans, whoſe numbers

* It has been judged proper to omit them both—the neceſſity of Kleber's promotions is but too apparent from his own letter.

rapidly increaſe the inſtant we allow them a moment's reſpite.

You may judge of the feeble ſtate of the army, by its prodigious reduction ſince this time laſt year.

The number of effective men on the 22d of September 1798 was above 33,000 *; it is at preſent reduced below 22,000: from theſe muſt be taken 2000 ſick and wounded, who are abſolutely incapable of any duty whatever; beſides 4000 utterly unable to take the field, or enter upon any active ſervice. Moſt

* In eſtimating the army that diſembarked in Egypt at 42,000 (ſee the Second Part of the Intercepted Correſpondence, p. 196), it is evident that no deception was practiſed, no turn for exaggeration indulged. Even after the ſtorming, as it is called, of Alexandria, a place ſo ſtrong, that, according to Sonnini, the jackals uſed to leap in and out every night through the breaches in the walls, the numbers loſt in croſſing the Deſert of the Nile, the bloody engagement on that river, and the numerous ſkirmiſhes which Bonaparte has dignified with the name of Battles of the Pyramids, &c. &c. it appears that the effective force of the French ſtill conſiſted of 33,000 men; a calculation that leaves a deficit of 9000 for the ſick (who appear, from Duval's letter, Part I. p. 176, to be very numerous), the killed, and the wounded, in the ſhort ſpace of fifteen weeks! It is probable that none of Bonaparte's admirers will be intrepid enough to deny this loſs. But then, they will ſay, he acquired poſſeſſion of the country by it. This may be granted them in their turn; and then it will only remain to inquire whether the loſs of the 33,000 men that were left, and which is ſure to be ſuſtained in the evacuation of it, will not rather overbalance that boaſted advantage!

of theſe, though wounded, or labouring under diſeaſes of the eyes, prefer ſtaying at their quarters, to expoſing themſelves to the epidemic complaints which hoſpitals but too frequently generate in this country.

It reſults from this comparative ſtatement, that the effective ſtrength of the army is reduced a third within the laſt twelve months, and the actual number of thoſe under arms decreaſed a full half.

The 16,000 men (compriſing the forces of every deſcription) which compoſe the army, are diſperſed over a ſurface of country compriſed within a triangle, of which the baſe extends from Marabout * to El Ariſch, a line of near two hundred leagues, which is alſo the length of its two ſides, of which that from El Ariſch reaches beyond the firſt Cataracts (which may be conſidered as its apex), and the other from the Cataracts again to Marabout.

Experience fully proves, Citizen Miniſter, at this inſtant, that when the garriſons indiſpenſably neceſſary for the ſecurity of the fortreſſes and the provinces, are deducted from the number of men capable of bearing arms, it will be impoſſible to collect a force of 7000 men at any one point, to oppoſe the efforts of an enemy which menaces us with an irruption on every ſide.

* A ſmall bay, a little to the ſouth-weſt of Alexandria, where the French firſt landed.

I presume that the Commander in Chief, when writing to the Executive Directory, gave them more circumstantial information respecting the situation of the army, and every part of the colony.

Health and respect.

DAMASI.

No. XII.

LIBERTÉ. ÉGALITÉ.

REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE.

Au Caire, le 1 *Vendemiaire, an* 8.

E. POUSSIELGUE, *Contrôleur des Dépenses de l'Armée, et Administrateur Général des Finances de l'Egypte, au* DIRECTOIRE EXECUTIF.

Citoyens Directeurs,

J'AI été chargé exclusivement, depuis l'arrivée de l'armée en Egypte, de l'administration des Finances, et des autres parties qui tiennent à l'économie politique de ce païs.

Je crois vous devoir, après le départ du Général Bonaparte, et dans la position critique où il nous laisse, un tableau abrégé, mais fidèle, des observations que j'ai recueillies, et des opinions politiques qui en sont le resultat.

Les voyageurs et les agents mêmes du Gouvernement Français qui ont été en Egypte, se sont tellement

accordés dans les idées exagerées qu'ils ont données ſur les richeſſes naturelles, et ſur les tréſors que renfermoit cette contrée, que quinze mois de ſéjour, de recherches, et d'expériences par un grand nombre d'hommes éclairés, n'ont pas encore totalement effacé ces fauſſes impreſſions.

On portoit les revenus ordinaires, y compris les douanes, de 49 à 50 millions; on a même été juſqu'à 60 millions.

Il faut les réduire en tems de paix à 19 millions: un commerce bien entendu et protégé les porteroit à vingt.

En tems de guerre; tel que celui où nous n'avons ceſſé d'être, les revenus ne peuvent excéder douze et treize millions.

L'abondance en Egypte dépend d'abord d'un bon Nil, enſuite de la diſtribution des eaux. Il faut chaque année que les canaux ſoyent nettoyés; que les digues ſoyent reparées, et que chacune d'elles ne ſoit coupée ni plus tôt ni plus tard, que l'intérêt commun ne l'exige.

Il s'en faut que la diſtribution des canaux et leur entretien ſoyent portés ici au degré d'utilité qu'on eſpéreroit trouver dans un païs dont la fertilité dépend uniquement de l'obſervation de ces deux points.

Lors même que le Nil eſt bon, un grand nombre de terres demeurent incultes, faute d'ordre dans la coupe

des digues ; mais quand le Nil eſt mauvais ou médiocre, le dommage eſt dix fois plus grand qu'il ne devroit l'être, parce que tous les villages craignant de manquer d'eau, ceux qui ſont les plus voiſins du Nil ſe hâtent, avant le tems, de couper les digues, ce qui ne ſe fait pas ſans combat contre les villages intereſſés à s'y oppoſer, et par ce procédé inſenſé, une grande partie des eaux, déjà ſi rares, ſe perd ſans utilité.

Mais quelque abondantes que ſoyent les récoltes, elles ne peuvent, dans le ſyſtême actuel, accroître les revenus du gouvernement, quoiqu'il ſoit lui même propriétaire des deux-tiers des terres de l'Egypte, tandis qu'un mauvais Nil diminue conſidérablement le revenu.

Le ſyſtême de finances de l'Egypte eſt entièrement féodal.

Le payſan cultive à ſon profit, moyennant une redevance fixe qu'il paye en argent ou en nature au propriétaire.

Cette redevance ſe diviſe en trois eſpèces générales.

Le *Miri:* C'eſt la contribution foncière due au Grand Seigneur : le propriétaire le perçoit et le paye enſuite aux Effendys chargés d'en faire le recouvrement.

Ce Miri, impoſé ſur les terres, monte à 3,000,000, ſuivant toutes les matrices de roles que j'ai pû découvrir.

La 2e espèce de redevance s'appelle *Fais*. C'est le cens ou revenu net, affecté originairement au propriétaire ; il monte également pour toutes les propriétés, y compriſes celles du Gouvernement, à 3,000,000.

La troiſième eſpèce s'appelle *Barani* ou *Moudaf* ; elle ſe compoſe, 1. d'un excedent de revenus impoſé par le propriétaire par ſupplément au *Fais* ; 2. des réquiſitions extraordinaires de toute eſpèce, faites au village, ſoit en argent, ſoit en nature ; 3. des dépenſes cauſées par des paſſages de troupes ou par la preſence du propriétaire ; 4. de toutes les dépenſes d'adminiſtration du village et de la province, fondations pieuſes, &c.

Cette troiſieme eſpèce produit à tous les propriétaires de l'Egypte 6,400,000.

Il y a enfin un produit de 1,300,000 provenant des droits que les Cachefs percevoient à leur profit dans les provinces qu'ils gouvernoient.

Ainſi la totalité des revenus en argent que les cultivateurs des terres de l'Egypte ſupportent, non compris les vols immenſes des Cophtes qui les perçoivent, eſt de près de 14 millions.

Il faut en déduire trois millions deux cent mille livres pour le Fais et le Barani, des proprietés qui n'appartiennent pas au Gouvernement, et qui ſont évaluées au tiers de l'Egypte, il reſtera au Gouvernement 10,800,000.

On ne peut obtenir au delà de cette ſomme qu'en faiſant des avances, ou des exactions.

Il faut ajouter à ce revenu, le Fais et le Barani qui ſe paye en nature, ce qui n'a lieu que dans les provinces de la Haute Egypte.

On eſtime cette redevance à un million huit cent mille quintaux de toutes eſpèces de grains, pour la portion qui revient au Gouvernement, ce qui équivaut à un million de quintaux de froment pur à 3*l.* 10*s.* prix moyen donne un ſomme de 3,500,000.

Il faut en déduire 850,000 pour les fraix de recouvrement et de tranſport qui reviennent à 17*s.* par quintal rendu au Kaire, reſte à 2,650,000.

En tems de paix on eſtime les produits des douanes et des autres droits indirects à 5 millions environ.

La marque de la monnoye produit 750,000.

Les revenus du Gouvernement en tems de paix ſeroient donc de 19 millions 200,000.

Mais dans l'état de guerre où nous ſommes, les douanes et revenus indirects ne produiſent pas plus de 1,500,000.

Les grains de la Haute Egypte qu'on ne peut vendre ſur les lieux, et qu'on n'a pas de moyens ſuffiſans pour faire deſcendre, ne produiront pas plus d'un million.

Les décharges à accorder aux villages pour terreins non arrosés, monteront encore à plus d'un million et demi.

Il faudroit encore déduire une foule de charges et de pensions du pays qu'il a fallu conserver, les frais relatifs à la Caravanne de la Mekke qui ont été faits en partie l'année passée, et qu'il faudra faire en totalité cette année, les dépenses des Divans des provinces et des Janissaires du pays: toutes ces dépenses absorbent près de trois millions.

On ne peut donc compter les revenus affectés à l'armée que pour 9 à 10 millions; sur lesquels il ne reste qu'environ deux millions à recouvrer d'ici à la fin de Frimaire prochain.

Le Général Bonaparte a levé dans les premiers mois de notre arrivée sur les différentes nations et sur les négocians, environ quatre millions de contributions extraordinaires. Il a fait percevoir un droit des deux cinquiemes des revenus d'une année sur les propriétés foncières des particuliers qui a produit 1,200,000.

Ces moyens sont usés: il n'y a plus de contributions extraordinaires à espérer dans un pays sans aucun commerce depuis dix-neuf mois; l'argent des Chrétiens est épuisé; on ne pourroit en demander aux Turcs, sans occasionner une révolte, et d'ailleurs on n'en obtiendroit pas; l'argent est enfoui; et les Turcs, plus encore que les Chrétiens, se laissent emprisonner, se

laissent assommer de coups, et QUELQUES UNS SE SONT LAISSÉ COUPER LA TETE plutôt que découvrir leurs tresors.

Le recouvrement des revenus se commence en Frimaire pour les pays cultivés en rizières; en Pluviose pour ceux cultivés en bled et autres denrées, mais qui payent en argent; et en Messidor pour ceux qui payent en nature.

Les paysans tiennent encore plus à leur argent que les habitans des villes: ils ne payent qu'à la dernière extrémité et sou à sou, leur argent est caché; leurs denrées et leurs effets sont enfouis; ils savent qu'il faudra toujours finir par payer, et qu'en le faisant volontairement aux époques fixées, ils épargneroient des contraintes qui leur coûtent le double et qui les ruinent. Ils aiment mieux attendre une colonne de troupes; s'ils la voyent venir, ils s'enfuyent avec leurs femmes, leurs enfans, et leurs bestiaux, et l'on ne trouve plus que des cahutes abandonnées.—S'ils croyent être assez forts pour résister, ils se battent et appellent les villages voisins et même les Arabes à leur secours.—Ils ont toujours des hommes à l'affut pour être avertis à tems de l'approche des troupes.

Quelquefois on peut attraper les chefs du village: on les mène en prison, où on les retient jusqu'à ce que le village ait payé, et ce moyen est lent, et ne réussit pas toujours. Si on parvient à leur enlever leurs chameaux, leurs buffles et leurs troupeaux, ils les

laiſſent vendre, au lieu des racheter en s'acquittant, et s'expoſent à mourir de faim, en laiſſant leurs terres incultes l'année ſuivante.

Il faut donc avoir ſans ceſſe dans chacune des ſeize provinces de l'Egypte une colonne de 60, 80, ou 100 hommes uniquement employés à forcer les villages à payer; et ſouvent après une tournée pénible, ils reviennent avec très-peu de choſe.

Il eſt facile d'imaginer toutes les exactions, les dégâts, et les déſordres qui accompagnent ſouvent leurs courſes, quelque ſévere que puiſſe être la diſcipline.

Un inconvénient très-grave s'oppoſe aux recouvremens pendant les huit mois où l'Egypte n'eſt pas inondée: c'eſt le tems où les Arabes peuvent faire leurs courſes; où les deſcentes ont lieu, et où l'on eſt menacé d'être attaqué de tous les côtés.—Il faut alors ſe battre tous les jours, et à peine une colonne a-t-elle entrepris une tournée, qu'elle eſt forcée de retrograder ſur ſes pas pour aller punir des villages révoltés, ou chaſſer des Mamelouks et des Arabes.

Le recouvrement des grains eſt encore plus difficile—il faut également *par la bayonnete* contraindre les villages à payer ceux qu'ils doivent; il faut les tranſporter dans des magazins ſur les bords du Nil; il faut enfin les faire filer ſur le Kaire.

Quand on a vaincu les deux premiers obſtacles, il reſte à vaincre le plus difficile, à cauſe du petit nombre de bateaux qu'on peut employer à ces tranſports et parce qu'ils ne peuvent être faits que pendant les quatre mois où le Nil eſt navigable. — Depuis notre arrivée, il a été detruit un très-grand nombre de barques qui, faute de bois de chauffage, ont été brulées ; elles n'ont pas été et ne pouvoient être remplacées ; une partie de celles qui reſtent, eſt ſans ceſſe employée aux mouvemens des troupes qui pourſuivent Mourad Bey.

L'année paſſée il a fallu acheter comptant au Kaire pour la ſubſiſtance de l'armée, et malgré l'extrême pénurie d'argent, pour 300,000 de bled, tandis que nous en avions pour pluſieurs millions dans la Haute Egypte.

Cette année-ci les barques ont apporté excluſivement les grains du Gouvernement. Il en réſulte un autre inconvénient ; la ville du Kaire manque de bled, et l'inquiétude du peuple pour la ſubſiſtance, a déjà cauſé quelque fermentation.

Malgré tous ces inconvéniens, il y avoit encore l'année paſſée du numeraire ; le commerce de l'année précédente en avoit apporté, et *lors du départ du Général Bonaparte il étoit encore dû, cependant, plus de* 10 *millions à l'armée, dont quatre millions de ſolde.*

Aujourd'hui le numéraire diſparoit totalement ; on ne voit plus que des medins qui circulent avec une rapidité inconcevable.

Cette monnoye n'a qu'un peu plus d'un tiers de la valeur intrinſéque des autres monnoyes. Avant la guerre on apportoit beaucoup de piaſtres d'Eſpagne, et on emportoit des medins, à preſent les piaſtres ſe ſont écoulées par le commerce du caffé avec l'Yemen, où elles ont été fondues à la monnoye, enſorte qu'elles augmentent de valeur ainſi que les monnoyes d'or, en raiſon de leur rareté, et de la plus grande abondance des medins.—Il en réſulte le renchériſſement des denrées et beaucoup d'entraves dans la circulation des eſpèces.

L'engorgement actuel de toutes les denrées de l'Egypte, par une ſuite ſemblable de la ceſſation du commerce, eſt un inconvénient bien plus grave; il achevera de ruiner ce pays, car les villages devant toujours payer les mêmes ſommes, et ne pouvant ni exporter, ni trouver à vendre leurs denrées, leurs habitans vont être réduits à la dernière miſère, et l'armée qui avoit déjà tant de peine à avoir de l'argent quand il y en avoit encore, va être bientôt dans l'impoſſibilité de s'en procurer.

La caiſſe de l'armée eſt conſtamment vuide, et chaque mois, d'ici à quelque tems, on n'aura pas la perſpective de recouvrer plus de 2 à 300,000, tandis que les dépenſes reglées, s'elevent à plus de 1,300,000 par mois.

Le peuple Egyptien, nonobſtant ſes fréquentes *révoltes* contre nous, peut paſſer pour un peuple très-

doux, mais il eſt *diſſimulé, et il s'en faut de beaucoup qu'il nous aime*, quoiqu'il ait été traité avec plus d'égards qu'on n'en ait jamais accordé à aucun peuple conquis.

La différence des mœurs, celle extrêmement importante de la langue, et ſurtout leur religion, ſont des obſtacles invincibles à toute affection ſincere.

Ils déteſtent le gouvernement des Mamelouckes ; ils craignent le joug de Conſtantinople ; mais ils ne ſouffriront jamais le nôtre que dans l'attente de le ſecouer. Ils nous accorderoient ſeulement la préférence ſur toutes les nations qu'*ils appellent* CHRETIENNES.

Nous avons partout ici autour de nous, *dix mille* ennemis cachés, pour *un* ami apparent.

Nous avions réuſſi à entretenir une bonne intelligence avec le Chérif de la Mekke, et les lettres qu'il avoit écrites au Général Bonaparte et à moi avoient tranquiliſé un moment les conſciences des Muſulmans de l'Egypte : mais des eſpions qu'il a envoyés au Kaire depuis que le Grand Viſir eſt à Damas, donnent lieu de préſumer qu'il a changé de diſpoſitions à notre égard, et qu'en ſuivant les inſinuations des Anglois, qui ont actuellement des forces dans la Mer Rouge, il s'eſt rangé du côté de nos ennemis.

Nous avions 31,000 hommes ſous les armes et bien portants à notre arrivée en Egypte. Il n'y avoit

alors que les Mamelouck et les Arabes à combattre, et cependant, ils occupèrent exclusivement et chaque jour, jusqu'à la fin de Pluviose, toute cette armée.

Aujourd'hui les Mamelouck, quoique dispersés, existent encore presque tous, et peuvent, en un moment où l'armée seroit occupée ailleurs, se réunir très-promptement. Ils n'ont perdu que quatre ou cinq sous-chefs:—les principaux qui restent sont toujours puissans et ont du crédit.

Les Arabes n'ont pas diminué de nombre, ils nous haïssent autant qu'à notre arrivée; et leur vie errante les empêche de nous craindre.

Quand nous sommes débarqués, les Egyptiens ont crû, comme *nous le leur disions*, que c'étoit *d'accord avec le Grand Seigneur*, ils se sont soumis avec plus de docilité: à présent, ils sont bien convaincus du contraire; ceux qui paroissent nous servir, se croyent, *par notre* MENSONGE, autorisés à nous trahir; ils le feront à la première occasion; et déjà ils tressailloient de plaisir lors du débarquement de Messidor dernier à Aboukir.

Mais quand à ces nombreux ennemis au milieu des quels nous vivons, viennent se réunir ceux du dehors; que le Grand Visir même, avec les principaux officiers du Grand Seigneur, rassemblent toutes les forces Ottomanes pour nous attaquer sur divers points à la fois, par terre et par mer, et qu'il a pour auxiliaires les

Anglois et les Ruſſes; qu'il invite les grands et les peuples d'Egypte à la révolte; qu'enfin le peu d'Arabes qui nous étoient demeurés attachés, nous abandonnent pour ſe joindre à lui; il eſt facile de concevoir que notre ſituation devient déſeſpérée.

L'ennemi perd une armée—il en fait une autre à l'inſtant; il a été battu au Mont Tabor—deux mois après il l'a été à Aboukir; le même tems s'eſt écoulé, et il va encore ſe faire battre tout à l'heure à Salahieh. Mais chaque victoire nous coûte nos meilleurs ſoldats, et *leur perte ne ſe repare pas.* Un revers nous *anéantiroit tous*, et quelque brave que ſoit l'armée, *elle ne pourra l'éviter encore bien longtems.*

La guerre nous a enlevé d'excellens officiers généraux, tels que le Général Caffarelli, le Général Dommartin, le Général Bon, le Général Rambault, et le Général Dupuis; preſque tout le corps du Génie, et une très-grande partie des Chefs de Brigade d'Infanterie et de Cavalerie. Il eſt parti pluſieurs Généraux eſtimés, et le Général Bonaparte en a emmené cinq avec lui.

L'armée, ſans habits, et ſurtout ſans armes et ſans munitions, réduite à moins des deux-tiers en nombre, n'a pas plus de onze mille hommes en état de marcher à l'ennemi; quoiqu'il paroiſſe y en avoir ſous les armes environ 13 à 14 mille, mais c'eſt que beaucoup de ſoldats préſents à l'appel, aiment mieux malgré leurs bleſſures, ou leurs maladies faire le

ſervice du quartier que de demeurer dans les hôpitaux, ou dans les dépôts : lorſqu'il s'agit de faire une marche un peu longue et de combattre, on reconnoit leur invalidité forcée.

Les ophtalmies, les diſſenteries, les bleſſures et d'autres maladies non moins communes ici, ont mis le reſte de l'armée abſolument hors de combat.

Les hommes mêmes qui peuvent marcher ſont épuiſés de fatigues, affoiblis par le climat, les bleſſures et les maladies qu'ils ont eſſuyées, et leur courage eſt diminué en proportion.

Avec ce petit nombre d'hommes, il faut couvrir cinq cent lieues de ſuperficie, contenir trois millions d'habitans qui ſont autant d'ennemis, garnir les places et les forts à Alexandrie, Roſette, Rahmanie, Gizeh, Beniſuef, Medine, Miniet, Siout, Girgé, Kené, Koſſeir, le Kaire, Suez, Mitt Kanïar, Salahieh, El Ariſch, Bilbeis, Catieh, Damiette, Manſoura, Semenoud et El Benouf. Si le Grand Viſir attaque, on ne pourra oppoſer plus de 5 à 6000 hommes à toutes les forces Ottomanes qui ſeront à ſes ordres. Et s'il fait une double attaque, il entrera dans le pays ſans qu'on puiſſe l'en empêcher, ce qui ſeroit arrivé au Général Bonaparte, ſi en même tems que les Turcs faiſoient un débarquement à Aboukir, ils euſſent fait marcher l'armée en Syrie ſur l'Egypte.

Dans trois mois, il faudra paſſer une ſeconde fois par l'épreuve funeſte de la peſte, qui peut faire des ravages épouvantables. Cette perſpective effrayante abat les courages les plus intrépides.

Pour comble de malheur, le Nil de cette année a été extrêmement mauvais, en ce qu'il s'eſt écoulé tout de ſuite, ſans que les terres ayent eu le tems d'être ſucceſſivement arroſées. Nous ne pourrons retirer aucune contribution des villages qui n'auront pas eu d'eau, et nous ſommes menacés de la plus affreuſe misère.

Il n'eſt pas un ſoldat, un officier, un général qui ne ſoupire après ſon retour en France, perſuadés comme ils le ſont, qu'ils ſacrifient ici, inutilement pour leur patrie, leur ſanté et leur vie.

Cependant d'après la ſituation où ſont les affaires en France, et puiſque depuis quinze mois, il n'a pas été poſſible de nous envoyer des ſecours, nous ne devons plus en eſpérer d'aſſez prompts, ſurtout la ſaiſon favorable étant paſſée.

L'armée a vu avec plaiſir le Général Kleber avoir le commandement après le départ du Général Bonaparte ; perſonne ne pouvoit lui inſpirer plus d'eſtime et de confiance.

Mais il eſt plein d'honneur et de fierté, et plus la tâche qu'on lui a laiſſée eſt difficile, plus il craindra d'écouter des ſentimens commandés par les circon-

ſtances et pour l'intérêt de l'armée, mais que par la ſuite on pourroit taxer de timidité.

N'ayant pas la même reſponſabilité, je ne crains pas, Citoyens Directeurs, d'expoſer à vos yeux la vérité ; et telle que vous la liſez, vous la trouveriez bien affoiblie, ſi les bornes d'une lettre permettoient d'entrer dans de plus grands détails.

L'Egypte eſt un ſuperbe pays ; notre ſituation n'eſt qu'un effet des circonſtances, elle prouve ſeulement que nous y ſommes venus trop tôt, et qu'il n'eſt pas encore tems de nous y établir.

Il n'y a aucun doute que ſi nous étions les maitres paiſibles de l'Egypte, en peu d'années nous en ferions diſparoitre la plupart des fléaux qui la déſolent, tels que la peſte et les Arabes, et que nous donnerions à l'agriculture et au commerce une vie nouvelle qui ramèneroit ce pays à ſon ancienne ſplendeur—ce ſeroit la plus belle colonie de l'univers qui deviendroit bientôt le régulateur du commerce du monde.

Mais l'Egypte eſt bornée par les deux mers et par des déſerts.

Il faut avoir une marine puiſſante pour être maitre d'y aborder, et ſurtout pour protéger ſon commerce et en obtenir tous les avantages qu'il promet.

La République Françoiſe eſt actuellement ſans marine : elle ſera longtems encore, avant d'en avoir créé une qui puiſſe rivaliſer avec celle de ſes ennemis.

Vouloir conſerver l'Egypte ſans avoir aucun moyen d'y porter, d'y aſſurer des ſecours de toute eſpèce, c'eſt s'expoſer à être forcé de l'abandonner à la Ruſſie ou à l'Angleterre, qui ſous prétexte de nous en chaſſer, s'y établiroient, et dès lors s'y mettroient bientôt en état de nous en exclure pour toujours.

Nous pourrions encore nous y maintenir, ſi nous avions le conſentement de la Porte, mais ſi l'on n'a pas crû pouvoir l'obtenir avant notre invaſion, on le pourra bien moins aujourd'hui que la Porte s'eſt miſe à la merci des Ruſſes et des Anglois ; et fût-elle, contre toute apparence, diſpoſée par des conſidérations politiques, à nous laiſſer occuper l'Egypte proviſoirement, jamais les Anglois ne le lui permettroient.

Quand l'expédition d'Egypte a eu lieu, nous étions en paix ſur le Continent ; nous avions encore un reſte de marine dans la Méditerranée ; nous poſſédions toute l'Italie, Corfou, et Malte ; on pouvoit eſpérer d'obtenir le conſentement au moins tacite du Grand-Seigneur, et on ſeroit arrivé au but que l'on ſe propoſoit contre les Anglois, car je penſe avec tout le monde, qu'il s'agiſſoit en les faiſant trembler pour leurs poſſeſſions de l'Inde, de les forcer à une paix avantageuſe pour la République, en faiſant de l'évacuation

de l'Egypte un objet de compenſation pour les reſtitutions que nous leur demanderions.

Mais la bataille navale d'Aboukir a tout renverſé—elle a détruit notre marine ; elle nous a empêchés de recevoir le reſte des forces qui nous étoient deſtinées, elle a laiſſé à nos ennemis le champ libre pour nous faire déclarer la guerre par la Porte, elle a rallumé celle qui étoit mal éteinte avec l'Empereur d'Allemagne, elle a ouvert la Méditerranée aux Ruſſes et les a portés ſur nos frontières ; elle nous a fait bientôt perdre l'Italie et les belles poſſeſſions dans l'Adriatique que nous avions dûes aux heureuſes campagnes du Général Bonaparte ; enfin, elle a fait à l'inſtant avorter tous nos projets, puiſqu'il n'a plus fallu depuis, ſonger à inquiéter les Anglois dans les Indes—Le peuple d'Egypte, que nous avions dû conſidérer comme ami, comme allié, devenoit ſubitement notre ennemi, et, environnés entierement par les Muſulmans, nous nous trouvions réduits à une défenſive difficile ſans plus entrevoir aucun but d'utilité.

Aujourd'hui il ne faut plus eſpérer d'obtenir que les Anglois prennent en conſidération dans un traité de paix l'évacuation de l'Egypte. Ils ſavent d'abord l'état de dénuement et de foibleſſe où nous y ſommes réduits, ce qui nous met dans l'impoſſibilité de rien tenter contre eux : ils ſavent que quand même nous recevrions des ſecours, ce qu'ils empêcheront de tous leurs moyens, nous n'en ſerions pas plus avancés tant que nous aurons à combattre les Muſulmans, et ils ſont

assurés que la Porte ne fera pas la paix sans leur consentement, ou sans que la condition préliminaire, pour cesser la guerre, ne soit l'évacuation de l'Egypte.

Ainsi notre but est manqué sous ce rapport, qu'il ne peut plus concerner les Anglois ; et que soit à titre de conquête, soit à titre de colonie, nous ne pouvons plus conserver l'Egypte.

Mais il y a plus : c'est que si nous tardons à traiter, nous sommes dans un tel état de foiblesse, que nous ne ferons plus à tems de la faire ; et que le reste de l'armée périra, ou qu'il faudra évacuer sans conditions, tandis qu'on peut encore faire de cette évacuation le prix du rétablissement de la paix avec l'Empire Ottoman, et avec les puissances Barbaresques, resserrer nos anciennes liaisons avec la Porte, et reprendre dans le Levant le commerce exclusif dont nous jouissions.

Ce traité auquel les Anglois ne peuvent être étrangers, *prépareroit la paix* qu'il est tems enfin de faire avec eux ; il ameneroit infailliblemnt une déclaration de guerre de la Russie à la Porte, et opéreroit une heureuse diversion dans nos affaires d'Europe ; *nous pourrions espérer de reprendre, ce que nous avons perdu dans la Méditerranée.*

Cette opinion me paroit d'autant plus fondée, que les Anglois ne peuvent voir sans quelqu'inquiétude et sans une secrette jalousie, les progrès des Russes, bien plus dangereux pour eux que notre puissance conti-

nentale, aujourd'hui que notre marine eſt détruite, et que nous avons perdu nos conquêtes maritimes.

Le ſeul événement qui pourroit nous permettre de conſerver l'Egypte, ce ſeroit une prompte déclaration de guerre des Ruſſes à la Porte : toutes les forces Ottomanes qui ſe portent ici, voleroient bien vite à la défenſe du centre de l'empire. Le Grand-Seigneur conſentiroit alors à la paix aux conditions qui nous conviendroient.

Mais il eſt probable qu'à moins d'un traité d'alliance entre la République Françaiſe et la Ruſſie, qui pourroit un moment nous être utile, mais qui ſeroit impolitique, cette derniere puiſſance attendra que la Porte Ottomane ait fait la paix avec nous pour lui déclarer la guerre, car en nous battant avec la Porte, nous avons ſes forces et ſes moyens, c'eſt travailler pour la Ruſſie, qui de ſon côté ne pouvant faire la guerre à la Porte ſans lui faire auſſitot conclure la paix avec nous, va au même but ;—de détruire cette puiſſance, en faiſant la guerre aux Français qu'elle fait être ſon ſeul appui.

L'on regarde aujourd'hui l'Empire Ottoman comme un vieil édifice prêt à s'écrouler ; les puiſſances de l'Europe s'apprêtent depuis longtems à s'en partager les lambeaux, et pluſieurs politiques croyent cet événement très-prochain : dans cette hypotheſe il eſt convenable, penſent-ils, que la France ait ſa part de la dépouille, et l'Egypte eſt ſon lot.

Si cette ruine de l'Empire Ottoman qui n'eſt rien moins que ſure, quand on conſidère combien elle amèneroit de diſcuſſion, et d'oppoſitions entre les grandes puiſſances de l'Europe, même entre celles qui ſe ſeroient combinées pour cet objet, quand on conſidère encore qu'il ſera éternellement de l'intérêt de la France, de *l'Angleterre*, de la Pruſſe, et même de l'Empereur *de s'y oppoſer*, ſi cette ruine, dis-je, finiſſoit par ſe conſommer, la France ſeroit toujours à tems d'avoir l'Egypte, d'ailleurs les François y ſeroient appellés par les Turcs même, quand ceux-ci ſe verroient menacés par les Ruſſes, qu'ils haiſſent mortellement.

La France eſt un ſi beau pays, les Français ſont ſi puiſſans par leur nombre, par leurs richeſſes, et par leur poſition à l'égard des autres puiſſances, *qu'ils ne peuvent rien gagner à un bouleverſement de l'Europe*; tandis que ce bouleverſement peut créer une nouvelle puiſſance dominante qui lui enleveroit tous ſes avantages dans la Méditerranée.

En me reſumant, Citoyens Directeurs, je conclus que nous ſommes trop éloignés, et que les événemens ſe preſſent trop pour qu'il ſoit poſſible d'attendre vos ordres avant de prendre un parti, à moins de compromettre les intérêts de la République, la ſureté et la gloire du reſte de l'armée.

Qu'infailliblement il faudra évacuer l'Egypte, en rétabliſſant à ce prix la paix et tous nos anciens rapports avec les Ottomans et les Barbareſques.

Que tout ce que vous avez à eſpérer maintenant, quelque ſoyent vos vuës ſur l'Egypte, c'eſt dans la diſpoſition où eſt le Général Kleber, que l'évacuation ſoit retardée le plus poſſible par les lenteurs qu'il cherchera à apporter dans les negociations ſi on a le bonheur de negocier.

Qu'enfin, ſi l'évacuation a lieu ſans qu'on puiſſe attendre vos ordres, c'eſt qu'elle aura été inévitable, et que dans l'ignorance où nous ſommes ici de la véritable ſituation de la France et de l'Europe, cette évacuation ſe trouve commandée par la prudence, et d'accord avec nos intérêts politiques.

Salut et reſpect.

E. POUSSIELGUE.

TRANSLATION.

LIBERTY. EQUALITY.

FRENCH REPUBLIC.

Cairo, September 22, 1799.

E. POUSSIELGUE *, *Comptroller of the Expenſes of the Army, and Adminiſtrator-general of the Finances of Egypt, to the* EXECUTIVE DIRECTORY.

Citizen Directors,

I HAVE been excluſively charged, ſince the arrival of the army in Egypt, with the adminiſtration of the

* This is the longeſt letter yet received from Egypt, and, in many reſpects, the moſt important. It is no exaggeration to ſay, that it contains truer views of the finances, polity, &c. of that country, than moſt of the volumes written expreſsly on the ſubject. But it is not in this light alone that this maſterly production comes recommended to the reader; it corroborates all Kleber's ſtatements; it paints the miſeries of Bonaparte's deſerted troops in the moſt forcible manner; and it ſeems expreſsly drawn up (from an elaborate examination of facts) to prepare the French Government for the news they will ſhortly receive, either of the total loſs of the "Army of the Eaſt," or

finances, and of the other departments connected with the political economy of this country.

I conceive I owe you, after the departure of General Bonaparte, and in the critical situation in which he left us, a concise but faithful representation of the observations which I have collected, and the political opinions which naturally flow from them.

Travellers, and even the agents of the French Government, who have been in Egypt, have so cordially agreed in the exaggerated ideas which they have disseminated respecting the natural riches, and the treasures which this country contains, that a residence of fifteen months, with multiplied researches, and experiments by a great number of enlightened men, have not yet totally effaced the false impressions they had given.

The ordinary revenues, including the customs, were estimated from 49 to 50,000,000; some have even carried them as far as 60,000,000.

They can only be reckoned, in time of peace, at 19,000,000; a system of commerce well managed, and well protected, might raise them to 20,000,000.

of Egypt. This will not come unexpectedly on Bonaparte, though, with a dissimulation equal to his cruelty, he affected to take no notice, in the letter which *he left behind him*, of any wants that might not be removed by a supply of powder, &c. or any distresses that might not be relieved by a company of comedians!

In time of war (ſuch as that in which we have been inceſſantly engaged) the revenues do not, by any means, exceed 12 or 13,000,000.

Abundance in Egypt depends, firſt, on a good Nile, and ſecondly, on the diſtribution of the water: every year the canals muſt be cleaned out, the dikes repaired, and care taken that none of them be cut ſooner or later than the common intereſt appears to require.

The diſtribution and the maintenance of the canals are very far from being carried here to that degree of utility which one would expect to find in a country, whoſe fertility entirely depends on the obſervation of theſe two circumſtances.

Even when the Nile is good, a great quantity of land remains uncultivated, for want of order in cutting the dikes: but when the Nile is bad, or middling, the loſs is ten times greater than it ought to be, becauſe all the villages being equally afraid of wanting water, thoſe who border on the river haſten, before the proper time, to cut the dikes; which is never done without a conteſt with the villages intereſted in oppoſing it: and by this inconſiderate method of proceeding, a great part of the water, already ſo ſcarce, is loſt without procuring the leaſt advantage.

But however productive the harveſts may be, they cannot, under the preſent ſyſtem, increaſe the revenues of the Government, although it be itſelf proprietor of

two-thirds of the lands of Egypt; while, on the other hand, a bad Nile diminiſhes them conſiderably.

The Egyptian ſyſtem of finance is entirely feudal.

The peaſant ploughs and ſows for his own advantage, in conſideration of a fixed rent which he pays in money, or in kind, to the proprietor.

This rent may be divided into three diſtinct heads.

The *Miri:* this is a kind of ground-rent due to the Grand Seignior; the proprietor receives and pays it in to the Effendi appointed to collect it.

This miri, impoſed on the lands, amounts to 3,000,000 livres, according to all the rent-rolls which fell into my hands.

The ſecond kind of rent is called *Fais*; it is the quit-rent, or neat income, originally appropriated to the proprietor: it amounts, like the former, for all the lands, thoſe of Government included, to 3,000,000.

The third kind is called *Barani*, or *Moudaf*; it is compoſed, firſt, of an over-charge of income, laid on by the proprietor by way of ſupplement to the fais. Secondly, of extraordinary requiſitions of every kind, made on the village, either of money or of produce. Thirdly, of expenſes cauſed by the paſſage of the

troops, or by the visits of the proprietor. Fourthly, of all the official charges of the village and the province, pious foundations, &c. &c. These united, produce from all the landed property of Egypt, 6,400,000.

Besides this, there is a sum of 1,300,000 arising from the duties which the Cachefs used to collect for their own advantage in the provinces which they governed.

Thus it appears that the sum total of the revenues in specie which are raised from the cultivators of the lands of Egypt (exclusive of the immense peculations of the Copts who collect them) amounts pretty nearly to 14,000,000.

From these must be deducted 3,200,000 livres for the *fais* and the *baranis* of the lands which do not appertain to the Government, and which are estimated at a third of Egypt: there will then remain to the Government 10,800,000.

It is not possible to obtain more than this, without making advances, or exactions.

To this revenue must be added the *fais* and *barani* which is paid in kind. This only takes place in the provinces of Upper Egypt.

This is estimated at 1,800,000 quintals of all kinds of grain, for that portion which belongs

to the Government: taking the whole as equivalent to 1,000,000 quintals of good wheat, at 3 livres 10 ſols each, it will amount to 3,500,000 livres.

From this muſt be deducted 850,000 for the expenſes of collecting and carrying, which amount to 17 ſols for every quintal delivered at Cairo: there remain then 2,650,000 livres.

In time of peace the produce of the cuſtoms and of the other indirect duties is uſually ſtated at about 5,000,000.

The Mint produces 750,000.

From this it appears that the revenues of the Government in time of peace will be 19,200,000 livres; but in the ſtate of war in which we are, the cuſtoms and indirect revenues do not produce more than 1,500,000.

The grain of Upper Egypt which is not ſold on the ſpot, and which we have not ſufficient means to bring down the country, will not produce more than a million.

The diſcharges that muſt be given to the villages for the lands not watered, will amount to more than 1,500,000.

There muſt ſtill be deducted a number of charges

and penſions granted to the country, and which we have been obliged to continue; the expenſes of the caravan to Mecca, which were partly ſupplied by us laſt year, and which muſt be wholly ſo, this; the expenſes of the Divans of the Provinces, and of the Janiſſaries of the country: all theſe will take off nearly 3,000,000.

It is not poſſible, then, to take the revenues appropriated to the army at more than 9 or 10,000,000; of this ſum there only remains about 2,000,000 to be obtained from this period to the 20th of December next.

General Bonaparte levied in the firſt months of our arrival on the different nations, and on the merchants, about 4,000,000 livres of extraordinary contributions. He alſo laid a duty of two-fifths of a year's revenue on the landed property of individuals, which brought in about 1,200,000.

Theſe expedients are worn out. No more extraordinary contributions can be looked for in a country where all trade has been at an end for nineteen months. The money of the Chriſtians is exhauſted; we cannot aſk the Turks for any without occaſioning a revolt, and, beſides, we ſhould in no caſe obtain it. The money is hid; and the Turks, ſtill more than the Chriſtians, ſuffer themſelves to be impriſoned, to be beaten in the moſt cruel manner; nay, SOME OF THEM HAVE EVEN SUFFERED THEIR HEADS TO

BE CUT OFF RATHER THAN DISCOVER WHERE THEY HAD CONCEALED THEIR TREASURES*!

The collection of the revenues begins in November for the rice-grounds; in January for the land appropriated to wheat, and other articles which pay in money; and in June for thoſe which pay in kind.

The peaſantry are ſtill more tenacious of their money than the inhabitants of the towns; they never pay but when they are abſolutely forced to it, and even then ſous by ſous: their money is hid, their produce and their other property buried in the ground; they know they muſt pay at laſt, and that by doing it voluntarily, and at the regular periods, they might ſave themſelves from thoſe violent meaſures which always coſt them double, or ruin them. They prefer waiting for a column of troops; if they ſee them coming, they immediately flee with their wives, their children, and their cattle; and the ſoldiers find nothing at their arrival but a number of empty hovels. If they fancy themſelves ſtrong enough to reſiſt, they

* This moſt admirable plan of tax-gathering, which Bonaparte has introduced with ſuch eclat into Egypt (the country, which, as he ſays, he went to civilize and enlighten), though worthy of his unbounded talents for finance, is not of his invention; he acquired the knowledge of it during his apprenticeſhip under Robeſpierre, who, with his wonted facetiouſneſs, uſed to call the operation of the guillotine, COINING!

give battle, and call in the neighbouring villages, and even the Arabs, to their assistance. They have always scouts abroad to give them timely notice of the approach of the troops.

Sometimes it is possible to seize the chiefs of the village. They are thrown into prison, and kept there till the village has discharged what is due: this expedient is tedious, and does not always succeed. If we are fortunate enough to carry off their camels, buffaloes, and sheep, they suffer them to be sold, instead of attempting to recover them by paying their debt, and expose themselves to the hazard of dying with hunger, leaving their lands uncultivated for the succeeding year!

It is, therefore, absolutely necessary to maintain perpetually in each of the sixteen provinces of Egypt a column of eighty or a hundred men, whose sole employment it is to force the villagers to pay their taxes; very frequently after a long and laborious round the soldiers return with a mere trifle.

It is easy to conjecture all the evils, the exactions, the havoc and waste, and the confusion, which commonly attend those *rounds*, and which the severest discipline can neither prevent nor remedy.

An inconvenience of a very serious nature arises to

prevent the collecting of the taxes during the eight months in which the country is not inundated; it is the period when the Arabs undertake their predatory incurſions, when landings are made on the coaſts, and when we are threatened with attacks from every quarter. It then becomes neceſſary for us to be continually fighting; and a column of troops has ſcarce begun to move forward, before it is compelled to fall back, in order to puniſh the revolted villages, or to expel the Mameloucs and the Arabs!

The collection of grain is ſtill more difficult. Like the tax in ſpecie, it is abſolutely neceſſary to compel the villages, *at the point of the bayonet*, to pay what is due; it muſt then be taken to the magazines on the banks of the Nile, embarked in boats, and ſent down the river to Cairo.

When the two firſt difficulties are overcome, the third, more difficult than either, ſtill remains, on account of the ſmall number of boats which can be found for theſe convoys, and the ſhort time they can be uſed, which is only during the four months in which the Nile is navigable. Since our arrival a prodigious number of boats have been cut up and burnt for want of other fuel *; theſe neither have, nor can

* The exaſperation of the natives only could follow the wanton abuſe of the furniture and ornaments of the palaces of Rome, for fuel.

by any poſſible means, be replaced; a part of what is left is conſtantly employed in following the movements of the troops who are in purſuit of Mourad Bey.

Laſt year we were obliged to purchaſe, for ready money, at Cairo, notwithſtanding the ſcarcity of ſpecie, corn for the ſubſiſtence of the army, to the amount of more than 300,000 livres, though we had at that very time ſeveral millions worth in Upper Egypt.

This year the boats have been excluſively employed in bringing down the Government ſtores: the conſequence of this has been an inconvenience of another kind; the city of Cairo is in want of bread, and the

In Egypt more is hazarded;—they burn the boats of the Nile, the very boats which can alone render the country productive to them, by the tranſport of its produce to the capital.

Nor is this all: there is no timber in Egypt, and it will require ages to repair the havoc of this accurſed expedition, which, though fleeting and tranſitory, will leave behind it traces of deſtruction infinitely deeper than have ever yet been inflicted on this unhappy country, by the numerous viſitations of Heaven and man! Already "the city is in want of bread;" and it can afford little conſolation to the inhabitants, that their tyrants are involved in the ſame miſery with themſelves. A ſpeedy death, or a more ſpeedy flight, will put an end to the ſufferings of theſe; while thoſe will linger on amidſt the agonies of their families, or drop, exhauſted with hunger, in the ſilent and deſerted ſtreets of the once populous Grand Cairo.

uneaſineſs of the people on the occaſion has already produced ſome degree of fermentation!

In deſpite of all theſe diſagreeable circumſtances, there was laſt year ſome ſpecie in the country; ſome had been brought in by the commerce of the preceding year; and yet, *when Bonaparte left us, there were more than* 10,000,000 *ſtill due to the army, of which the mere pay of the troops amounted to* 4,000,000.

At preſent the ſpecie has entirely diſappeared; nothing is now to be ſeen but medins,* which circulate from hand to hand with inconceivable rapidity!

* A copper coin of nearly the value of an Engliſh halfpenny. Here is a lamentable falling off from the louis, with which former letters repreſented the French as playing at *ducks and drakes!* What can have become of the 20,000,000 livres which Bonaparte affirmed to the Directory his ſoldiers had found on the bodies of the Mameloucs, killed at the "Battle of the Pyramids?" *Intercepted Correſpondence*, Part 1ſt, pp. 64, 166.) It cannot have found its way to France, unleſs in the pockets of Bonaparte: and even this may reaſonably be doubted, ſince both Pouſſielgue and Dugua ſeem to hint that this renowned General before his flight was reduced to the neceſſity of robbing the military cheſt.

But to return to the 20,000,000 livres: ſhall it be ſaid that the Mameloucs recovered them again on the bodies of the French they have killed? The one is juſt as likely as the other: and body for body (for no advantage is meant to be taken of the ſuperior numbers of the latter that have fallen), there is little hazard in maintaining that the Mameloucs have found as many louis as the French.

This coin bears but little more than a third of the intrinsic value of the other coins. Before the war, Spaniſh dollars were brought here in abundance, and the medins carried away: at preſent the dollars are all taken off by the coffee-trade with Yemen, where they are ſent to the mint, and melted down; ſo that, like the gold coin, they become more valuable as they become more ſcarce, and the medins more plentiful. The conſequence of this is, a riſe in the price of every article, and a number of obſtacles in the circulation of caſh.

The preſent ſuperabundance of all the mercantile productions of Egypt, ariſing from the total ceſſation of foreign trade, is a circumſtance ſtill more diſagreeable: it will complete the ruin of this country; for the villages being obliged to pay us always the ſame ſums, and unable either to export, or to find a market for, their produce at home, will ſpeedily ſee their inhabitants reduced to the laſt ſtage of miſery; while the army, which had ſo much difficulty to procure money while there was yet ſome in the country, will ſhortly be deprived of it altogether.

The military cheſt is always empty; and for a conſiderable period to come, we have not the moſt diſtant proſpect of receiving more than 2 or 300,000 livres a month, while the ordinary expenſes amount to more than 1,300,000 for the ſame ſpace of time †.

† This paragraph is ſo palpable a contradiction of the account delivered in by Bonaparte to the Legiſlative Commiſſions, and at the ſame

The natives of this country, notwithſtanding their frequent inſurrections, may be conſidered as a mild and tractable people; but they cannot be truſted; they are beſides very far from *loving* us, although they have been treated with more kindneſs than was ever yet ſhown to any conquered people * !!!

thing ſo conformable to the ſtatements of Kleber, Dugua, &c. that if the General be not incapable of ſhame, he muſt ſink with confuſion at the ſight of it.

It appears from the official papers, that he made thoſe Commiſſions grant a credit to the Miniſter of War of 12,000,000 livres for the army in Egypt, aſſuring them at the ſame time that this vote "would be no burden on the French finance, *as ample proviſion was already made out of the revenue of Egypt, to ſupply all their wants.*

In this manner did he render nugatory the only proſpect of relief held out to the troops whom he had abandoned, and this too, when he knew the depth of miſery into which he had plunged them, and which he increaſed to the utmoſt of his power by taking with him the laſt farthing of the military cheſt.

* Theſe *ungrateful* Egyptians muſt ſurely be the moſt perverſe mules that ever exiſted! To revolt againſt the French, who uſe them more kindly than any conquered people was ever uſed; who only "cut their heads off," to obtain their money, and "point their bayonets at their breaſts," to make them give up every thing elſe, argues a degree of ingratitude equal to the inſenſibility they all ſhow in not *loving* ſuch exquiſite benefactors! and of which Pouſſielgue ſo feelingly complains.

Seriouſly, what muſt be the treatment which they undergo, to force ſo mild a people to ſuch frequent revolts? and what muſt be the inhuman inſolence of the French, to give ſuch a name to thoſe natural expreſſions of indignation at the barbarous rapacity of their tyrants?

The difference of manners, that extremely important one of language, and, above all, their religion, form obſtacles of the moſt inſuperable nature to every thing like a ſincere affection.

They hate the government of the Mameloucs; they dread the yoke of Conſtantinople; but they will never be brought to endure ours but in the hope of ultimately ſhaking it off. The only favour they might be diſpoſed to grant, is, to allow us the preference of all the nations which THEY call Chriſtians *.

We have here, on every ſide of us, ten thouſand ſecret enemies to one open friend!

We had ſucceeded in maintaining a good intelligence with the Cherif of Mecca; and the letters which he wrote to Bonaparte and myſelf had quieted for an inſtant the conſciences of the Muſſulmen in this country: but we conjecture, from ſome ſpies which he has ſent to Cairo ſince the arrival of the Grand Vizier at Damaſcus, that he has changed his opinion, and, in conſequence of the inſinuations of the Engliſh, who have a force in the Red Sea, gone over to our enemies.

We had 41,000 effective men at our arrival in

* "THEY call," is well put in—for it is likely that the Egyptians have fallen into the ſame error as the poor Peruvians, who took Chriſtian to be ſynonimous with Spaniard.

Egypt. There were then only Mameloucs and Arabs to fight; and yet theſe conſtantly and excluſively occupied the whole attention of the army to the end of January.

At preſent the Mameloucs, though diſperſed, are notwithſtanding *almoſt all* in exiſtence; and may, whenever the attention of the army ſhall be otherwiſe occupied, reunite with the utmoſt promptitude: they have only loſt four or five inferior chiefs; the principal ones who remain are ſtill powerful, and have a conſiderable degree of intereſt.

The Arabs are not at all diminiſhed; they hate us as much as they did at our arrival; and their wandering kind of life renders us no objects of apprehenſion to them.

When we firſt landed, the Egyptians believed, AS WE TOLD THEM, that it was *with the conſent of the Grand Signior*, and they ſubmitted with more docility: at preſent they are perfectly convinced of the contrary. Thoſe who appear to be in our intereſt conceive themſelves authorized, BY OUR LIE, to betray us; they will certainly do it on the firſt occaſion*; and

* Can Pouſſielgue wonder that a people ſo groſsly deceived ſhould feel the wiſh of deceiving in their turn? He is too ſenſible a man not

their hearts were bounding with joy when the landing took place at Aboukir in Auguſt laſt.

But when to theſe numerous armies, in the midſt of whom we live, are added thoſe from without; when the Grand Vizier, with the principal officers of the Ottoman Court, is aſſembling all the forces of the Empire to attack us in different points at once, by land and ſea, aſſiſted too by England and Ruſſia; when he calls upon all the people of this country to riſe againſt us; and finally, when the few Arabs whom he had attached to us leave us to go over to him; it is not difficult to diſcover that our ſituation is deſperate!

The enemy loſes an army; he raiſes another inſtantly. He was beaten at Mount Tabor, two months after he was beaten at Aboukir; the ſame period is elapſed, and he is again ready to be beaten at Salahieh! But every victory carries off ſome of our beſt troops, *and their loſs cannot be repaired.* A DEFEAT WOULD ANNIHILATE US ALL TO THE LAST

to aſſure himſelf, if he reflects for a moment, that the ſyſtem of fraud begun by themſelves, will be propagated to all around them. Fidelity and attachment can never conſiſt with that inveterate ſyſtem of falſehood which has marked the commencement and progreſs of the whole conduct of France towards Egypt.

Non bene conveniunt, nec in unâ ſede morantur.

MAN; AND HOWEVER BRAVE THE ARMY MAY BE, IT CANNOT LONG AVERT THAT FATAL EVENT!

The war has deprived us of a number of excellent officers, such as General Caffarelli, General Dommartin, General Bon, General Rambault, and General Dupuis; it has also deprived us of almost the whole corps of Engineers †, and of a very considerable part of the Chiefs of Brigade, both of infantry and cavalry. Several able Generals have left us, and Bonaparte has taken five with him.

The army, without clothes, and, above all, without arms, and without stores of any kind, reduced to less than two thirds of its original numbers, has now no more than eleven thousand men capable of taking the field, although about thirteen or fourteen thousand appear under arms; this is owing to the appearance of a great number of soldiers at the roll-call, who

† This corroborates a striking passage in a letter of Lacuée, an officer of this corps, to his uncle. Intercepted Correspondence, Part II. p. 135.

The conclusion of this paragraph conveys a tacit reproach to Bonaparte for depriving an army so circumstanced, of its Generals. That he would take Berthier with him, there were strong reasons for believing; but it does not appear why four others should be selected to share the disgrace of his flight, unless it were to increase the difficulties of Kleber, and the despondency of the army.

preſer, ſick and wounded as they are, doing duty at their quarters to ſtaying in the hoſpitals or in the depôts. When they are wanted to march a little farther than uſual, or to fight, the force they have put upon themſelves inſtantly appears. Wounds, ophthalmies, dyſenteries, and other diſeaſes not leſs common here, have abſolutely diſabled the reſt of the army.

Even thoſe who are in a condition to march are exhauſted by fatigue, enfeebled by the climate, and the wounds and ſickneſſes which they have endured; and their courage is proportionably diminiſhed.

With this handful of men, we have to cover five hundred leagues of country; overawe three millions of inhabitants, who may be reckoned as ſo many enemies; and garriſon the holds and fortreſſes of Alexandria, Roſetta, Rahmanie, Gizeh, Beniſuef, Medine, Miniet, Siout, Girgé, Kené, Coſſeir, Cairo, Suez, Mitt Kanïar, Salahieh, El Ariſch, Bilbeis, Catieh, Damietta, Manſora, Semenoud, and El Benouf. Should the Grand Vizier attack us, we cannot oppoſe more than five or ſix thouſand men to all the Ottoman forces which will be at his diſpoſal; and ſhould he attack us in two places at once, he will penetrate into the country without a poſſibility on our ſide of preventing him; this would certainly have happened to General Bonaparte, if the Turks, while they were landing at Aboukir, had made the Syrian army advance upon Egypt!

In three months we ſhall be obliged to encounter, a ſecond time, that deſtructive malady the plague, which may make dreadful havoc amongſt us: this horrible proſpect diſmays the ſtouteſt hearts.

To put the finiſhing hand to our misfortunes, the Nile of this year has been extremely bad, having flowed off ſuddenly, and before the lands could be inundated in due ſucceſſion; we ſhall not be able to draw any contribution from the villages which have not received their water, and we are threatened with the moſt frightful miſery!

There is not a ſoldier, not an officer, not a general who does not moſt earneſtly long to return to France; perſuaded, as they all are, that they are ſacrificing here, without any advantage to their country, their healths, and their lives!

However, from the preſent ſituation of things in France, and conſidering that for more than fifteen months it has not been poſſible to ſend us any aſſiſtance, it is clear that we muſt forego the hope of having it in any time to do us ſervice, eſpecially as the favourable ſeaſon has now been ſuffered to paſs by.

The army ſaw with pleaſure General Kleber at their head after the departure of General Bonaparte; no one is more capable of inſpiring them with confidence and eſteem.

But he is full of honour, and of noble pride; and the more ſenſible he is of the difficulty of the taſk that left him, the more fearful he will be of liſtening to ſentiments imperiouſly dictated by circumſtances, and the immediate intereſt of the army, but which might ſome time hence be attributed, perhaps, to timidity.

Not having the ſame reſponſibility on me, I am not afraid, Citizen Directors, to lay before you the naked truth; and be aſſured that, however ſtrong the repreſentation I have juſt made, you would find it but feeble and imperfect, if the limits of a letter would allow me to enter into greater details.

Egypt is a very fine country; our dreadful ſituation in it is merely the effect of circumſtances. It proves only that we are arrived too ſoon, and that the time is not yet come for us to eſtabliſh ourſelves.

There is not a doubt but that if we were peaceable maſters of Egypt, we might in a few years entirely remove a great part of the evils which infeſt and deſolate it, ſuch as the plague and the Arabs; and give to agriculture and commerce a new activity, which ſhould reſtore this country to its ancient ſplendour. This would render it one of the fineſt colonies in the world, which would ſpeedily become the centre of univerſal commerce.

But Egypt is bounded by two ſeas (the Red Sea and the Mediterranean) and by deſerts.

It is neceſſary to have a powerful marine to be in a condition of approaching it at pleaſure; and above all, to be enabled to protect its commerce, and enſure all the advantages which it holds out.

The French Republic is at preſent without a navy; it will be yet a long time before it can have created one capable of contending with that of our enemies.

To pretend to preſerve Egypt without having any means of ſending thither, and of aſſuring the ſafety of our convoys of every kind, is merely to expoſe ourſelves to the hazard of being compelled to abandon it to Ruſſia or England, who, under the pretext of driving us from it, will eſtabliſh themſelves there, and very ſoon take effectual meaſures to exclude us from it for ever.

We might, indeed, ſtill maintain ourſelves there if we had the permiſſion of the Porte; but if it was not thought poſſible to obtain it before our invaſion, it muſt be ſtill leſs ſo now, when the Porte lies at the mercy of the Ruſſians and Engliſh: and even were ſhe, contrary to all appearances, diſpoſed, from political conſiderations, to ſuffer us to occupy Egypt proviſionally, the Engliſh would never be induced to permit it.

When the expedition to Egypt took place, we were at peace on the Continent; we had ſtill a conſiderable fragment of our naval force in the Mediterranean; and we were in poſſeſſion of the whole of Italy, Corfu, and Malta; a hope, too, might have been indulged that we ſhould obtain the conſent of the Porte, at leaſt tacitly; and thus we ſhould have gained the end we propoſed, againſt the Engliſh; for it is my opinion, with that of all the world, that our proper view was, by alarming them for the ſafety of their Indian poſſeſſions, to force them into a peace, advantageous for the Republic, by making the evacuation of Egypt an object of compenſation for the reſtitutions which we ſhould in that caſe have required!

BUT THE FATAL ENGAGEMENT OF ABOUKIR RUINED ALL OUR HOPES. It prevented us from receiving the remainder of the forces which were deſtined for us; it left the field free for the Engliſh to perſuade the Porte to declare war againſt us; it rekindled that which was hardly extinguiſhed with the Emperor of Germany; it opened the Mediterranean to the Ruſſians, and planted them on our frontiers; it occaſioned the loſs of Italy, and the invaluable poſſeſſions in the Adriatic, which we owed to the ſucceſsful campaigns of Bonaparte; and finally, it at once rendered abortive all our projects, ſince it was no longer poſſible for us to dream of giving the Engliſh any uneaſineſs in

India: add to this, that the people of Egypt whom we wiſhed to conſider as friends and allies, inſtantaneouſly became our enemies, and, entirely ſurrounded as we were by the Turks, we found ourſelves engaged in a moſt difficult defenſive war, without a glimpſe of the ſlighteſt future advantage to be derived from it *.

At preſent we can no longer flatter ourſelves that the Engliſh will be prevailed on to agree to an equivalent in the articles of peace, for the evacuation of

* This is a moſt magnificent deſcription of the immenſe advantages derived to the common cauſe of Europe, from the glorious victory of Lord Nelſon. It is the more honourable for this country, as it comes from the unſuſpected teſtimony of an enemy, who had nothing but truth and the real intereſts of France in view, when he drew it up. It differs a little, it muſt be confeſſed, from the ingenious ſtatement handed about by the friends of France in this country with ſuch prodigious applauſe, and which the reader may poſſibly have ſeen. In that, all the advantages were, *of courſe*, placed on the ſide of France, who was made debtor (for it was quite a matter of calculation) for eleven ſail of the line, *not too highly valued*; and creditor for the whole of Tuſcany and Naples; which, it appeared, left a balance of ſeven millions ſterling, *errors excepted*, in her favour! It is probable that ſhe never received them: but this detracts nothing from the good will of her friends, who, on looking wiſtfully acroſs the water, have often found cauſe to cry out with Helena,

———'tis pity
That *wiſhing well* had not a body in't
Which might be felt: that WE, *the poorer ſort*,
Whoſe *baſer* ſtars do ſhut us up in *wiſhes*,
Might with *effects of them* follow OUR FRIENDS—

Egypt. For, in the firſt place, they know perfectly well the degree of weakneſs and want to which we are reduced, and which renders it impoſſible to undertake any thing againſt them: and in the ſecond, that even if we ſhould receive ſuccours (which they will uſe every means in their power to prevent), we ſhould not, on that account, be a jot farther advanced while we have the Turks to contend with; and while they are aſſured that the Porte will not make peace without their conſent, or without ſtipulating that the preliminary article for terminating the war, ſhall be the evacuation of Egypt.

Under this point of view, our plan has totally failed; in as much as it can no longer affect the Engliſh; and thus, neither as a conqueſt nor a colony, can there be any farther pretence for keeping poſſeſſion of Egypt.

But there is yet another conſideration; it is, that if we delay entering into a treaty (ſuch is the ſtate of weakneſs to which we are already reduced), there is reaſon to fear that we ſhall be too late; that the remainder of the army will periſh, or that we ſhall be obliged to evacuate the country without any conditions at all; while, on the contrary, we have it at preſent in our power to make it the price of peace with the Ottoman Empire and the Barbary States, the ſtrengthening our old connexions with Conſtantinople, and reſuming in

the Levant that excluſive commerce which we once enjoyed.

This treaty, to which THE ENGLISH MUST BE ADMITTED AS A PARTY, will be a preparatory ſtep to that peace which it is, at length, more than time to conclude with them *. It will infallibly induce Ruſſia to declare war againſt the Porte, and cauſe a diverſion of the moſt important kind in our affairs in Europe; *we might even hope to regain by it what we have loſt in the Mediterranean.*

* This ADMISSION, which Pouſſielgue pronounces indiſpenſable, and on which he dwells with ſuch earneſtneſs towards the concluſion of his moſt admirable letter, ariſes wholly, or in great part, from the hopeleſs condition of the naval force of France.

Egypt, it is clear, muſt be ſpeedily evacuated, or not a man of the Army of the Eaſt will be left alive: it becomes therefore a conſideration of the next importance to preſerve as much of the ſad remains of it as poſſible; and this can only be done by the neutrality or friendſhip of the Engliſh. That another fugitive General (if another there be, baſe enough to ſneak away from his poſt like a midnight thief) may, as Bonaparte did, effect his eſcape, is far from being impoſſible; but the attempt is hazardous, and the ſhame (which even ſucceſs cannot leſſen) ſuch as a ſoldier of honour would rather die a thouſand deaths than encounter.

With a numerous fleet of tranſports, however, ſo foul and unprepared as thoſe in the ports of Alexandria, flight muſt be evidently hopeleſs, and indeed impracticable, even if there were not ſuch vigilant and gallant commanders to evade, or overcome, as NELSON, TROWBRIDGE, and BALL!

I have the greater confidence in this opinion, becauſe I am perſuaded that the Engliſh cannot ſee without ſome uneaſineſs, and without a ſecret kind of jealouſy, the progreſs of the Ruſſians — a progreſs much more dangerous for them than our continental power, now that our navy is deſtroyed, and that we have loſt our maritime conqueſts.

The only event which could poſſibly enable us to preſerve Egypt, would be an immediate war between Ruſſia and the Porte. All the Ottoman forces which are marching againſt us would inſtantly fly to protect the centre of the empire. In ſuch a caſe, the Grand Seignior would grant us peace on any terms we might think proper to aſk.

But it is probable, that without a treaty of alliance between the French Republic and Ruſſia, which might be uſeful to us at this moment, but which would certainly be impolitic, this laſt power will only wait till the Porte ſhall have made peace with us to declare war againſt her: for, by fighting againſt the Turks, we diminiſh his forces and his means. This is toiling for Ruſſia, who, on her ſide, unable to make war againſt the Porte without forcing her to conclude a peace with us, attains her purpoſe, which is the deſtruction of that power, juſt as effectually by making war on the French, whom ſhe knows to be her ſole ſtay and ſupport.

The Ottoman Empire is generally regarded as an old edifice, tottering to its fall. The European powers have long been preparing to divide its ſcattered fragments, and many politicians conceive that the cataſtrophe is cloſe at hand. In this ſuppoſition, they think it but right that France ſhould have her ſhare of the ſpoils; and the part allotted to her is Egypt.

If this fall of the Ottoman Empire (which is very far from being ſo certain, when we conſider the diſcuſſions and the variety of oppoſitions it would produce amongſt the great powers of Europe, even among thoſe who might have combined for this very object; when we conſider ſtill further, that it will be eternally the intereſt of France, England, Pruſſia, and even the Empire, to oppoſe it); if this fall, I ſay, ſhould after all take place, France will always be in time to have Egypt. Beſides, the French will be invited there by the Turks themſelves, whenever the latter find themſelves menaced by the Ruſſians, whom they mortally hate.

France is ſo fine a country; the French are ſo powerful by their numbers, their riches, and their ſituation with reſpect to the other continental powers, *that they cannot poſſibly gain any thing by a total overthrow of the ſyſtem of Europe*; while, at the ſame time, this overthrow may give birth to a new and preponde-

rating power, which ſhall deprive them of all their advantages in the Mediterranean.

Weighing all theſe circumſtances, Citizen Directors, I cannot but conclude that we are too diſtant, and that events operate too rapidly, to permit us to wait for your orders before we take our reſolution; at leaſt we cannot do ſo without compromiſing the intereſts of the Republic, the ſafety and the honour of the remains of the army:

That we muſt infallibly evacuate Egypt, eſtabliſhing, as the price of this ſacrifice, a peace, together with all our ancient connexions, with the Ottomans and the States of Barbary:

That all which you have now to hope for, whatever may be your views on Egypt, depends upon the preſent intentions of General Kleber, which are to retard the evacuation as long as poſſible by the delays which he will endeavour to introduce into the negotiation; if, after all, we are happy enough to be permitted to negotiate:

That finally, if the evacuation ſhould take place without waiting for your orders, it will only be, becauſe it was inevitable; and becauſe, in the ſtate of ignorance in which we all are, reſpecting the real

situation of France, and of Europe, this evacuation was imperiously called for by prudence, and was not inconsistent with our political interests.

Health and respect.

E. POUSSIELGUE.

No. XIII.

Au Kaire, le 22 Vendémiaire, an 8.

DUGUA, *Général de Diviſion, au Citoyen* BARRAS, *Directeur.*

Citoyen Directeur,

JE vous ai écrit pluſieurs lettres depuis l'arrivée de l'armée en Egypte. J'ignore ſi elles vous ſont parvenues. Bien peu de dépêches particulières ſont allées à leur deſtination. Je vous diſois dans les lettres que j'avois grande envie de retourner en France, mais cette envie étoit ſubordonnée au déſir d'y retourner d'une maniere flatteuſe, et non avec l'air d'avoir quitté l'armée, par impatience, par dégoût, par légéreté, ou par crainte, ſoit de la peſte, ſoit de nos nombreux ennemis Ruſſes, Anglois, Turcs, Arabes et Mamelucks, qui menacent l'Egypte ſur quatre ou cinq points différents, *Alexandrie, El Arich, la Mer Rouge et le Déſert.*

Je profite du retour de votre couſin, pour vous donner des détails ſur notre poſition, qui, peut-être, ne vous a pas été peinte telle qu'elle eſt. J'ai commandé les deux-tiers de l'Egypte pendant les expéditions de Syrie et d'Aboukir. Je connois ſes produits, ſes reſſources, la force des places que l'on appelle de

guerre, les chemins que l'on peut prendre pour les éviter, l'eſprit des habitans, l'état de l'armée, de nos arſenaux, de nos magazins et de nos finances. Je vais faire paſſer rapidement ſous vos yeux l'apperçu de tous ces objets, et vous jugerez s'il n'eſt pas inſtant que le Gouvernement vienne à notre ſécours.

Je ne vous dirai que peu de mots ſur le départ du Général Bonaparte: il n'a été communiqué qu'à ceux qui devoient en être; il a été précipité, l'armée eſt reſtée 13 jours ſans Général en Chef. Il n'y avoit pas un ſol dans les caiſſes, aucun ſervice n'étoit aſſuré, l'ennemi à peine parti d'Aboukir étoit encore devant Damiette, et le Grand-Viſir étoit déjà à Damas: telle a été notre poſition au Caire du 1 au 13 Fructidor.

Je vous avoue, Citoyen Directeur, que je ne pouvois pas croire que le Général Bonaparte nous eût abandonnés dans l'état où il nous a laiſſés; ſans argent, ſans poudre, ſans boulets, une partie des ſoldats ſans armes. Alexandrie eſt un grand camp retranché, à qui l'expédition de Syrie a enlevé une partie des bouches à feu qui lui étoient néceſſaires pour ſa défenſe. Liſbé, près Damiette, eſt à peine clos: une portion des murs d'El Arich ſont tombés d'eux-mêmes; des dettes énormes, plus du tiers de l'armée détruit par *la peſte, la diſſenterie, l'opthalmie*, et les combats; ce qui reſte eſt preſque nud, et l'ennemi eſt à huit journées de nous—telle choſe que l'on puiſſe vous dire à Paris, ce tableau n'eſt que trop vrai: vous me connoiſſez incapable d'en faire de faux.

Une grande armée ſe raſſemble en Syrie, des flottes dont nous ne connoiſſons pas les forces, menacent nos côtes, que nous ſavons être acceſſibles en beaucoup d'endroits.—Le Général en Chef ne peut réunir que 7000 combattans. L'ennemi peut former trois attaques à la fois; que feroient 7000 hommes diſſeminés?

Nous avons contre nous le fanatiſme Muſulman, qui ne peut pas être apprivoiſé, l'idée d'un gouvernement Chrétien eſt un ſupplice pour le peuple; les exemples les plus ſévères n'empêchent pas les villageois de ſe révolter au moindre bruit déſavantageux, ou au moindre firman répandu contre nous.

Cependant le pays eſt ſuperbe, la propriété peut en être utile, ſous bien des rapports, à la République.—On peut y cultiver les productions de toutes les parties de la terre.—Si ces avantages décident le Gouvernement à faire des efforts pour conſerver l'Egypte, il n'a pas un moment à perdre, il faut qu'il nous envoie, au plus vite, des hommes, des fuſils, du plomb, de la poudre, des boulets, &c.

Si le Gouvernement ne peut pas nous faire paſſer ces ſecours; s'il ne peut pas calmer la Cour Ottomane, et la rappeller à ſes véritables intérêts, ſi, enfin, nous ſommes ici abandonnés à nous-mêmes, forcés de continuer à nous battre un contre dix, de lutter contre les maladies les plus cruelles, le Gouvernment ne reverra de l'armée d'Egypte, que des aveugles et des

estropiés;—si les Turcs ont l'humanité de lui en renvoyer: tout le reste aura péri, épuisé par les fatigues et les victoires.

Je vous réitere l'assurance, Citoyen Directeur, que vous venez de lire la vérité la plus exacte. Mille raisons peuvent avoir empêché qu'elle ne vous ait été dévoilée toute entière. Je vous l'ai dite, parce que je crois ne pouvoir vous donner de preuve plus intime de mon sincère attachement; et parce que je dois les détails à l'armée d'Egypte, au Gouvernement, et à ma patrie.

Salut et respect.

DUCUA.

TRANSLATION.

LIBERTY. EQUALITY.

Cairo, October 13, 1799.

DUGUA *, *General of Division, to Citizen* BARRAS, *Director.*

Citizen Director,

I HAVE written ſeveral letters to you ſince the arrival of the army in Egypt; I know not if any of them have reached you; very few private letters have arrived at the place of their deſtination †.

* *Though laſt not leaſt.* If there be *yet* any doubts of the falſehood, incompetence, and unfeeling barbarity of Bonaparte, this excellent letter muſt effectually remove them. It is written by an officer high in command, confident of his knowledge, and appealing without heſitation to his eſtabliſhed character for the credit of facts which Bonaparte will now find it impoſſible to palliate or deny.

† This alludes to a circumſtance frequently hinted at in the courſe of this Correſpondence. A very general perſuaſion prevailed in the army, that the letters of individuals were examined by Bonaparte's orders; and, if found hoſtile to his views, kept back and deſtroyed.

I mentioned to you, in ſome of theſe letters, that I was exceedingly anxious to return to France; but this anxiety was ſubordinate to the deſire of returning there in a flattering manner, and not with an air of having quitted the army through diſguſt or ficklenеſs; or through fear, either of the plague, or of the numerous enemies, Ruſſians, Engliſh, Turks, Arabs, and Mameloucs, which threaten Egypt in four or five different points—Alexandria, El Ariſch, the Red Sea, and the Deſert.

I ſeize the opportunity of your couſin's return, to give you a few details reſpecting our actual ſituation, which, perhaps, has not yet been ſet before you in its true light. I had the command of two thirds of Egypt during the expeditions of Syria and Aboukir. I KNOW its produce, its reſources, the ſtrength of the

A ſuſpicion of this nature can neither be proved nor diſproved here; indeed it ſo happens, that it is of no conſequence either way, ſince the *belief* that he was capable of ſuch a crime does him as little honour as the actual commiſſion of it.

For the reſt, it is needleſs to call the reader's attention to ſlight remarks from the peruſal of this moſt important document. It contradicts the General's ſtatements in every point, and that with a boldneſs derived from ſuperior knowledge and truth: it arraigns the baſe and cowardly deſertion of his army in terms of ſtrong and manly indignation; and it ſpeaks of the ſufferings and deſpair of that deſerted army in a manner that, if there be one ſpark of feeling, one ſentiment of honour yet left in France, will produce a cry of univerſal indignation and horror, and drive the "IDOL OF A FORTNIGHT" from his imaginary throne.

places, *which ſome people call fortreſſes*, the roads by which they may be avoided, the diſpoſition of the inhabitants, the ſtate of the army, of the arſenals and the magazines, and the finances. I am about to preſent you with a rapid ſketch of all theſe various objects; and you will then be enabled to judge if it be not abſolutely indiſpenſable for Government to come to our immediate aſſiſtance.

I ſhall ſay but little to you on the departure of the General. It was only communicated to thoſe who were to accompany him. It was precipitated. The army was thirteen days without a Commander in Chief. There was not a ſous in any of the military cheſts; no part of the ſervice arranged; the enemy ſcarce retired from Aboukir was ſtill before Damietta. Such was our ſituation at Cairo from the 18th of Auguſt to the 30th.

I confeſs to you, Citizen Director, that I could never have believed General Bonaparte would have abandoned us in the condition in which we were; without money, without powder, without ball, and one part of the ſoldiers without arms. Alexandria is a vaſt intrenched camp, which the expedition into Syria has deprived of a conſiderable portion of the heavy artillery neceſſary for its defence. Leſbé, near Damietta, is ſcarcely walled in; part of the wall of El Ariſch is tumbling of itſelf. Debts to an enormous amount; more than a third of the army deſtroyed by the plague, the dyſentery, by ophthalmia, and

by the war; that which remains almoſt naked, and the enemy but eight days march from us! Whatever may be told you at Paris, this deſcription is but too true. You know me to be incapable of impoſing on you by a falſe one.

A numerous army is aſſembling in Syria; fleets, of which we know not the ſtrength, threaten our coaſts, which we know to be acceſſible in many places. The Commander in Chief cannot bring together more than 7000 fighting men; the enemy have it in their power to make three ſeparate attacks at the ſame time—what can 7000 men (and thoſe neceſſarily divided) hope to do?

We have againſt us the Muſſulman fanaticiſm, which cannot be ſoftened or diminiſhed; the idea of a Chriſtian government is a real torment for the people. The ſevereſt examples do not prevent the country people from riſing againſt us at the leaſt report to our diſadvantage, or at the moſt inſignificant *firman* diſperſed againſt us.

The country, however, is very fine; the poſſeſſion of it may be uſeful to the Republic in many points of view. The productions of every quarter of the globe may be raiſed here. If theſe advantages determine the Government to exert itſelf to preſerve Egypt, there is not a moment to loſe; men, arms, powder, lead, cannon-balls, &c. &c. muſt be ſent us without the ſmalleſt delay.

If the Government cannot ſuccour us, if it cannot appeaſe the Ottoman Court, and recall it to its true intereſts; if, in ſhort, we are abandoned here to ourſelves, compelled to continue fighting, one againſt ten, to ſtruggle with the moſt cruel maladies, all that France will ever ſee again of the "Army of Egypt," will be the maimed and the blind, if the Turks ſhould have the humanity to ſend them back. The reſt will periſh here, exhauſted by their fatigues and their victories!

I repeat my ſolemn aſſurances, Citizen Director, that what you have juſt read is the moſt exact truth. A thouſand reaſons may have prevented its being hitherto fairly laid before you. I have done it, becauſe I perſuade myſelf that I could not have given you a more convincing proof of my ſincere attachment; and becauſe I owe theſe details of the "Army of Egypt" to the Government and to my country.

Health and reſpect.

DUGUA.

No. XIV.

Au Quartier-Général du Caire, le 30 Thermidor, An 7.

BONAPARTE, *Général en Chef, au* GRAND-VIZIR, *Grand parmi les Grands, Eclairés et Sages, seul Dépositaire de la Confiance du plus Grand des Sultans.*

J'AI l'honneur d'écrire à Votre Excellence, par l'Effendi qui a été fait prisonnier à Aboukir et que je lui renvoie, pour lui faire connoître la véritable situation de l'Egypte, et entamer des négociations entre la Sublime Porte et la République Françoise, qui puissent mettre fin à la guerre qui se trouve exister pour le malheur et de l'un et l'autre état.

Par quelle fatalité la Porte et la France, amies de tous les temps, et dès lors par habitude, amies par l'éloignement de leurs frontières ; la France, ennemie de la Russie et de l'Empereur ; la Porte, ennemie de la Russie et de l'Empereur, sont-elles cependant en guerre ?

Comment Votre Excellence ne sentiroit-elle pas, qu'il n'y a pas un François de tué, qui ne soit un appui de moins pour la Porte ?

Comment Votre Excellence, si éclairée dans la connoissance de la politique et des intérêts des divers Etats, pourroit-elle ignorer que la Russie et l'Empereur d'Allemagne se sont plusieurs fois entendus pour le partage de la Turquie, et que ce n'a été que l'intervention de la France, qui l'a empêché ?

Votre Excellence n'ignore pas que le vrai ennemi de l'Islamisme est la Russie. L'Empereur Paul III † s'est fait Grand-Maître de Malte, c'est-à-dire, a fait vœu de faire la guerre aux Musulmans. N'est-ce pas lui qui est le chef de la religion Grecque, c'est-à-dire, des plus nombreux ennemis qu'ait l'Islamisme ?

La France, au contraire, a détruit les Chevaliers de Malte, rompu les chaînes des Turcs qui étoient détenus en esclavage, et croit, *comme l'ordonne l'Islamisme*, qu'*il n'y a qu'un seul Dieu.*

Ainsi donc la Sublime Porte a déclaré la guerre à ses véritables amis, et s'est alliée à ses véritables ennemis.

Ainsi donc la Sublime Porte qui a été l'amie de la France tant que cette Puissance A ÉTÉ CHRÉTIENNE, lui a fait la guerre dès l'instant que la France par sa religion S'EST RAPPROCHÉE DE LA CROYANCE MUSULMANE.

† Sic Orig.

La Russie et l'Angleterre ont trompé la Sublime Porte. Ils ont intercepté nos courriers, par lesquels nous lui faisions part de l'expédition d'Egypte, et l'ont représentée comme le commencement de l'envahissement de l'Empire Musulman. Comme si je n'avois pas toujours déclaré que l'intention de la République Françoise étoit de détruire les Mamelouks, et non de faire la guerre à la Sublime Porte ; étoit de nuire aux Anglois et non à son grand et fidèle allié l'Empereur Sélim.

La conduite que j'ai tenue envers tous les gens de la Porte qui étoient en Egypte, envers les bâtimens du Grand-Seigneur, envers les bâtimens de commerce portant pavillon Ottoman, n'est-elle pas un sûr garant des intentions pacifiques de la République Françoise ?

La Sublime Porte a déclaré la guerre dans le mois de Janvier à la République Françoise avec une précipitation inouïe ; sans attendre l'arrivée de l'Ambassadeur Descorches, qui étoit déjà parti de Paris pour se rendre à Constantinople ; sans me demander aucune explication, ni répondre à aucunes des avances que j'ai faites.

J'ai cependant espéré, quoique la déclaration de guerre me fût parfaitement connue, pouvoir la faire revenir, et j'ai à cet effet envoyé le Citoyen Beauchamp, Consul de la République, sur la caravelle ; pour toute réponse on l'a emprisonné ; pour toute réponse on a créé des armées, on les a réunies à Gaza, et on leur a ordonné d'envahir l'Egypte.—Je me suis trouvé alors obligé de

passer le Désert, préférant de faire la guerre en Syrie, à ce que l'on me la fît en Egypte.

Mon armée est forte, parfaitement disciplinée et *approvisionnée de tout* ce qui peut la rendre victorieuse des armées, fussent-elles aussi nombreuses que les sables de la mer. Des citadelles et des places fortes hérissées de canons, se sont élevées sur les côtes et sur les frontières du Désert. Je ne crains donc rien, et je suis ici invincible. Mais je dois à l'humanité, à la vraie politique, au plus ancien comme au plus vrai des alliés, l'Empereur Sélim, la démarche que je fais.

Ce que la Sublime Porte n'atteindra jamais par la force des armes, elle peut l'obtenir par une négociation. J'abattrai toutes les armées lorsqu'elles projetteront l'envahissement de l'Egypte, mais je répondrai d'une manière conciliante à toutes les ouvertures de négociation qui me seroient faites. La République Françoise, dès l'instant que la Sublime Porte ne fera plus cause commune avec nos ennemis, la Russie et l'Empereur, fera tout ce qui sera en elle pour rétablir la bonne intelligence et lever tout ce qui pourroit être un sujet de désunion entre les deux Etats.

Cessez donc des armemens dispendieux et inutiles. Vos ennemis ne sont pas en Egypte, ils sont sur le Bosphore, ils sont à Corfou, ils sont aujourd'hui, par votre extrême imprudence, au milieu de l'Archipel.

Radoubez et réarmez vos vaisseaux, reformez vos équipages d'artillerie, tenez-vous prêts à déployer bien-

tôt l'étendard du Prophète, non contre la France, mais contre les Russes et les Allemands, qui rient de la guerre insensée que nous nous faisons, et qui lorsqu'ils vous auront affoiblis, lèveront la tête et déclareront bien haut la prétention qu'ils font déjà.

Vous voulez l'Egypte, dit-on, *mais l'intention de la France n'a jamais été de vous l'ôter.*

Chargez votre Ministre à Paris de vos pleins pouvoirs, ou envoyez quelqu'un chargé de vos intentions et de vos pleins pouvoirs en Egypte. On peut en deux heures d'entretien tout arranger. C'est le seul moyen de rasseoir l'Empire Musulman, en lui donnant la force contre ses véritables ennemis, et de déjouer leur projet perfide et qui malheureusement leur a si fort réussi.

Dites un mot, nous fermerons la Mer Noire à la Russie, et nous cesserons d'être le jouet de cette puissance ennemie que nous avons tant de sujets de haïr, et je ferai tout ce qui pourra vous convenir.

Ce n'est pas contre les Musulmans que les armées Françoises auroient à déployer et leur tactique et leur courage, mais c'est au contraire réunies à des Musulmans qu'elles doivent un jour, comme cela a été de tout temps, chasser leur ennemi commun.

Je crois en avoir assez dit par cette lettre à Votre Excellence. Elle peut faire venir auprès d'elle le citoyen Beauchamp, que l'on m'assure être détenu

dans la Mer Noire. Elle peut prendre tout autre moyen pour me faire connoître ses intentions.

Quant à moi, je tiendrai pour le plus beau jour de ma vie, celui où je pourrai contribuer à faire terminer une guerre *à la fois impolitique et sans objet.*

Je prie Votre Excellence de croire à l'estime et à la considération distinguée que j'ai pour elle.

(Signé) BONAPARTE.

Pour copie conforme à l'original.

KLÉBER.

No. XV.

**Traduction d'une lettre de* BONAPARTE, *en date du 4 . . . 1214.*

A Son Excellence le Suprême Vizir, Vicaire Absolu du Grand des Grands, du Judicieux & Intelligent, & du plus Grand de tous les Monarques, l'Empereur des Ottomans.

L'OBJET de la présente lettre, adressée à V. E. et expédiée par le canal de l'Effendi fait prisonnier à Aboukir, est de lui faire un fidèle exposé de l'état des choses en Arabie, et en terminant la guerre qui a eu lieu entre la Sublime Porte et la République Françoise, donner la paix à ces deux puissances. Hélas! pourquoi, amies depuis tant d'années, se trouvent-elles à présent en guerre! Est-ce pour l'éloignement et la distance de leurs limites, qu'elles se battent? Est-ce parce que les Cours d'Allemagne et de Russie confinent avec la Sublime Porte, qu'elles se sont unis à elle? V. E. ne peut ignorer que la nation Françoise est sans exception très-attachée à la Sublime Porte. Etant douée des qualités les plus éminentes et instruite des véritables intérêts des Cours, est-il possible que V. E. ne sache pas que les

* Cette traduction est celle qui a été faite par ordre de la Sublime Porte.

Russes et les Autrichiens ont conspiré une fois pour toutes contre la Sublime Porte, et que les François au contraire font leur possible pour s'opposer à leurs méchans projets? V. E. sait que les Russes sont les ennemis de la religion Musulmane, & que Paul Troisième, Empereur de Russie, comme Grand-Maître de Malte, c'est-à-dire premier Chevalier, a solennellement juré l'inimitié aux Musulmans. Les François ont aboli l'ordre de Malte, donné la liberté aux prisonniers Mahométans qui s'y trouvoient détenus, et ILS CROIENT COMME EUX, en disant *il n'y a de Dieu que le vrai Dieu.* Il est donc bien étrange que la Sublime Porte déclare la guerre aux François, ses véritables et sincères amis, et contracte des alliances avec les Russes et les Allemands, ses ennemis décidés. Quand les François étoient nécessairement de la secte du Messie, ils étoient les amis de la Sublime Porte, à peine se sont-ils RAPPROCHÉS PAR LA RELIGION, elle leur déclare la guerre. Les Cours d'Angleterre et de Russie ont induit en erreur la Sublime Porte, que nous avions informée par nos lettres de l'expédition de nos troupes en Arabie. Ces Cours ont trouvé le moyen d'intercepter et cacher nos papiers; & comme si je n'avois pas manifesté à la Sublime Porte, que la République Françoise, loin de lui faire perdre des domaines, n'avoit pas la moindre intention de lui faire la guerre, Sa Majesté, le très-glorieux Sultan Sélim, a cru aux Anglois, & a eu de l'aversion pour les François ses anciens amis. Est-ce que les bons traitemens qui j'ai pratiqué envers les vaisseaux de guerre et marchands appartenans à la Sublime Porte qui se trouvoient alors dans les ports de l'Arabie ne sont pas une preuve suffisante de l'extrême désir et de l'amour de la République

Françoise pour la paix et l'amitié? La Sublime Porte, sans attendre l'arrivée du Ministre François Descorches, parti de France pour se rendre à Constantinople, et sans demander sur quoi étoient fondés mes mouvemens et ma conduite, a déclaré la guerre aux François avec l'empressement le plus grand. Nonobstant que j'étois informé de cette guerre, j'ai fait partir sur la caravelle le Consul de la République Beauchamp, dans la sûreté de la terminer, et tandis que j'attendois des réponses de la Sublime Porte par son canal, il a été mis en prison, et des troupes Musulmanes ont été expédiées à Gaza avec ordre de s'emparer de l'Arabie. Alors j'ai jugé convenable de faire la guerre plutôt de ce côté-ci, que dans le territoire de l'Egypte, et j'ai été obligé, malgré moi, de traverser le désert. Quoique mon armée soit aussi nombreuse que le sable de la mer, pleine de valeur, aguerrie au dernier point, et victorieuse; quoiqu'elle soit complètement pourvue de tout ce qu'elle pourroit avoir besoin, que j'aie des châteaux & des forteresses les plus sûres, et que le centre et les limites du désert soient fortifiés par des bouches à feu; quoique je n'aie aucune crainte ni appréhension, que je n'aie à me garder de rien, et qu'il soit impossible que je sois vaincu: néanmoins par commisération du genre humain, et en égard à ces procédés louables, honorés par les nations, surtout pour nous rapprocher du premier et du plus véritable de nos alliés, Sa Majesté le très-glorieux Sultan Selim notre allié, je manifeste ici mes dispositions à la paix. Il est sûr que la Sublime Porte ne réalisera pas ses espérances par la force des armes, et que c'est par une conduite pacifique qu'elle peut faire son bonheur. Autant de troupes qui viendront contre le Caire, je peux les re-

pousser toutes, et malgré cela je faciliterai toutes les propositions qui me seront faites tendant à la paix. Aussitôt que la Sublime Porte se détachera des Russes et des Anglois nos ennemis, il n'y a pas de doute que la République Françoise renouvellera et rétablira autant que possible les bases de la paix et de l'amitié avec la Sublime Porte. Il vaut mieux cesser de s'efforcer à former des armées, et à amasser des munitions de guerre, inutilement. Votre ennemi n'est pas dans l'Arabie. Il est dans la Bulgarie, à Corfou, et par votre mauvaise politique, au milieu de la Mer Blanche. Augmentez le nombre de vos vaisseaux, mettez-les en bon ordre, et formez des canonniers. Que la sacrée bannière du Prophète ne soit pas portée sur les François ; mais préparez-vous à vous en servir contre les Russes et les Allemands, qui après avoir souri à la rupture qui a eu lieu inconsidérément & imprudemment entre nous, lèvent bien haut leurs têtes, & d'un cri fort & perçant vous font les propositions les plus onéreuses. Si vous voulez l'Egypte, dites-le ; la France n'a jamais prétendu la prendre des mains de la Sublime Porte, & la dévorer. Donnez des pouvoirs à votre Ministre qui est à Paris, ou envoyez quelqu'un en Egypte avec des pleins pouvoirs illimités, et tout sera arrangé sans amertume et à désir. Mettez-vous sur le chemin qui vous fera tirer vengeance de nos ennemis. Travaillez à consolider et à raffermir les fondemens de l'Empire Ottoman. Employez tout votre pouvoir à éloigner les propositions qui vous viennent faites par vos ennemis, ainsi qu'à détourner les terribles projets qu'ils pourroient par malheur faire exécuter dans ces momens. Ayant eu par le passé tant de motifs d'abhorrer les Russes, convient-il de leur faire aban-

donner la Mer Noire, et de ne pas se venger d'eux ? Dites un seul mot pour cela, & je travaillerai pour votre avantage. L'armée Françoise, loin de prétendre à montrer aux Ottomans qu'elle est disciplinée et valeureuse, désire s'unir à eux pour punir leurs ennemis. Que V. E., que j'ai importunée par cette lettre, fasse venir le François Beauchamp qui se trouve à la Mer Noire, et j'espère qu'après l'avoir interrogé, la mauvaise opinion qu'elle a de moi sera changée à mon avantage. S'il dépendoit de moi, le jour que je pourrois éteindre le feu d'une guerre aussi absurde que messéante, ce jour seroit réputé et compté par moi, comme le plus heureux de ma vie.

TRANSLATION

Of a Letter from BONAPARTE *to the* GRAND VIZIER, *dated* 4 . . . . , 1214 *(Mahometan Era)*,

TO HIS EXCELLENCY THE SUPREME VIZIER, ABSOLUTE VICAR OF THE GREATEST OF THE GREAT, OF THE JUDICIOUS AND INTELLIGENT, AND OF THE GREATEST OF ALL THE MONARCHS OF THE EARTH, THE EMPEROR OF THE OTTOMANS *.

THE object of the present letter, addressed to Your Excellency, and transmitted by the hands of the Ef-

* There are two copies of this curious State Paper. The one, faithfully translated from the Arabic by the Turkish Go-

fendi made prisoner at Aboukir, is to furnish you with a faithful view of the state of things in Arabia; and, by putting an end to the war which has taken place between the Sublime Porte and the French Republic, to give peace to those two powers.

Alas! why, after having been friends for so many years, do they now find themselves at war? Is it because the boundaries of the two States are so distant from each other that they fight? Is it because the Courts of Germany and Russia border on the territories of the Sublime Porte that they have united themselves with it?

Your Excellency cannot be ignorant that the French Nation, without exception, is extremely attached to the Sublime Porte. Endowed as Your Excellency is with

vernment, and transmitted from Constantinople; the other, loosely, but elegantly rendered from the same original by the French, and found amongst the Intercepted Papers.

Both are here given; but the first only is translated, as being infinitely more to be relied on than that so elaborately framed at Cairo, and expressly calculated for the meridian of Paris. The general tenor, however, of both is the same: an incidental variation or two will be noticed.

To remark upon the particular points of this paper would be endless. Whoever sits down to peruse it must prepare himself for all that ignorance, blasphemy, meanness and hypocrisy—all that misrepresentation, defeating its own purpose, and falsehood, so gross as to be felt, can suggest to a contracted and restless mind, incapable of directing any scheme of policy, yet presumptuously venturing upon all.

the most distinguished talents, and acquainted with the real interests of Courts, can it have escaped you that the Russians and Austrians have conspired, once for all, against the Sublime Porte, and that the French, on the contrary, are using every possible effort to counteract their wicked designs? Your Excellency knows that the Russians are the enemies of the Mussulman Faith, and that Paul the Third*, Emperor of Russia, as Grand Master of Malta, that is to say, Chief Knight, has solemnly sworn enmity to the Mussulmen. The French have abolished the Order of Malta, given liberty to the Mahometan Prisoners detained there, and have the same belief as themselves, that "*There is no "God but the true God*†." It is then very strange that the Sublime Porte should declare war on the French, its real and sincere friends; and contract alliances with the Russians and Germans, its declared enemies!

* This Paul the *Third* is an Emperor of Bonaparte's own creation. Since the French laid aside the Red Book, they have fallen into strange errors! One of their profound Legislators lately exclaimed, amidst the shouts of the admiring Senate: "What! Francis the *First* dare to brave the anger of the "*Great Nation!* Well, he shall be Francis the Last!!!"

But how must the Grand Vizier (acquainted, as Bonaparte says he is, with the interest of Courts, and who must be supposed to be so, in some degree, whether he had said it or no) how must he have smiled, with mingled pity and contempt, at the sottish stupidity, the whining and hypocritical cant of the person to whom the interests of a powerful nation were entrusted!

† A sentence taken from the Coran. In the original it is properly marked as a quotation.

When the French were necessarily of the sect of the Messiah, they were the friends of the Sublime Porte; now, that they are, as it were, united by the same religion, that Power declares war against them!!* The Courts of England and Russia have led the Sublime Porte into an error. We had *informed* it by letters of our intended expedition into Arabia; but those Courts found means to intercept and conceal our papers †; and, as if I had not proved to the Sublime Porte that the French Republic, far from wishing to deprive it of its domains, had not even the smallest intention of making war on it; His Most Glorious Majesty, Sultan Selim, gave credit to the English, and conceived an aversion for the French, his ancient friends. Is not the kind treatment which the ships of war and merchantmen belonging to the Sublime Porte, in the different ports of Arabia, experienced at my hands, a sufficient proof of the extreme desire, and love of the French Republic, for peace and amity? The Sublime Porte, without waiting

* This precious sentiment is thus expressed in the intercepted translation: "So then, the Sublime Porte, which was the "friend of France while she was a Christian Nation, has de-"clared war against her, the instant she adopted, as it were, "the Mussulman Faith!"

† This assertion is *positively* contradicted by Kléber: who labours to excuse the French Government to the Porte, for the omission of this *information*, by alleging the necessity of secresy as to the object of the armament.

Kléber had Bonaparte's letter before him when he introduced this remarkable deviation from it. What must have been that general's opinion—what must now be the opinion of the world, of its veracity.

for the arrival of the French Minister Descorches, who had already left France for Constantinople, and, without inquiring what were the motives for my conduct, declared war against the French, with the most unaccountable precipitation.‡ Although I was informed of this war, I dispatched Beauchamp, Consul of the Republic in the Caravel, in full confidence of terminating it; and while I was expecting the answer of the Sublime Porte, by the same conveyance, I found that he had been thrown into prison, and Turkish troops dispatched to Gaza, with orders to take possession of Arabia.

Upon this I thought it more advisable to make war there than in the territory of Egypt; and I was obliged, in spite of myself, to cross the Desart.

Although my army is as innumerable as the sands of the sea,† full of courage, inured to war in the highest degree, and victorious; although it is completely provided with every thing of which it can stand,

† The drudgery of remarking on this effusion of folly and wickedness is inconceivable. In consequence of the just indignation of the Porte at the invasion of Egypt, Descorches was dispatched to inform it of the *amicable* intentions of France in this act of unprovoked hostility. Yet Bonaparte has the stupid insolence to make the crime of the Porte to be, the not waiting for Descorches' arrival!!!

† It is but just to observe, that there is a considerable variation in the sense of the corresponding passages in this and the intercepted copy. That says—"My army is strong, perfecti-

in need; though I have castles and fortresses of prodigious strength, and though the center, and the extremities of the Desart are fortified by batteries of cannon; although I have no fear nor apprehension of any kind, though I have no precautions to take, and that it is impossible for me to be overcome;—nevertheless, out of commisseration for the human race, respect for those honourable ways of proceeding which are respected by all nations, and, above all, out of a desire

disciplined, and amply provided with every thing that can render it victorious over your armies, though *they* be as innumerable as the sands of the sea." Whether this qui-pro-quo arises from the imperfect wording of the Arabic, or from an idea in Bonaparte, that the original rhodomontade was too extravagant for France, cannot be told. The Turks could have no temptation to exaggerate the absurdity of this matchless production. Enough remained, though this boast had been withdrawn, to provoke the bitter smile of the Ottoman Court. But what must have been the sensations of the Grand-Vizier, when he heard Bonaparte vaunt of the *ample manner* in which his army was supplied, when (as it appears from Kléber) he well knew it to be perishing with want; or of his being *invincible*, when the whole of his (the Vizier's) long march, from Damascus to Gaza, had been over the mangled carcases of the French, whom the General had left to the hyænas of Syria, in his hasty and disgraceful flight.

With this observation this letter is left to the scorn of the world.

The English reader, when he compares it with BONAPARTE's parting instructions to KLÉBER, will not fail to be struck with the SINCERITY of an overture, which is not to followed up *at all* except 1500 Frenchmen shall have died of the plague, and which, *in that case*, is to be followed up only by a negociation PURELY TO GAIN TIME.

to be re-united with the first and truest of our allies, His Most Glorious Majesty Sultan Selim, I now make manifest my disposition for peace. It is certain that the Sublime Porte can never realize its wishes by force of arms, and that its happiness can only be effectual by a pacific conduct. Whatever armies may march against Cairo, I can repulse them all.—And *yet* I will facilitate, as much as possible, every proposition which shall be made me tending to peace. The instant the Sublime Porte shall have detached itself from our enemies, the Russians and English;—there cannot be a doubt but that the French Republic will renew and re-establish, in the completest manner, the bases of peace and friendship with the Sublime Porte.

It will be better for you to cease your exertions in forming armies, and amassing provisions and warlike stores to no purpose. Your enemy is not in Arabia. He is in Bulgaria, at Corfou, and, by your mistaken policy, in the heart of the Mediterranean. Augment the number of your ships, put them in good order, and form a corps of able cannoniers. Let not the sacred banner of the Prophet be displayed against the French, but prepare yourselves to make use of it against the Germans and Russians, who, after smiling at the rupture, which has so inconsiderately and imprudently taken place between us, will suddenly raise their heads, and, with a loud and piercing cry, offer you the most burthensome propositions.

If you wish to have Egypt—tell me so. France has never entertained an idea of taking it out of the

hands of the Sublime Porte, and swallowing it up. Give authority to your Minister who is at Paris, or send some one to Egypt, with full and unlimited powers, and all shall be arranged without animosity, and to your wish.

Enter upon the way that will enable you to take vengeance of your enemies. Labour to consolidate and strengthen the foundations of the Ottoman Empire. Employ all your influence to prevent the acceptance of the propositions which will be made to you by your enemies, as well as to turn aside the terrible and destructive projects which they may unhappily have set on foot at this moment. Having had, during the past, so many motives to abhor the Russians, is it wise to abandon the Black Sea to them, and not rather to exact vengeance? Say but a single word on this last head, and I will exert myself for your advantage. The French army is by no means desirous of convincing the Ottoman forces of its discipline and courage; it would rather unite with them to punish their common enemy.

If Your Excellency, to whom I have addressed my wishes in this letter, will send for M. Beauchamp, who is on the Black Sea, and question him on the subject, I am persuaded you will abandon the unfavourable opinion you now have of me. If it depended on my exertions, the day on which I should be able to extinguish the flames of a war so absurd and so unbecoming both parties would be reckoned by me as the most happy of my life.

BONAPARTE.

No. XVI.*

Traduction d'une Lettre du Général KLEBER, *en date du 16 Rebiul-Akhir, 1214 (17 Septembre, 1799.)*

LE Général Kléber, dans sa lettre datée du 16 de Rebiul-Akhir, expose à V. E. que, dans la probabilité que la lettre de Bonaparte, adressée et expédiée trente jours auparavant à V. E. par le canal de son serviteur, Mahommed Rechdi, n'ait été interceptée par les bâtimens qui croisent dans la Mer Blanche, il a cru convenable de lui en envoyer la copie, espérant que le sens de cette lettre sera conforme aux sentimens de V. E.; que, pour ceux qui connoissent les vrais intérêts des deux puissances, la paix est ce qu'il y a de plus salutaire et de plus avantageux pour leurs Etats et sujets; que les François ont mis pied en Egypte, uniquement pour donner de l'appréhension aux Anglois, ébranler leurs pos-

* It has not been thought necessary to translate this letter The English reader may be assured he has nothing to regret.. It is a mere recapitulation of that which he has just read from Bonaparte, with the exception only of its boasting, and the single variation noticed in the notes to No. XII. Kléber seems to have felt a just indignation at the task imposed on him by Bonaparte, and a dryness runs through his letter, which shews how little his heart and his hand went together.

† Traduction faite par ordre de la Sublime Porte.

sessions et leur commerce dans l'Inde, & les forcer à la paix; que l'intention des François étoit de tirer vengeance des Mamelouks, de délivrer le Caire de leurs oppressions, et de le rendre à la Sublime Porte; que les François, ayant dépouillé les Mamelouks de toutes leurs propriétés, outre qu'ils n'ont pas touché à celles des personnes, appartenantes à la Sublime Porte, chacune d'elles étoit restée comme auparavant; que les *odgahlits*, les militaires et leurs juges, confirmés dans leurs services et emplois, exerçoient la loi du Prophète, et que le gouvernement et l'administration du pays a été laissée aux chefs et ulemars de l'Egypte; que la charge d'inspecteur des pèlerins avoit été confiée au *Kyahyn* du *Pacha*, et que si le départ et le retour des pèlerins ne se faisoit pas dans le temps fixé, c'étoit à cause de l'inexactitude et de la négligence de cet Agha; que les François s'étoient rendue commune la religion Mahométane, et l'honoroient en toutes les manières; que nonobstant que la Sublime Porte leur ait déclaré la guerre, ils n'avoient pas renoncé à leur attachement et à leur amitié envers elle, et, forcés à combattre à Aboukir et dans l'Arabie, bongré malgré, quoique vainqueurs, leur attachement, leur estime, et leur bonne disposition envers la Sublime Porte, n'ayant fait qu'accroître, ils désirent la fin de cette guerre; qu'ils étoient dans l'incertitude si l'affaire de leur expédition en Egypte avoit été opérée en informant la Sublime Porte, et avec sa permission: mais si c'étoit sans la prévenir, de telle manière que cela soit, cette expédition étant dirigée contre les Anglois, il a fallu envoyer l'armée en Egypte avec autant de promptitude que de secret; qu'en considérant l'amitié que la Sublime Porte avoit

toujours professé envers les François, l'expédition de leurs troupes en Egypte ne pouvoit être que pour son avantage; que dans la confiance d'apaiser la Sublime Porte, ils espèrent que *leurs excuses*, dans cette affaire, *seront agréées*; que le Gén. Bonaparte n'ayant pu faire part à la Sublime Porte de la vérité du fait, après le malheureux combat naval d'Aboukir, les ennemis communs, en prenant de la supériorité sur les Ottomans et les François, s'en sont réjouis; ils ont fait entendre ce qu'ils vouloient, ils se sont donnés de la gloire auprès de la Sublime Porte, et ils ont donné des preuves de leur *extension** contre les François, ils ont fait taire la Sublime Porte, et ils ont ainsi attisé avec facilité le feu de la malice et de l'astuce; que si la Sublime Porte en avoit prévenu les François en lui dessillant les yeux, ils n'auroient pas manqué de lui indiquer le parti le plus avantageux à prendre; que l'affaire de la paix étoit propre à augmenter la renommée et la gloire de Votre Excellence, et qu'elle seroit comme un des plus grands services à rendre à la Sublime Porte; que la nation Françoise est une nation qui ne craint pas le fer et le feu, et la guerre qu'elle a faite depuis dix années consécutives, en offre la preuve: cependant, devant la faire contre la Sublime Porte, c'étoit pour eux comme s'ils la faisoient à leur propre gouvernement, et voyant par là diminuer et affoiblir des forces qu'ils devroient employer, unis à la Sublime Porte, contre l'ennemi commun, leurs victoires actuelles étoient pour eux un sujet de peine et d'affliction; que le don de cette paix est facile, vu qu'entre les deux puissances il n'y avoit aucune affaire obscure et douteuse à débrouil-

* *Sic Orig.*

ler, et la restitution du Caire, étant ce qu'on leur demandoit, ils ne s'y opposoient pas, ayant déjà réussi d'en expulser les Mamelouks ; que dans la conviction qu'il faut s'allier à ses ennemis quand ils sont puissans, la Sublime Porte s'est unie à ses ennemis, mais il est probable qu'à la première occasion ils se déclareront contre elle, et il faut s'en prémunir et bien garder ; qu'il est, par conséquent, très-utile et nécessaire de conclure la paix un moment plutôt, comme très-messéant d'épuiser inutilement ses trésors et ses troupes ; en un mot, que la guerre qui a eu lieu entre la Sublime Porte et les François n'étant d'aucun profit, l'affaire de la paix étoit à préférer, et le parti le plus solide à prendre ; que Votre Excellence voulant bien leur envoyer une personne de confiance, en toutes les manières, il ne sera aucunement manqué à son égard; qu'ainsi on s'entendroit bientôt avec facilité, et que, pour effectuer l'affaire très-convenable et nécessaire de cette paix, Bonaparte étoit parti de l'Egypte, ayant laissé à sa place le Général KLÉBER, qui désire également de la voir terminée.

THE END.

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